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FOREWORD 
he European Union has in recent years developed ‘Strategic 
Partnerships’ with ten global powers, including Brazil. At the same 
time Brazil has become an active member of the BRICS and other 
groups bringing together countries of the ‘global south’. These 
developments pose the crucial question, whether the Brazil and the EU can 
use their strategic partnership not only to deepen their bilateral relations 
but also to work out positions that bridge the gaps between the ‘West’ and 
the ‘rest’ in global affairs.  
The present book is the result of a project to test this question. The 
project was organised through ‘twinning’ five sets of Brazilian and 
European researchers to investigate five themes of undoubted strategic 
significance, and this explains the structure of the book.  
The project began with a mission in May 2102 by several of the 
Europeans from CEPS and FRIDE to Brazil, which served both to link up 
with the Brazilian researchers from the Getulio Vargas Foundation, the 
University of Brasilia and the University of Rio de Janeiro, and to enter into 
the subject matter, with seminars hosted by Brazilian think tanks and 
meetings in Brasilia with officials.  
The resulting papers were presented at conferences at CEPS in 
Brussels on 4-5 March 2013, and at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in 
Lisbon on March 7.  
The project was funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 
Lisbon, to whom we are greatly indebted.  
 
 
Michael Emerson Renato Flores 
CEPS, Brussels Getulio Vargas Foundation, 
  Rio de Janeiro 
T
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY …. FROM THE 
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TO THE GLOBAL  
his report examines the Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership, which is a 
thoroughly institutionalised diplomatic process, covering a vast 
landscape of political and economic issues. However, many 
observers consider that the Partnership is lacking in truly strategic focus 
and operational impact. 
We have therefore chosen to examine in some depth five topics of 
undoubted strategic significance: i) global macroeconomics, ii) trade policy, 
iii) climate change, iv) foreign and security policy norms, and v) continental 
regionalism.  
By way of conclusion, we would like to see the two parties concentrate on 
two issues of outstanding strategic importance for the Brazil-EU 
relationship:  
i) The bilateral or regional economic relationship  
Given that both the Doha Round and the EU-Mercosur negotiations seem 
to be at an impasse, and that freer and deeper trade between the two 
parties could be mutually beneficial, there is an unsettled question here on 
how to proceed. For Brazil the Mercosur regional organisation is too 
important – both politically and economically – to be abandoned, 
notwithstanding its present limitations. On the other hand, the Brazil-EU 
relationship is too important to be held hostage to an impasse with 
Mercosur.  
We have therefore considered a number of options. We are unhappy 
with the negative scenario, according to which the EU-Mercosur 
negotiations fail again and are suspended again. The EU has said that it 
would like an “ambitious” agreement with Mercosur. While this is not 
defined, we would suggest an agreement that would be less demanding of 
all Mercosur states at the present time, while going ahead with many 
T
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sectoral agreements bilaterally with Brazil that would not be incompatible 
with Mercosur.1 Clearly, tariff rates have to remain the essential feature of 
the Mercosur customs union. But even here one could envisage alternative 
approaches, either a simple common schedule for reducing and eliminating 
tariffs, or one in which there could be some transitional differentiation 
between the tariff schedules adopted by different Mercosur states. In the 
complex but very rich field of non-tariff barriers and regulatory regimes for 
service sectors there is ample room for bilateral progress between Brazil 
and the EU. Here the method of mutual recognition, which has been so 
important for the EU internally, could have considerable potential for 
Brazil-EU affairs, without damaging Mercosur. 
Overall, a fresh approach to save the EU-Mercosur negotiations from 
outright failure could be described summarily as having either or both of 
two aspects. First there could be some ‘two-speed’ features, of which the 
EU has much experience, with a core group of Mercosur going ahead faster 
than some others. Second, the approach could resemble what one of our 
authors calls “anything but trade (or tariffs)”, i.e. that Brazil and the EU 
would go ahead with a maximum agenda of bilateral negotiations on all 
economic matters other than tariff schedules. The overall Mercosur 
umbrella for inter-regional trade relations with the EU would be retained. 
Something of a precedent has been seen in the EU’s trade agreement with 
some Andean countries (Colombia and Peru), where there is a single 
agreement containing some differentiated provisions for the Andean states.  
ii) Global governance matters of strategic importance 
All of the five priority themes of economic and foreign policy researched in 
the present project fall into this category. The dynamics of globalisation 
have lifted much of the action on these topics way above the bilateral level, 
yet made the processes of bilateral dialogue between major global players 
an essential prerequisite for shaping convergence of policy positions 
among G20 participants, leading to global action. The relative weights in 
the agenda of the Brazil-EU ‘strategic partnership’ are therefore shifting 
from the bilateral to the global.  
                                                     
1 As the editing of this book was nearing completion we were glad to read from 
press reports that the Brazilian position was shifting in the direction of proposing 
diffentiated offers by Brazil relative to other Mercosur countries, without the 
details being available to us, (“Brazil reaches out to EU for trade deal”, Financial 
Times 11 August 2013).  
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On two themes, climate change and foreign and security policy 
norms, Brazil and the EU are already working together towards the goal of 
better global understanding.  
In climate change policy both parties are leading activists in their 
respective groups of developing and advanced economies, they engage in 
explicit cooperation on multilateral climate change diplomacy and have 
more in common with each other than with some of other BRICS or 
Western powers, respectively.  
In the realm of security norms there is also a search for middle 
ground, at least in discourse, with Brazil bringing the Responsibility while 
Protecting (RwP) as a concept into the debate about how to implement the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
Also, both parties are highly active at the level of continental 
regionalism. If the contexts and methods are very different between the 
Americas and the wider Europe, the two parties nonetheless offer a variety 
of models, which other regions may observe.  
In the field of multilateral trade diplomacy the EU has noted Brazil’s 
constructive efforts in trying to bring developing and developed countries 
closer together, which may be a positive pointer for the future, even if the 
Doha Round has not progressed.  
In the field of global macroeconomics the emerging economies 
consider the impact of current Western monetary policies to be harmful, 
and indeed the eurozone for its part has to get its house in order in both its 
own interests and those of the global economy. The debate about exchange 
rate regimes and the impact of exchange rate instability is an old subject of 
controversy within the West, but now finds a confusing map of controversy 
over so-called currency manipulation. Brazil and the United States are 
doing much of the criticising, with China and Japan currently the targets of 
criticism. The EU is in the middle ground on this score, and could therefore 
be well placed to enter into dialogue with Brazil to explore the ground for a 
possible convergence of positions.  
What is striking about our five priority themes is both the present 
state of dissonance at the G20 level, yet also the extent to which Brazil and 
the EU can more often see eye to eye. The two parties cannot pretend to 
determine global policies, but can develop a specialist niche in global 
affairs, working together in the avant-garde of those searching for workable 
global solutions, seeking to bridge the still frequent wide differences 
between the West and the rest, or North and South, or old powers and new 
ones. 
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As a small exemplary case of bridging actions, the January 2013 
summit in Brasilia agreed to go ahead with ‘trilateral’ cooperation for Brazil 
and the EU together to support electoral processes in Portuguese-speaking 
Africa. While this may be an action of limited scope its political symbolism 
is very clear and positive, and may be a pointer to bigger things for the 
future. 
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SUMÁRIO EXECUTIVO.... DO BILATERAL E REGIONAL 
PARA O GLOBAL  
ste  relatório  analisa  a  Parceria  Estratégica  Brasil‐UE,  um  processo 
diplomático  profundamente  institucionalizado,  e  que  cobre  uma  vasto 
leque  de questões políticas  e  econômicas. Contudo, muitos observadores 
consideram  que  faltam‐lhe  um  foco  verdadeiramente  estratégico  e  impacto 
operacional. 
Escolhemos, portanto, examinar em profundidade cinco temas de  inegável 
importância  estratégica:  i)  macroeconomia  global,  ii)  política  comercial,  iii) 
mudança  climática,  iv)  as  normas  de  política  externa  e  de  segurança,  e  V) 
regionalismo continental. 
Em nossas conclusões, gostariamos de ver as duas partes concentrarem‐se 
em duas questões de grande importância estratégica para a relação Brasil‐UE. 
i)  A relação econômica bilateral ou regional 
Levando  em  conta  que  tanto  a  Rodada  de  Doha  quanto  as  negociações  UE‐
Mercosul parecem estar em um  impasse, e que um comércio ainda mais  livre e 
amplo  entre  as  duas  partes  pode  ser  mutuamente  benéfico,  há  uma  questão 
ainda não resolvida sobre como proceder. Para o Brasil, a organização regional do 
Mercosul  é muito  importante,  tanto política quanto  economicamente, para  ser 
abandonada, apesar de suas limitações atuais. Por outro lado, a relação Brasil‐UE 
é demasiado importante para ser refém de um impasse com o Mercosul.  
Temos, portanto,  considerado  algumas opções. Não  gostamos do  cenário 
negativo,  que  atualmente  parece  ser  a  perspectiva mais  provável,  e  de  acordo 
com a qual as negociações UE‐Mercosul irão falhar de novo e serão mais uma vez 
suspensas.  A  UE  anunciou  que  gostaria  de  um  acordo  "ambicioso"  com  o 
Mercosul. Enquanto este não é definido, preferimos sugerir um acordo que fosse 
menos  exigente  para  todos  os  Estados  do  Mercosul  atualmente,  mas  que 
permitisse que se desse seguimento a diferentes acordos setoriais bilaterais com 
o Brasil, o que não seria  incompatível com o Mercosul. É evidente que as tarifas 
de importação devem manter‐se como o aspecto principal da união aduaneira do 
E
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Mercosul.  Mas  ainda  aí  podem‐se  vislumbrar  abordagens  alternativas,  como  a 
adoção  de  um  cronograma  simples  e  comum  para  a  redução  e  eliminação  de 
tarifas,  ou  um  cronograma  diferenciado  de  redução  e  eliminação  de  tarifas 
adotado pelos diferentes países do Mercosul. No campo complexo, porém muito 
rico, das barreiras não‐tarifárias e regimes regulatórios para os setores de serviço, 
há bastante espaço para o progresso bilateral entre o Brasil e a União Europeia. 
Aqui,  o  método  de  reconhecimento  mútuo,  que  foi  tão  importante  para  o 
processo  interno de formação da UE, poderia ter um potencial considerável para 
os assuntos Brasil‐UE, sem, no entanto, prejudicar o Mercosul.  
Em geral, uma nova abordagem para salvar as negociações UE‐Mercosul de 
um fracasso total poderia ser descrita sumariamente como tendo um ou dois dos 
aspectos  descritos  a  seguir.  Em  primeiro  lugar,  poderia  haver  negociações  em 
"duas velocidades", nas quais a UE tem muita experiência, com alguns países do 
Mercosul  indo mais  rápido do outros. Em  segundo  lugar,  a  abordagem poderia 
assemelhar‐se  a  algo  chamado  por  um  dos  nossos  autores  de  “tudo, menos  o 
comércio (ou tarifas)”, ou seja, o Brasil e a UE poderiam avançar em uma agenda 
com o máximo de negociações bilaterais possíveis nas quais entrariam  todos os 
assuntos  econômicos,  à  exceção  de  tarifas. O  guarda‐chuva  geral  do Mercosul 
para  as  relações  comerciais  inter‐regionais  com  a  UE  seria  mantido.  Um 
precedente seria o acordo comercial entre a UE e alguns países andinos (Colômbia 
e  Peru),  onde  existe  um  único  contrato  que  contém  algumas  disposições 
diferenciadas para os Estados andinos. 
ii)  Assuntos de governança global de importância estratégica 
Todos  os  temas  prioritários  de  política  econômica  e  externa  pesquisados  no 
presente  projeto  enquadram‐se  nesta  categoria.  A  dinâmica  da  globalização 
impulsionou as ações nesses temas para muito além do nível bilateral, no entanto, 
fez dos processos de diálogo bilateral entre os principais atores globais um pré‐
requisito  essencial  para  a  convergência  de  posições  políticas  entre  os 
participantes do G20,  levando a uma ação global. O peso  relativo na agenda da 
"parceria  estratégica"  entre  o  Brasil  e  a  UE  está,  portanto,  deslocando‐se  do 
bilateral para o global. 
Em  dois  temas,  mudanças  climáticas  e  normas  de  política  externa  e  de 
segurança,  o  Brasil  e  a  UE  já  estão  trabalhando  juntos  para  um  maior 
entendimento global.  
Na política de mudança climática, ambas as partes são militantes líderes em 
seus  respectivos  grupos  de  economias  em  desenvolvimento  e  avançadas, 
engajam‐se  juntos  em  iniciativas  de  cooperação  explícita  na  diplomacia 
multilateral de mudanças climáticas, e têm mais em comum entre si do que com 
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alguns  dos  outros  membros  dos  BRICS  ou  potências  do  Ocidente, 
respectivamente.  
No  âmbito  das  normas  de  segurança,  também  busca‐se  um meio  termo, 
pelo menos no plano dos discursos, com o Brasil trazendo a “Responsibility while 
Protecting”  (RwP)  como um  conceito para o debate  sobre  como  implementar a 
“Responsibility to Protect”(R2P).  
Além disso, ambas as partes são muito ativas em questões de regionalismo 
continental. Se os contextos e métodos são muito diferentes entre as Américas e 
o continente Europeu, ambos oferecem, contudo, uma variedade de modelos que 
outras regiões podem observar.  
No  campo  da  diplomacia  multilateral  de  comércio,  a  UE  reconheceu  os 
esforços construtivos do Brasil ao tentar aproximar os países desenvolvidos e em 
desenvolvimento, o que pode ser um ponto positivo para o  futuro, mesmo se a 
Rodada de Doha não avançou. 
No  campo  da  macroeconomia  mundial,  as  economias  emergentes 
consideram o  impacto das atuais políticas monetárias do Ocidente prejudicial, e 
que a Zona Euro, por seu lado, deveria colocar a casa em ordem para seu próprio 
benefício e da economia mundial. O debate sobre regimes cambiais e o  impacto 
da  instabilidade da  taxa de  câmbio é um antigo assunto  controverso dentro do 
Ocidente.  Atualmente  a  controvérsia  se  dá  sobre  a  chamada  manipulação 
cambial. O Brasil e os Estados Unidos têm feito duras críticas a esse respeito, cujos 
alvos  são a China e o  Japão. A UE, por  sua vez, está em uma posição de meio‐
termo sobre este assunto, e poderia, portanto, aproveitar sua posição privilegiada 
para  dialogar  com  o  Brasil  a  fim  de  explorar  o  terreno  de  uma  possível 
convergência de posições. 
O que é surpreendente sobre os nossos cinco temas prioritários é o estado 
atual da dissonância dentro do G20, mas também até que ponto o Brasil e a UE 
poderiam  encarar‐se  com  mais  frequência  olho  no  olho.  As  duas  partes  não 
podem  fingir determinar as políticas globais, mas podem desenvolver um nicho 
especializado  em  assuntos  globais,  trabalhando  juntos  na  busca  por  soluções 
globais  viáveis,  procurando  criar  pontes  que  façam  a  ligação  entre  as  ainda 
grandes diferenças entre o  ‘Ocidente e o resto’, ou o Norte e o Sul, ou antigas e 
novas potências. 
Como  um  pequeno  caso  exemplar  de  ações  que  buscam  criar  pontes,  a 
Cúpula  de  Janeiro  de  2013,  em  Brasília,  concordou  em  ir  em  frente  com  a 
cooperação "trilateral" para o Brasil e a União Europeia, em conjunto, apoiarem 
os  processos  eleitorais  nos  países  africanos  que  falam  a  língua  portuguesa. 
Embora essa possa ser uma ação de alcance  limitado, seu simbolismo político é 
muito claro e positivo, e um indicador, talvez, para coisas maiores no futuro. 
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INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
he first decade of the 21st century has seen a radically new structure 
of international relations emerge, with the end of the historical 
unipolar moment of the United States, with the old G7 having 
effectively ceded primacy of place to the new G20, and with the BRICS 
asserting their presence individually and collectively as major global actors. 
Now a global search process is underway. The old and new major 
international actors explore with each other the landscape of global 
governance issues, identifying areas of convergence and divergence, and 
looking for new patterns of alliances, both in terms of operational projects 
and the norms of international relations. This is a hugely complex process, 
as one can readily imagine when contemplating the theoretical matrix of 
bilateral relations between G20 partners. Maybe not all cells of the matrix 
are being actively explored, but the EU alone has established ten ‘strategic 
partnerships’, including one with Brazil. 
This is the context within which our project has examined the Brazil-
EU strategic partnership. The question is whether Brazil and the EU can 
work together towards a civilised new world order through the positions 
they adopt on key issues of global governance, as well as develop mutually 
beneficial bilateral relations. The two parties hold key positions within the 
BRICS group and the old West respectively. Can they work together as a 
bridge across this divide towards enlightened global consensus? 
At the highest level of official political declarations the answer given 
is “Yes, of course”. The strategic partnership has certainly been active at the 
diplomatic level. On 24th January 2013 there was the 6th Brazil-EU Summit 
meeting in Brasilia, billed under the heading “An Ever-Closer 
Relationship”. This was followed on 26-27 January by a summit in 
Santiago, Chile, of the EU with the Community of Latin America and 
Caribbean States (CELAC); this one billed as “Creating Alliances for 
Investment and Sustainable Development”. Also in Santiago were held 
ministerial meetings between the EU and the Mercosur states on the 
T 
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ongoing negotiations for an EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, which 
would include a free trade agreement. The CELAC Summit was attended 
by leaders of the 27 EU member states at that time, as well as the EU 
institutions, and the 32 CELAC states. From this one can conclude that at 
least the diplomatic infrastructure for top-level meetings at the bilateral 
and regional level is established and functioning. But evaluation of the 
content is less easily done, and to this we now turn.  
The starting point is a rather favourable one. Both Brazil and the EU 
are emerging global actors, albeit of quite different types. Brazil asserts its 
growing weight in the world, with a huge continental landmass, a dynamic 
economy and cultural image, and the will to break out from the earlier 
historical period when the Americas were politically dominated by the 
United States. In the EU the old European powers are gradually trying to 
piece together a common foreign policy to match up to the contemporary 
context with new major global powers. Both seek to play leading roles in 
their respective continents. There are zero mutual tensions over security 
threats, and no divergences over fundamental political values, such as is 
the case with China or Russia. Even in relations with the United States, 
which is the EU’s bedrock alliance, there are some respects in which Brazil 
and the EU are closer to each other. While the EU is comfortable with the 
Obama administration, most Europeans regard Republican politics as being 
almost from another planet, as do most Brazilians. Both parties consider the 
US position over Cuba to be obsolete, if not rather ridiculous. Many 
European commentators see Brazil as more constructive in seeking to build 
bridges between the West and the developing world than, for example, 
India. Finally, there is the ease of personal relationships between Brazilians 
and Europeans who share common cultural heritages.  
All that may be well and good. But there is also the objective reality 
that the rise of Asia and current economic stagnation in Europe mean that 
the economic relationship between Brazil and the EU is of declining relative 
importance, and this affects political attitudes too. The BRICS grouping, 
and other mini-lateral formations including IBSA and the WTO G-20, are 
seen by Brazil as key instruments for the enhancement of its status in global 
affairs.  
Our task, however, has been to go deeper into the realities of the 
Brazil-EU relationship, beyond these important and largely positive 
starting points, but where there are also serious limitations and unresolved 
problems, or at least underexploited potentialities.  
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For our purpose we adopted a selective approach, picking five topics 
of undoubted strategic significance, and looking at each in some depth. 
These five topics are i) global macroeconomics, ii) trade policy, iii) climate 
change, iv) norms of foreign and security policy, and v) continental 
regionalism.  
Our method of work has been to test these fields with the following 
questions: Is there convergence or divergence in the positions being taken 
by the two parties? If convergence, does this go beyond compatible 
discourse, and see operational cooperation? What is, or could become, the 
sum of the parts - i.e. the overall character of the strategic partnership? For 
example, how far might Brazil and the EU work together to bridge 
divergences that are evident among G20 participants in pursuit of a more 
effective world order? 
Global macroeconomics 
Here there are real issues of divergent arguments and interests. At top 
official levels the Brazilian side has been among the most eloquent of the 
BRICS in criticising the West on grounds both of their actual economic 
policy and the issue of representation in the international financial 
institutions. Brazil complained that the US Fed’s policy of quantitative 
easing during 2009 to 2013 led to overvaluation of the Brazilian currency, 
and that the economic policies of both the US and EU have created great 
difficulties by reducing demand for imports from the emerging economies. 
The Brazilian argument is echoed by Chile and other Latin American states. 
In early 2013 tensions emerged over exchange rate policies in the world at 
large following a shift in Japanese policy, with G7 and G20 meetings 
having to confront what the financial press is calling ‘currency wars’. The 
issue has now surfaced sharply at the G20 level, but policy-makers are so 
far unable to do more than declare innocence and good intentions.2 
It is certainly justifiable to complain that the governance of the world’s 
‘advanced’ economies has over recent years has been seriously defective, as 
                                                     
2 The Communiqué of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 
meeting in Moscow on 16 February 2013 declared: “Monetary policy should be 
directed toward domestic price stability and continuing to support economic 
recovery according to the respective mandates. We commit to monitor and 
minimise the negative spillovers on other countries of policies implemented for 
domestic purposes. …. We reiterate our commitments …. to avoid persistent 
exchange rate misalignments. …. We will refrain from competitive devaluation”. 
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in both the so-called ‘fiscal cliff’ prevarication over budgetary policy in the 
US, and the systemic crisis of the eurozone. At the time of writing both the 
US and EU may be recovering from their most critical crisis points, but still, 
damage has been done. This damage at the international level has to be 
carefully assessed, however. The Brazilian critique of the US quantitative 
easing is vulnerable to the reply that without these extreme monetary 
measures the US economy would have fallen into real depression, with far 
more dramatic consequences for the world economy.  
This leads further into the argument about the impact of exchange 
rate changes on Brazil, and its importance for the performance of the 
Brazilian economy. In fact the Brazilian exchange rate has moved in very 
sharp cycles of over- and under-valuation during recent years, and in the 
course of 2012 the Brazilian authorities achieved their objective of 
substantially lowering the exchange rate from levels deemed to be over-
valued. On how far the exchange rate is key to Brazilian macroeconomic 
performance the paper by Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi points out that the 
Brazilian economy is relatively closed to foreign trade, compared to other 
major advanced and BRICS economies. This lack of openness sees its 
counterpart in a relatively high level of tariff protection, again compared to 
other major economies. The consequence of this is that the exchange rate 
will be a relatively weak instrument for influencing the rate of growth of 
the Brazilian economy.  
This in turn means that to get a more dynamic performance in its 
manufacturing and service sectors, Brazil needs to address domestic 
hindrances to growth, as described vividly in Alfredo Valladao’s paper. 
The Brazilian growth model of the first decade of the 2000s was fuelled by a 
commodities export boom, notably for iron ore and soya, which generated 
large trade surpluses. As a result, Brazil drastically reduced its external 
debt, built up currency reserves, and this provided the elbow room for the 
Lula government to undertake a huge programme of social transfers, 
coupled also to a credit boom boosting consumer demand.  
At the same time, however, Brazilian industry was suffering huge 
declines in competitiveness through the government’s failure to solve the 
economy’s structural weaknesses, including inadequate transport 
infrastructure, poor quality education, and lack of fiscal and regulatory 
reforms. The problems were then accentuated by piecemeal protectionist 
measures shielding archaic producers from foreign competition. When 
from 2009 global market conditions for commodities deteriorated 
drastically for both the price and volume of Brazilian exports the 
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macroeconomic indicators were hard hit, with increasing federal public 
debt, widening balance of payments current account deficits, declining 
investment and a drop in the GDP growth rate to only 2.5% in 2011 and 1% 
in 2012. The ‘Custo Brazil’ slogan became emblematic for the economy’s 
lack of competitiveness. Overall, the growth model of the 2000s had hit its 
limits. While not disastrous compared to its big Mercosur neighbours 
Argentina and Venezuela, Brazil’s economic performance now looks 
unfavourable by comparison with a group of dynamic and much more 
open Andean economics and Mexico.  
While these domestic economic policy issues have now to receive 
priority attention, from which exchange rate arguments cannot provide a 
scapegoat, it is still pertinent to question the adequacy of the exchange rate 
regime in the world economy, which is hardly a system at all. Here the 
Brazilian side – at both official levels in their representations to the IMF and 
WTO, and in academic writings, notably in the paper by Vera Thorstensen 
and colleagues – is arguing in favour of more active exchange rate policy 
norms alongside the trade policy rules of the WTO to bring the IMF and 
WTO closer together in acting against harmful currency manipulation. 
There is now a growing literature and political concern, especially in the US 
in relation to China, over currency manipulation. The study by Vera 
Thorstensen and colleagues advocates a rule permitting countervailing 
tariffs to counter currency undervaluation, and strikingly even proposes 
that this should be an innovative feature to be introduced into the EU-
Mercosur free trade negotiations. This particular formulation is open to a 
European reply that in all the empirical data the eurozone is absolutely in 
the middle on these currency valuation scores, being neither over- nor 
under-valued, and not subject to a deliberate targeting of the exchange rate. 
So the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement may not be the most plausible 
terrain to experiment with these ideas. On the other hand, the hyper-
competitiveness of the Chinese economy over recent years, and the 
consequent accumulation of huge foreign exchange reserves, would be a 
more plausible target. The US Congress has been pushing for action here, 
and a recent independent analysis from Washington by Fred Bergsten and 
Joseph Gagnon3 goes through the range of policy options that might be 
                                                     
3 Fred Bergsten and Joseph Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US economy, 
and the Global Economic Order”, Policy Brief No. 12-25, Petersen Institute for 
International Economics, December 2012. 
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used, including countervailing capital market interventions as well as trade 
policy moves.  
The EU for its part has been expressing its concern over the Chinese 
exchange rate, and for this reason has so far refused to grant China full 
‘market economy’ status. A virtual alliance between Brazil, the EU and the 
US on this matter is therefore conceivable, although for the time being 
China has moved towards external balance. One of the options for action is 
that the US Treasury could block Chinese access to buying new Treasury 
bonds, which would not require new rules at the WTO and/or the IMF, 
and for which it would be extremely difficult to reach consensus.  
This leads into a final issue discussed in the paper by Daniel Gros and 
Cinzia Alcidi; namely the representation of the EU in the power structure 
of the international financial institutions, which Brazil and all the BRICS see 
as being excessive. In fact, the voting weights at the IMF are being 
continuously adapted according to objective macroeconomic indicators. 
The Brazilian voting weight is low if GDP were the only criterion, but its 
share is held down by other indicators, in particular low trade openness. 
However, the euro crisis throws these issues into a new perspective. The 
euro crisis has led the IMF to acquire extra resources to meet the possibility 
of having to contribute to the rescue of a large eurozone economy, with the 
BRICS contributing notably to this new capability. This prompts the 
question whether the eurozone should be represented as a monetary union 
as full member of the governing board of the IMF, replacing the individual 
eurozone member states. If this were to happen it would be logical for the 
trade weight of the eurozone in the IMF’s standard formula to be revised 
downwards to cut out intra-eurozone trade. This would free up additional 
voting power for emerging and developing countries. Of course, such a 
scenario is a highly sensitive matter for the eurozone national governments, 
and only the subject of independent views so far, but the logic is plausible 
and would presumably be approved of by Brazil and the other BRICS. 
Overall, this global macroeconomic domain sees important unsettled 
matters warranting continuing dialogue between Brazil and the EU, as in 
the other strategic partnerships and negotiations in the global fora, 
especially G20, the IMF and WTO. However, on the critical exchange rate 
question, the fact that the eurozone is clearly in a neutral position makes it 
well placed in principle to have a serious dialogue with Brazil to try and 
work towards a common ground for a more adequate set of rules and 
criteria for corrective action.  
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Trade and regulatory policies 
It is generally recognised that the WTO-level Doha round is in a state of 
coma, matched by the consequent proliferation of bilateral, regional and 
inter-regional preferential trade agreements. Notwithstanding this dismal 
WTO landscape, the EU has come to appreciate the role of Brazil in WTO-
level negotiations over the last two decades. As Patrick Messerlin recounts 
in his paper, the Brazilian approach to WTO matters changed in 1995, 
dropping an uncompromising tone, and effectively permitting the Uruguay 
Round to reach a successful conclusion. During the early stages of the Doha 
Round in the 2000s Brazil was suggesting some compromise concessions by 
developing and emerging countries, with a relatively constructive central 
position, unlike the positions being taken by India and China. While Doha 
has not progressed, these Brazilian efforts in multilateral trade diplomacy 
have been noted, and were rewarded in May 2013 by the appointment of a 
Brazilian to be the next head of the WTO.  
Negotiations between the EU and the Mercosur customs union over 
an Association Agreement, incorporating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
have been underway, on and off, for many years. Mercosur was established 
in 1991 and very soon after signed a first inter-institutional agreement with 
the EU. The decision to start negotiations on an FTA was taken in 1998, but 
these were suspended in 2004, with dissatisfaction on both sides with the 
offers being made. For Brazil, access to EU agricultural markets was 
insufficient, while the EU wanted more access in the service sectors. 
However, after a lengthy pause, negotiations were restarted in 2010 and are 
still ongoing. Meanwhile, the political context within Mercosur has become 
more complex. Of the four original members, Argentine, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, there are manifest economic policy problems in Argentina, 
and a (probably temporary) political problem with Paraguay, whose 
membership is currently suspended because of constitutional irregularities. 
In addition, Venezuela’s recent accession to Mercosur brings in a country 
whose radical policies would be difficult to reconcile with an ambitious 
FTA. 
Two chapters on this topic, by Renato Flores and Patrick Messerlin, 
are quite convergent in their analyses. In an earlier paper Renato Flores4 
                                                     
4 German Calat and Renato Flores, “The EU-Mercosul Free Trade Agreement - 
Quantifying Mutual Gains”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 44, No 5, pp 921-
945, December 2006. 
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calculated that an FTA could be beneficial to both sides, with potential 
gains for Mercosur concentrated in the agricultural sector, especially for 
Argentinian and Brazilian beef producers, and with more wide-ranging 
gains for the EU’s industrial and service sectors. He felt that the two parties 
were not that far from agreement in 2004, if the two parties had been 
willing to make somewhat greater concessions, and remains of the view 
that a simple FTA would be mutually beneficial and feasible.  
At the January 2013 meetings in Santiago there was agreement to try 
and progress with the negotiations, with the two parties agreeing in 
principle to exchange offers by the end of the year. However, the authors of 
our two papers are sceptical over the depth of the political commitment on 
both sides to conclude an FTA. They are critical of a process in which both 
sides make superficial political gestures to keep the negotiation process 
officially alive, when in reality it seems to be at an impasse. The Mercosur 
side is still blighted by protectionist sentiment, albeit more in Argentina 
and Venezuela than in Brazil. As to the EU side, Messerlin observes that 
trade policy priorities are focused now on Japan and the United States, 
with little appetite at top political levels, especially in France, for any 
radical liberalisation of market access for agricultural products. In these 
circumstances the explicit call for an ‘ambitious’ FTA by the EU side seems 
particularly unrealistic, given that the EU’s idea would entail extensive 
convergence by the other party on EU internal market regulations and 
standards, which in turn demands of the other party high levels of 
commitment and scarce administrative skills for their adoption and 
implementation. Moreover, the world economy has moved on rapidly 
during the years in which the EU-Mercosur negotiations have been 
dragging along, with South American economies becoming more 
integrated with the dynamic Asian economies.  
In these circumstances, what should be done? For Renato Flores it 
could still be possible to make a simple FTA, with the EU liberalising half a 
dozen agricultural products and Mercosur liberalising around 50-100 
manufactures. As for the service sectors there is now awareness in Brazil of 
the need for an up-to-date services ancillary to the manufacturing and 
commodity producing sectors, and there has indeed been progress in 
regulatory convergence in some of these sectors such as telecoms, with 
some surprising results (see Box 1). However, the aim should be selective of 
what is feasible, rather than an encompassing attempt for many sectors. 
Moreover, while Brussels may have been priding itself on being the 
‘regulatory capital of the world’, Flores points out that some EU regulations 
impose hugely expensive costs on exporters to the EU, citing the REACH 
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Directive for chemical products as an important example. He would like a 
consultative process to minimise what are covert non-tariff barriers. His 
overall conclusion is that the EU and Mercosur should either aim at a quick 
and simple FTA with a sharp deadline, say December 2014, or close down 
the negotiation process until more propitious circumstances emerge in 
some years time.  
 
Box 1. Brazil has found the right regulatory policy mix for the telecoms sector 
In December 2012 Brazil and the EU celebrated ten years of co-operation in 
the ICT field with a full week of dialogue and exchange of ideas about 
innovation, research and regulation. The EU is an eager exporter of its 
regulatory models, and in the telecoms sector Brazil was quick to copy 
Europe's 2002 regulatory framework, which they praised as a solid basis for 
liberalising reforms.  
However, there was a problem. Partly because of its antitrust rules, 
the EU's 2002 telecoms package centred on the credo that market entrants 
should not be required to invest upfront in their own infrastructure. This 
model, termed the ‘investment ladder', has required mind-boggling 
acrobatics to implement. The US has experimented with a similar model 
since 1996 (termed ‘stepping stones', rather than ‘investment ladder'). But 
when it came to stimulating investment in networks, the US regulator 
decided in 2003 to permit ‘regulatory holidays' for companies that invested 
in broadband networks, and investment flourished.  
Brazil decided to make the best of the EU and US models together, 
notably when it ran a 4G auction for high-speed mobile broadband long 
before many EU member states did so. It has taken the well-shaped EU 
telecoms package, but with regulatory holidays for broadband. Now, the 
ball goes back to the EU. Perhaps the time is ripe for it to consider lifting 
regulatory obligations on investors. Unless it does so, it is probable that 
Brazil will join the broadband fast lane before the EU. 
Source: Andrea Renda, CEPS. 
 
Messerlin agrees that a fully-fledged FTA between the EU and 
Mercosur is beyond reach, but rejects the option to simply suspend 
negotiations again, as was done in 2004. This would encourage 
protectionist forces in Mercosur countries, and for Brazil to have the 
important drawback of excluding its economy from the growing web of 
‘mega’ preferential trade pacts now being negotiated in Asia and across the 
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Pacific and North Atlantic. He further stresses the great technical 
complexity of these ‘mega’ negotiations, meaning that the negotiating 
teams, from the technical to political levels, are going to be hard pressed, 
with little space left for difficult negotiations of second-level economic 
importance. Together these factors point toward drawing up a fresh but 
limited agenda of topics for negotiation with Mercosur, cutting down the 
huge and comprehensive landscape of issues that usually appears on the 
EU’s wish-list to a limited number of domains where progress could be 
usefully made in the foreseeable future. This long, conventional EU list is 
particularly inappropriate for negotiations with Mercosur, given the 
organisation’s limited effective competencies. Better, there should be 
prioritisation on topics that are important for making future market 
liberalisation truly meaningful and which are not under Mercosur’s 
exclusive competence. His selection of topics answering these criteria 
includes norms and standards for industrial goods, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures for agri-food sectors, regulations for some service 
sectors. The list would have a second category of regulations and 
cooperation domains less directly related to trade, in the environmental 
and climate change field, and for research and transfer of industrial 
technologies (agreeing here with the papers by Eduardo Viola and Renato 
Flores respectively). Messerlin draws attention to the potential value of the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’, of which the EU has much experience, 
and which has the merit of being flexible, permitting bilateral agreements. 
Bigger things may then become possible in due course when the parties get 
closer to what Messerlin calls “the same mood”. 
A way out of the EU-Mercosur blockage is also explored by Alfredo 
Valladao, with ideas that are quite consistent with those of Flores and 
Messerlin, but arguing more urgently in favour of a Brazilian economic 
reform package that would include both internal and external reforms. The 
trade liberalising measures have, however, to respect the Brazilian political 
imperative not to damage Mercosur, which is the political as well as 
economic foundation of Brazil’s relations with its direct neighbours, and 
first of all Argentina. Valladao advances two ideas. In the first one Brazil 
would go ahead bilaterally with a set of bilateral agreements with the EU 
on ‘anything but trade’, or more precisely anything but tariffs, but going 
ahead on technical standards, non-tariff barriers, regulatory policies, 
business facilitation etc., where there is no necessary Mercosur competence. 
The second idea, consistent with the first one, would be to enter into a 
different kind of negotiation with Mercosur, allowing its individual 
Mercosur states to adopt faster or much slower liberalisation commitments. 
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The EU itself has experience of such compromises in its own internal 
affairs, with various ‘two-speed’ methods, but also closer to Brazil in the 
case of its free trade agreements with the Andean Community, with a 
single agreement containing differentiated provisions for Colombia and 
Peru. Overall the approach is opening up a hybrid concept, coupling 
‘anything but trade’ bilateralism with ‘two-speed’ regionalism.  
Climate change 
Both Brazil and the EU are serious about climate change policy, with no 
time for ‘climate change deniers’ such as still exist in the US. The EU and 
Brazil have major climate policy achievements to their credit, albeit of quite 
different types, while both also now face severe challenges for the next 
stages of their policy development.  
Brazil is a key country for global climate change and environmental 
issues, as the chapter by Eduardo Viola explains in some detail, having the 
largest forest area in the world, the largest reserve of hydropower, the 
largest reserve of agricultural land, and the largest stock of bio-diversity. In 
the period 2005-2009 Brazil achieved both a steady economic growth and a 
dramatic reduction of carbon emissions by 25% at the same time; a unique 
achievement in the world. The main contributing factor for reduction of 
carbon emissions was the curbing of the deforestation of Amazonia, due to 
the dramatic strengthening of enforcement by the federal authorities of 
legislation that had been in place since 1997. The reduction in deforestation 
was not total, but still by a margin of almost three-quarters.  
At the same time Brazil has been adapting its posture in international 
climate change processes. Until around the mid-2000s Brazilian thinking 
was heavily influenced by entrenched attitudes favouring the short-term 
use of natural resources, coupled with traditional conceptions of national 
sovereignty, both factors conflicting with international concern over the 
deforestation of Amazonia. However, in 2006 at the Nairobi UNFCCC 
meeting Brazil proposed a global fund to slow deforestation. At the level of 
strategic commitments, in 2009 Brazil pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 
2020 by between 36 and 39% compared to a ‘business as usual’ projection. 
But for achievement of these targets Brazil now has to go beyond the 
arresting of deforestation into fields where the resistance to remedial action 
is strong, especially the fast-growing emissions from urban transportation. 
At the level of strategic international diplomacy the issue now for 
Brazil, as analysed by Viola, is how far or for how long it will maintain its 
alliance with its main BRICS partners (China, Russia, and India) which are 
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typically conservative on climate policy, or to converge and cooperate more 
with leading climate policy actors such as the EU, Japan and Korea.  
For its part, the EU found itself catapulted into a position of global 
climate policy leadership when the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations in 2005. The EU went ahead then to gather sufficient 
signatures for the Protocol to become operative. As the chapter by Christian 
Egenhofer and Monica Alessi explains, the centrepiece of EU policy was its 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which also started in 2005. In order to 
implement its commitments the EU worked out its ‘20-20 by 2020’ package, 
finally adopted in April 2009: for a 20% reduction in emissions compared to 
1990 levels, to be upgraded to 30% in the event of a global agreement, for 
20% renewables in primary energy consumption, and other elements, 
including a break-down of the targets by member state. With a coverage of 
2 billion tons of GHG emissions the EU’s ETS makes up about 80% of the 
global carbon market. But the initial ETS revealed some serious design 
flaws, leading to changes negotiated for the post-2012 period. However, it 
is acknowledged now that the 20% target is inadequate to get the EU’s 
decarbonisation performance into line with its long-term target of reducing 
emissions by 80-95% by 2050, required as its contribution to holding back 
global warming to 2 degrees centigrade. Various steps are being taken by 
the EU to bring its house into better order, for example by adjusting the 
issue of allowances to be auctioned.  
At the same time, international aspects are becoming more crucial for 
the EU, as its own share of global emissions is falling fast, from 13% 
currently to an expected 10% in 2020, while the shares of China and the US 
are around 20%. In addition, concern in the EU for the competitiveness of 
its own industries as a result of its largely unilateral climate policies is also 
growing. In this context the task of building alliances that aim at 
cooperative international solutions is of capital importance, and here the 
issue of cooperation between the EU and Brazil is highly relevant. Already 
at the Durban (2011) and Doha (2012) meetings of the UNFCCC process the 
negotiators of Brazil and the EU worked seriously together, seeking to 
bridge the huge political gaps between the advanced climate policy 
countries and the conservatives (in both developing and some advanced 
countries). Brazil, in particular, which has key roles in both the BRICS and 
developing countries groups, has helped, with the EU, to secure diplomatic 
advances such as at Durban when it was decided to extend the Kyoto 
Protocol and work towards globally inclusive mechanisms by 2015.  
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Thinking further ahead, Viola sees the case for Brazil to strengthen its 
alliance with the EU and other progressive climate policy countries, while 
still acting as a bridge between the EU and the BRICS/BASIC groups. This 
alliance would be both at the level of international diplomacy and through 
a long list of conceivable bilateral programmes between the EU and Brazil, 
such as for biofuels, hydropower, deforestation, solar and wind power, 
carbon capture and storage, smart grids, public transport etc. In addition, 
Viola sees some potential in the medium-term future for a convergence of 
positions on climate change between the EU, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, and 
if this emerges the EU-CELAC inter-regional process could be useful in 
building on it in the direction of a wider inter-continental alliance. 
Overall, climate policy is a promising field for active cooperation 
between Brazil and the EU. Both parties have made major commitments, 
although both now face a hard task to move on to the next stages of their 
domestic policies. From a strategic standpoint this is a case where Brazil 
and the EU are together closer in their objectives to each other than either is 
to major partners in their primary international alliances or groupings (the 
BRICS and the West respectively). This is important both for the chances of 
constructing effective climate alliances worldwide, and more broadly for 
attenuating the antagonistic polarisation of the world between ‘the West 
and the rest’.  
Norms of foreign and security policy 
The EU-Brazil relationship is completely devoid of any kind of mutual 
security threats, which is more than can be said for quite a number of 
relationships between the BRICS and the West, or even among some of the 
BRICS. Both Brazil and the EU share unquestionable commitment to 
political and humanitarian norms of democracy and human rights. These 
factors form a solid bedrock of mutual confidence and values on which to 
base foreign and security policy norms. However, the world at large shows 
that coherence between internal and external norms is not automatic, with 
many factors often intervening to separate the two. In particular, the drive 
by the West, both the US and EU, to promote democracy and human rights 
as universal values can collide with the doctrine of non-interference 
strongly held by the BRICS and traditional groupings of developing 
countries that suffered colonialism.  
Both Brazil and the EU are, in their very different ways, emerging 
foreign policy actors. As explained in the chapter by Alcides Costa Vaz, in 
recent decades Brazil has emerged with a highly diversified set of priority 
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partners, compared to former times when its foreign policy was anchored 
on the North Atlantic axis and neighbourly relations with Argentina. 
Brazil’s active role in a new generation of international mini-lateral 
coalitions, including the WTO G-20, the BRICS and IBSA, have greatly 
helped to enhance its profile as a global actor, while keeping constantly in 
mind the still distant goal of permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council. Brazil has clearly endorsed the concept of multipolarity as a 
desired power structure, and makes the argument that this can work 
synergetically with multilateralism, although as pointed out in the chapter 
by Giovanni Grevi, this may not be self-evident.  
Grevi observes how the EU has developed its world view from its 
own formative experiences in overcoming the twin traumas of the world 
wars for which Europe was responsible and the associated disasters of 
dictatorship. This set the EU on course to define itself as a normative power 
in international relations, even if practice shows that this is not a 
straightforward proposition. The first and so far only European Security 
Strategy of 2003 identified the EU as a champion of effective 
multilateralism. Like Brazil, the EU perceives no inter-state threats to its 
territorial integrity. The EU is therefore largely focused on the asymmetric 
threats to the established order (terrorism, state failure, proliferation of 
WMD), with much investment in the conceptualisation and instruments of 
conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution. Concretely 
the EU has engaged in a proliferation of crisis and conflict missions with 
light military support, as well as civilian support for many ‘rule of law’ 
missions. The EU also notes that Brazil has become increasingly active in 
the field of humanitarian intervention, as in the striking example of its 
leading role in Haiti. In its own neighbourhood the EU’s methods have 
been profoundly influenced by the experience of its own ‘transformative 
power’, which was so effective in the big enlargement of 2005 to the states 
of Central and Eastern Europe.  
By 2008, when the EU’s first security strategy document was 
reviewed, the notion of the ‘changing world’ entered the title, and indeed 
this was the time of the first G20 meeting attempting to manage the global 
financial crisis. In the years that have followed the EU expanded and 
consolidated its list of now ten strategic partnerships with major G20 states, 
including, of course, Brazil. This has marked an important rebalancing of 
the EU’s priorities as between the European neighbourhood and global 
affairs, with increasing attention given to the latter without neglecting the 
former. Meanwhile Brazil has undertaken an even weightier rebalancing of 
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its priorities in favour of the global, as illustrated by the mini-lateral 
formations in which it participates.  
As regards its approach to normative foreign policy issues Brazil has 
cautiously engaged in the issues governing international intervention, 
given its strong sympathy with the doctrine of non-interference. However, 
with the debate leading to the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) Brazil had to define its position, and ultimately endorsed R2P, while 
continuing to express concern about its over-active application. This led in 
September 2011 to promotion in UN fora by the Brazilian government of 
the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), which was prompted 
by the experience of the Libyan war and the ongoing uprising in Syria. The 
EU for its part, as doctrinal subscriber to R2P, has been somewhat intrigued 
by the Brazilian initiative, which has been discussed but not become in any 
way operational at the UN level. The EU seems rather unsure about 
whether it is a constructive attempt to build a bridge between the West and 
the hard-liners among the BRICS, or just diplomatic grandstanding.  
Our two chapters also sharpen the debate about the merits of 
multipolarity. For Alcides Cos Vaz multipolarity and multilateralism go 
well together. For his part Giovanni Grevi asks whether “multipolarity has 
come too late”, by which he means that the BRICS and other rising powers 
are so deeply interdependent with the West and each other in the fast 
globalising world that the idea of stand-alone poles is itself outdated. In 
other writings he has advanced the notion of ‘interpolarity’ to reflect this 
interdependence factor, which is more than a matter of playing with words. 
The issue is how far effective multilateralism is the shared objective of both 
the BRICS and the West. Brazil and the EU are arguably the most solid pair 
from these two communities to promote this objective. For the future both 
Alcides Costa Vaz and Giovanni Grevi see the likelihood of more 
convergence between Brazil and the EU on global issues and prospects for 
working together bilaterally to develop convergent positions, although this 
will not happen automatically, and needs an enduring strategic 
partnership. Grevi suggests that joint initiatives in third countries - for 
example, in projects addressing the nexus of development and democracy - 
could be a tool to this end. 
Continental regionalism 
Both Brazil and the EU are highly active in their continental regions. Both 
subscribe to the view that regional cooperation at this level is crucial to 
securing peace and order in their neighbourhoods. Regional cooperation or 
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integration is part of their packages of political norms – viewed as public 
goods for the world at large. But beyond these generalities the comparisons 
between Brazil in the Americas and the EU in the wider Europe are more 
often striking for the differences of approach.  
Primary differences are of course that Brazil is a sovereign state, 
whereas the EU is a supranational entity. Brazil seeks deepening 
cooperation with its neighbours, whereas the EU aims at political and 
economic integration. The EU has been enlarging its membership to former 
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, subject to very heavy 
political and economic conditionality. But this transformative experience 
has little relevance for the Americas, although the current suspension of 
Paraguay from Mercosur and UNASUR shows that political conditionality 
also exists in these organisations. 
Brazil’s prime motivations in its continental regionalism, as explained 
in the chapter by Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, is heavily 
weighted by its will to be the preeminent power, at least in South America, 
and to downgrade the pan-Americanism historically led by the United 
States and represented still by the Organization of American States (OAS). 
One could say that Brazil is more interested in the value of power, whereas 
the EU is more interested in the power of values. This makes sense in that 
Brazil has all the attributes of a powerful state, whereas the EU has been 
unable to develop a real hard power projection capability, but has a very 
strong political and legal commitment to the promotion of democracy and 
human rights, both at home and in its wider neighbourhood. 
Both Brazil and the EU are currently testing the evolution of their 
regional structures, but in quite different ways. Brazil has been promoting 
regional cooperation at the three levels of Mercosur (with Atlantic but not 
Pacific facing South America so far), UNASUR for all of South America, 
and CELAC, which further includes Central America and the Caribbean. 
While Mercosur is mainly economic but also political (e.g. for framing its 
relationship with Argentina), UNASUR is largely political with some 
defence and regional infrastructure aspects. CELAC is about asserting a 
large regional identity to the exclusion of North America. The geographic 
composition of UNASUR and CELAC now seem to be fixed, but Mercosur 
is open for enlargement. By comparison the EU’s wider circles include the 
Council of Europe, with strongly developed human rights competences for 
all of Europe including Russia, while the OSCE has developed a set of 
political-security norms for Europe extended to include the whole off the 
post-Soviet space and the US and Canada.  
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The dynamics of regional integration amount to a major puzzle for 
politicians and academics alike. While CELAC has a less ambitious agenda 
than UNASUR, neither organisation is testing the possibilities for deep 
integration, while Mercosur has problems in assuring the integrity of its 
customs union. In the EU, on the other hand, as explained by Michael 
Emerson in his chapter, the old ‘bicycle theory of integration’ rides again 
(either keep moving, or fall off) with the current eurozone crisis. While this 
may lead to a more federal structure for the eurozone, it also exposes the 
resistance of eurosceptic states, notably the UK whose prime minister now 
rejects the Treaty of Rome’s gospel about an “ever closer union”.  
Interestingly, one can also contrast perceptions of the US and Russia 
as the big outsiders, next to Latin America and the EU, respectively. Brazil 
boosts the UNASUR and CELAC to enhance its autonomy in relation to the 
huge power of the United States. But the EU supports the wider European 
regional organisations, the Council of Europe and OSCE, in the hope of 
drawing Russia progressively into its system of political values. 
Both continents also struggle to define the contours of their economic 
areas. In the wider Europe there is now competition between the EU and 
Russia. The EU seeks to conclude a set of Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (DCFTA) with former Soviet states such as Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia and Armenia. Russia for its part starts up a customs union with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan with the evident objective of getting Ukraine to 
join in and scrap its DCFTA with the EU. The US for its part launched a 
proposal in 1994 for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but this 
died in 2005 after failing to get support from several Latin American states, 
including Brazil. On the other hand, the Mercosur customs union has 
recently enlarged to include Venezuela, and receives further applications 
for accession from some Andean states. 
Discussion of whether the EU is a model for Latin America is not the 
most fruitful question to pursue. Rather, Europe has a wealth of 
experiences that are worth noting. The most robust and least contested part 
of the EU experience has been with its single market. In the 1980s the 
conclusion was drawn that the full benefits of market integration could not 
be realised without a hugely complex set of regulatory measures, in part 
consisting of legally binding harmonisation and in part mutual recognition 
of national standards for goods and service markets. This in turn required 
strong institutional, legal and decision-making (majority voting) structures.  
The euro crisis represents another huge lesson of experience, of how 
not to create a monetary union. The risk taken by the founding fathers of 
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the euro was that an excellent, independent central bank was the only new 
quasi-federal structure required for its stability, while the public finance 
and monetary regulatory functions could rely on inter-governmental 
cooperation and soft rules. The recipe for systemic repair now advocated, 
through adding a banking union, a fiscal union and political union on top 
of the monetary union, stands as ample warning to other continents not to 
enter into monetary integration commitments lightly.  
Finally, Brazil and the EU come together in ‘inter-regionalism’, as 
illustrated on 26-27 January 2013 by the Summit meeting of the EU and 
CELAC, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Mercosur. The EU values 
these activities as a general rule, as with ASEAN and the ASEM in Asia, 
and with the African Union. These meetings are huge jamborees, like 
down-sized UN General Assemblies, providing for a lot of political 
socialisation between leaders, and bilateral or mini-lateral dealings in the 
margins. The EU-CELAC summit was the first of its kind to include the 
Caribbean states. But in shape the meeting was essentially a continuation of 
the six earlier summits between the EU and Latin America (LAC). The 
conclusions of this summit were able to list an impressive number of 
cooperative activities between the EU and the several sub-regions and 
individual states: with Chile, Colombia and Peru, Central America, Mexico, 
the Caribbean, Brazil and Mercosur. But as regards the EU-Mercosur 
negotiations, as already noted in the context of trade policy, these have 
failed over many years to achieve results, and require a fresh approach. 
Brazil for its part is keen to develop other inter-regional initiatives, such as 
the South America-Africa Summits and the South America-Arab Country 
Summits. 
What other business? 
In their official strategic partnership Brazil and the EU have agreed long 
and detailed Joint Action Plans, the most recent dating from October 2011, 
with no fewer than 204 bulleted action points spread over 28 pages of text. 
We find fault in this method. The possibly strategic matters are drowned in 
a sea of detail. Every conceivable topic is covered, and where there is no 
real action in sight there has to be ‘dialogue’. The EU is probably most at 
fault for this, since the format of the Joint Action Plan follows a model that 
it has generally used with all partners that agree to it. 
The January 2013 summit between Brazil and the EU reported that 
there are no fewer than 30 sectoral policy dialogues up and running. These 
have not been laid out in any official analytical order, but we make our 
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own presentation of them in Box 2. The majority of these headings fall well 
within the themes chosen in this report as strategic priorities: foreign and 
security policy, macroeconomic policy, trade-related issues, climate change 
and related environmental issues.  
The list of individualised dialogues is very long, however, which the 
outside observer may be tempted to view as excessive. There are instances 
of overlapping topics, which might be consolidated (political dialogue, UN 
matters, human rights, international peace and security, disarmament). 
There are other cases that have little or no strategic or operational 
significance, or where the EU competence is very limited. The list conveys 
the impression that almost every department of the European institutions 
and the Brazilian government has to have their bilateral dialogue.  
Box 2. Policy dialogue groups established between Brazil and the EU  
Political and security nexus 
High-level political dialogue  
UN general matters  
International peace and security  
Human rights 
Disarmament and non-proliferation 
Drugs matters  
Disaster risk preparedness  
Economic & social policy nexus 
Economic and financial issues 
Financial services 
Statistics 
Sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) consultation mechanism 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Industrial pilot regulatory dialogues (textile, steel, forest products, etc.) 
Competition policy issues 
Maritime transport  
Air transport 
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Climate change 
Environment  
Energy  
Nuclear issues  
Science and technology 
Information Society  
Space cooperation 
Small and Medium Enterprises policy  
Tourism  
Institutional strengthening and state modernisation  
Social policies and social cohesion  
Regional development and territorial integration 
Education  
Culture 
 
Source: European External Action Service. 
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 primeira década do século XXI viu surgir uma estrutura radicalmente nova 
das relações internacionais, com o fim do momento histórico unipolar dos 
Estados Unidos,  o  antigo G7  cedendo  efetivamente  sua  primazia  para  o 
novo G20, e com os BRICS afirmando a sua presença,  individual e coletivamente, 
como importantes atores globais. 
Agora, um processo de busca global está em andamento. Os grandes atores 
internacionais,  velhos  e  novos,  exploram  em  conjunto  o  panorama  de  temas 
relacionados  à  governança  global,  identificando  áreas  de  convergência  e 
divergência, e buscando novos padrões de aliança  tanto em  termos de projetos 
operacionais quanto de normas de  relações  internacionais. Este é um processo 
extremamente  complexo,  como  se  pode  facilmente  imaginar  ao  contemplar  a 
matriz teórica das relações bilaterais entre os parceiros do G20. Talvez nem todas 
as células da matriz estejam sendo ativamente exploradas, mas só da parte da UE 
dez "parcerias estratégicas" foram criadas, incluindo esta com o Brasil. 
Este é o  contexto no qual o nosso projeto analisou a parceria estratégica 
Brasil‐UE. A questão que resta é se o Brasil e a UE estão trabalhando em conjunto 
para  a  construção de uma nova ordem mundial  civilizada,  através das posições 
que  adotam  em  questões‐chave  de  governança  global,  bem  como  para 
desenvolver  relações  bilaterais mutuamente  benéficas.  As  duas  partes  ocupam 
posições‐chave  dentro  do  grupo  dos  BRICS  e  no  antigo  Ocidente, 
respectivamente.  Serão estes  capazes de  trabalhar em  conjunto  criando pontes 
entre as suas diferentes visões em direção a um esclarecido consenso global ? 
Em  seu  nível mais  elevado,  as  declarações  políticas  oficiais  afirmam  que 
"sim, claro". A parceria estratégica tem sido certamente ativa a nível diplomático. 
Em 24 de janeiro de 2013, a reunião da 6ª Cúpula Brasil‐UE, realizada em Brasília, 
teve como título "Uma relação ainda mais estreita”. Esse evento foi seguido, nos 
dias 26 e 27 de  janeiro, por uma Cúpula em Santiago, no Chile, entre a UE e a 
Comunidade dos Estados Latinoamericanos e Caribenhos  (CELAC), cujo  título  foi 
"Criando Alianças para o Investimento e Desenvolvimento Sustentável”. Também 
em Santiago ocorreram reuniões ministeriais entre a UE e os países do Mercosul 
sobre  as  negociações  em  curso  para  um  Acordo  de  Associação  entre  a  UE‐
A
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Mercosul, que  incluiria um acordo de  livre comércio. A Cúpula da CELAC contou 
com a presença de  líderes dos 27 Estados membros da UE à época, bem  como 
com das instituições da UE e com dos 32 Estados membros da CELAC. Daí pode‐se 
concluir que pelo menos a infraestrutura diplomática para reuniões de alto nível, 
bilateral  e  regional,  está  estabelecida  e  em  funcionamento. A  avaliação de  seu 
conteúdo  contudo menos  fácil  de  fazer.  E  é  a  essa  questão  que  nos  voltamos 
agora. 
O ponto de partida é  consideravelmente  favorável. O Brasil e a UE estão 
emergindo  como  atores  globais,  embora  de  tipos  bastante  diferentes. O  Brasil 
afirma o seu peso crescente no mundo, com uma enorme massa continental, uma 
economia  dinâmica  e  uma  imagem  cultural,  e  uma  vontade  de  romper  com  o 
passado  histórico  recente,  quando  as  Américas  eram  politicamente  dominadas 
pelos  Estados  Unidos.  Dentro  da  UE,  as  antigas  potências  europeias  vêm 
gradualmente tentando construir uma política externa comum a fim de igualar‐se 
ao  contexto  contemporâneo  das  novas  grandes  potências  mundiais.  Ambos 
procuram desempenhar papéis importantes em seus respectivos continentes. Não 
há  tensões  sobre  ameaças  à  segurança,  ou  divergências  sobre  valores  políticos 
fundamentais, como ocorre com a China ou a Rússia. Mesmo nas relações com os 
Estados  Unidos,  que  é  a  aliança  fundamental  para  a  União,  existem  alguns 
aspectos em que o Brasil e a UE estão bem próximos um do outro. Embora a UE 
esteja confortável com a administração Obama, a maioria dos europeus considera 
a  política  dos Republicanos  quase  como  vinda  de  outro  planeta,  assim  como  a 
maioria dos brasileiros. Ambos consideram a posição dos EUA em relação a Cuba 
obsoleta,  para  não  dizer  ridícula.  Muitos  comentaristas  europeus  veem  um 
engajamento maior do Brasil, do que, por exemplo, da Índia, no sentido de tentar 
construir pontes entre o Ocidente e o mundo em desenvolvimento. Finalmente, 
há  a  facilidade  de  relacionamentos  pessoais  entre  brasileiros  e  europeus  que 
compartilham heranças culturais comuns. 
Tudo isso pode ser muito bom. Mas há também a realidade objetiva de que 
a  ascensão  da  Ásia  e  a  atual  estagnação  econômica  na  Europa  implicam  um 
declínio  relativo na  imporância do  relacionamento econômico entre o Brasil e a 
UE, o que afeta  igualmente  suas posições políticas. O grupo dos BRICS e outras 
formações minilaterais,  incluindo o  IBAS e o G‐20 da OMC, são vistos pelo Brasil 
como  instrumentos  fundamentais  para  a  melhoria  do  seu  status  nos  assuntos 
globais. 
A  nossa  missão,  entretanto,  tem  sido  de  ir  a  fundo  na  realidade  das 
relações Brasil‐UE, para além destes pontos de partida importantes e amplamente 
positivos,  onde  também  encontram‐se  sérias  limitações  e  problemas  não 
resolvidos, ou pelo menos potencialidades subaproveitadas. 
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A  fim  de  atingir  nosso  objetivo,  adotamos  uma  abordagem  seletiva, 
escolhendo cinco temas de inegável importância estratégica, e olhando para cada 
um deles com certa profundidade. Os cinco temas são: (1) macroeconomia global, 
(2) política  comercial,  (3) mudanças  climáticas,  (4) normas de política externa e 
segurança, e (5) regionalismo continental. 
Nosso  método  de  trabalho  consistiu  em  testar  estes  temas  fazendo  as 
seguintes  perguntas:  existe  uma  convergência  ou  divergência  nas  posições  que 
estão sendo tomadas pelas duas partes? Se há convergência, esta vai além de um 
discurso compatível e  inclui a cooperação operacional? O que é, ou pode tornar‐
se,  a  soma  das  partes,  ou  seja,  o  caráter  global  da  parceria  estratégica?  Por 
exemplo,  até  que  ponto  podem  o  Brasil  e  a  UE  trabalhar  em  conjunto  para 
superar  as  divergências  que  são  evidentes  entre  os  participantes  do  G20,  em 
busca de uma ordem mundial mais eficaz? 
Macroeconomia global 
Nesta área, há reais divergências tanto de argumentos quanto de  interesses. No 
plano oficial mais elevado, o lado brasileiro tem sido um dos mais eloquentes dos 
BRICS  ao  criticar  o  Ocidente  tanto  em  sua  atual  política  econômica  quanto 
questões  de  representação  nas  instituições  financeiras  internacionais.  O  Brasil 
reclama que a política de “flexibilização quantitativa” do Banco Central dos EUA 
de 2009 a 2013 tem levado a uma supervalorização da moeda brasileira, e que as 
políticas  econômicas  tanto  dos  EUA  e  da  UE  criaram  grandes  dificuldades  ao 
reduzir  a  demanda  de  importações  provenientes  dos  países  emergentes.  O 
argumento  brasileiro  teve  repercusão  no  Chile  e  em  outros  países  latino‐
americanos. No  início de 2013,  surgiram  tensões  sobre as políticas  cambiais no 
mundo em geral depois de uma mudança na política  japonesa, com as reuniões 
do G7  e  do G20  tendo  que  lidar  com  o  que  a  imprensa  financeira  chamou  de 
“guerra  cambial”. Recentemente, a questão  voltou à  tona  com  força dentro do 
G20, mas os “policy makers” mostraram‐se até agora  incapazes de fazer mais do 
que declarar inocência e boas intenções5. 
                                                     
5 No Comunicado dos Ministros das Finanças do G20 e dos presidents dos Bancos 
Centrais, reunidos em Moscou, em 16 de fevereiro de 2013 foi declarado que: 
“Monetary policy should be directed toward domestic price stability and 
continuing to support economic recovery according to the respective mandates. 
We commit to monitor and minimize the negative spillovers on other countries of 
policies implemented for domestic purposes. …. We reiterate our commitments …. 
to avoid persistent exchange rate misalignments. …. We will refrain from 
competitive devaluation”. 
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É certamente justificável a queixa de que a governança das economias mais 
“avançadas” do mundo  tem se deteriorado ao  longo dos últimos anos,  tanto no 
chamado "abismo fiscal” da política orçamental dos EUA quanto na crise sistêmica 
da zona do euro. No momento em que este trabalho está sendo escrito, ambos os 
EUA e a UE podem estar se recuperando dos momentos mais graves da crise, mas 
de  toda  forma  danos  já  foram  causados.  No  entanto,  estes  danos  devem  ser 
cuidadosamente  avaliados  a  nível  internacional.  A  crítica  brasileira  a 
“flexibilização  quantitativa”  dos  EUA  é  vulnerável  a  resposta  de  que  sem  essas 
medidas monetárias extremas a economia dos EUA teria caído em real depressão, 
com consequências muito mais desastrosas para a economia mundial. 
Isto  leva  à  discussão  do  impacto  da  variação  cambial  no  Brasil,  e  sua 
importância para o desempenho da economia brasileira. Na verdade, a  taxa de 
câmbio brasileira tem variado em ciclos muito nítidos de sobre‐ e sub‐ valorização 
nos últimos anos, e no decorrer de 2012, as autoridades brasileiras atingiram o 
objetivo  de  reduzir  substancialmente  a  taxa  de  câmbio  em  relação  aos  níveis 
considerados  sobrevalorizados.  Em  se  tratando  do  quanto  a  taxa  de  câmbio  é 
fundamental para o desempenho macroeconômico brasileiro, o artigo de Daniel 
Gros e Cinzia Alcides ressalta que a economia brasileira é relativamente fechada 
ao comércio exterior em comparação com outras grandes economias avançadas e 
com  os  BRICS.  Esta  falta  de  abertura  tem  como  complemento  um  nível 
relativamente  elevado  de  proteção  tarifária,  igualmente  em  comparação  com 
outras grandes economias. A consequência disso é que a taxa de câmbio será um 
instrumento  relativamente  fraco  para  influenciar  a  taxa  de  crescimento  da 
economia brasileira. 
Isto, por sua vez, significa que para obter um desempenho mais dinâmico 
em  seus  setores  de  manufatura  e  serviços,  o  Brasil  precisa  resolver  entraves 
internos para o seu crescimento, como descrito claramente no artigo de Alfredo 
Valladão. O modelo de crescimento brasileiro da primeira década dos anos 2000 
foi  impulsionado por um boom das exportações de commodities, em especial do 
ferro  e  da  soja,  o  que  gerou  grandes  superávits  comerciais  para  o  país.  Como 
resultado, o Brasil  reduziu drasticamente  sua dívida externa, acumulou  reservas 
de  divisas,  e  criou  espaço  suficiente  para  o  governo  Lula  realizar  um  grande 
programa  social  transferência  de  renda,  aliado  a  um  boom  de  crédito  que 
aumentou a demanda dos consumidores. 
Mas,  ao  mesmo  tempo,  a  indústria  brasileira  estava  sofrendo  enormes 
quedas  de  competitividade,  devido  a  incapacidade  do  governo  de  resolver 
debilidades  estruturais  da  economia  como  infraestrutura  inadequada  de 
transporte,  educação  de  baixa  qualidade  e  a  ausência  de  reformas  fiscais  e 
regulatórias.  Os  problemas  foram  acentuados  por  medidas  protecionistas 
pontuais  cujo  propósito  era  blindar  os  obsoletos  produtores  locais  contra  a 
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concorrência  estrangeira.  Quando  a  partir  de  2009  as  condições  do  mercado 
mundial de commodities se  transformaram drasticamente culminando na queda 
dos  preços  e  do  volume  das  exportações  brasileiras,  os  indicadores 
macroeconômicos foram duramente atingidos, com o aumento da dívida pública 
federal,  ampliação  do  déficit  em  conta  corrente  do  balanço  de  pagamentos, 
queda do investimento e queda na taxa de crescimento do PIB, que foi de apenas 
2,5% em 2011 e 1% em 2012. O slogan “Custo Brasil” se tornou emblemático para 
a  falta de competitividade da economia. Em geral, o modelo de crescimento da 
década  de  2000  atingiu  seus  limites.  Embora  não  seja  tão  desastroso  quando 
comparado aos seus vizinhos do Mercosul, Argentina e Venezuela, o desempenho 
econômico  do  Brasil  agora  parece  desfavorável  em  comparação  com  as 
economias dinâmicas e muito mais abertas do países Andinos e do México. 
Embora a política econômica doméstica necessite receber nesse momento 
atenção prioritária, para a qual os argumentos sobre a taxa de câmbio não podem 
fornecer  um  bode  expiatório,  ainda  é  pertinente  questionar  a  adequação  do 
regime de taxa de câmbio na economia mundial, que não pode ser propriamente 
qualificado  como um  sistema. Aqui, o  lado brasileiro  ‐  tanto no plano oficial de 
suas representações no FMI e na OMC, e em artigos acadêmicos, nomeadamente 
no artigo de Vera Thorstensen et al. ‐ argumenta em favor de normas de política 
cambial mais ativas, em paralelo a regras de política comercial da OMC para que o 
FMI e a OMC ajam  juntos contra a manipulação prejudicial das taxas de câmbio. 
Existem agora uma crescente literatura e preocupação política, especialmente nos 
EUA em relação à China, no que diz respeito a manipulação das taxas de câmbio,. 
O estudo realizado por Vera Thorstensen et al. defende uma regra que permita o 
uso  de  tarifas  compensatórias  para  fazer  frente  a  uma  desvalorização  cambial. 
Surpreendentemente,  estudo  propõe  ainda  que  este  deve  ser  uma  medida 
inovadora  a  ser  introduzida  nas  negociações  de  livre  comércio  entre  UE  e 
Mercosul. Esta formulação particular está aberta a resposta da Uniao Europeia de 
que a zona do euro está, de acordo com todos os dados empíricos, absolutamente 
no meio dessas pontuações sobrevalorização cambial. O euro não seria portanto 
nem sobrevalorizado e nem subvalorizado, e não estaria sujeito a uma deliberada 
meta  cambial.  Assim,  o  acordo  de  livre  comércio UE‐Mercosul  pode  não  ser  o 
terreno mais razoável para experimentar estas  ideias. Por outro  lado, a altíssima 
competitividade  da  economia  chinesa  nos  últimos  anos,  e  a  consequente 
acumulação de enormes  reservas  cambiais,  seria um  alvo mais plausível. Nesse 
ponto,  o  Congresso  dos  EUA  tem  agido  efetivamente,  e  uma  análise  recente 
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independente feita por Fred Bergsten e Joseph Gagnon6 analisa a gama de opções 
de políticas que podem ser utilizadas,  incluindo mecanismos compensatórios de 
intervenção  no  mercado  de  capitais,  bem  como  instrumentos  de  política 
comercial. 
A União Europeia, por  sua  vez,  tem manifestado  sua preocupação  com  a 
taxa de câmbio chinesa, e por esta razão tem até então recusado a concer a China 
o status pleno de "economia de mercado". Uma aliança virtual entre o Brasil, a UE 
e  os  EUA  sobre  este  assunto  é,  portanto,  concebível,  embora  por  enquanto  a 
China tenha alcançado o equilíbrio externo. Uma das opções de ação seria que o 
Tesouro  americano  bloqueasse  o  acesso  chinês  à  compra  de  novos  títulos  do 
Tesouro, o que não exigiria novas regras da OMC e/ou do FMI, e para a qual seria 
extremamente difícil obter consenso. 
Isso  leva a uma última questão discutida no paper de Daniel Gros e Cinzia 
Alcide,  nomeadamente:  a  representação  da  UE  na  estrutura  de  poder  das 
instituições  financeiras  internacionais, que o Brasil e todos os BRICS veem como 
excessiva.  Na  verdade,  o  peso  dos  votos  dentro  do  FMI  estão  sendo 
continuamente  adaptados  de  acordo  com  indicadores  macroeconômicos 
objetivos. O peso do voto do Brasil seria baixo caso o PIB  fosse o único critério; 
sua  participação  se  mantém  de  toda  forma  reduzida  devido  a  baixa  abertura 
comercial do país. No entanto, a  crise do euro  coloca essas questões  sob nova 
perspectiva.  A  crise  do  euro  levou  o  FMI  a  adquirir  recursos  extras  para  fazer 
frente  à  possibilidade  de  ter  de  contribuir  para  o  resgate  de  uma  grande 
economia da  zona do euro, com os BRICS  contribuindo consideravelmente para 
esta nova capacidade.  Isso  traz à  tona a questão de se a zona do euro deve ser 
representada como uma união monetária enquanto membro pleno do Conselho 
de Administração do FMI,  substituindo os Estados  individuais membros da  zona 
do euro. Se isso viesse a acontecer, seria lógico que o peso comercial da zona do 
euro na  fórmula padrão do FMI  fosse  revisto e  reduzido no sentido de  limitar o 
comércio  intra‐zona.  Isso ofereceria um poder de  voto  adicional para os países 
emergentes e em desenvolvimento. De fato, tal cenário é uma questão altamente 
sensível  para  os  governos  da  zona  do  euro,  e  objeto  de  pontos  de  vista 
independentes  até  então,  mas  a  lógica  é  plausível  e  seria  presumivelmente 
aprovada pelo Brasil e os outros membros dos BRICS. 
Em geral este domínio macroeconômico mundial vê  importantes questões 
não resolvidas justificando o diálogo permanente entre o Brasil e a UE, como em 
                                                     
6 Fred Bergsten and Joseph Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US economy, 
and the Global Economic Order”, Policy Brief no. 12-25, Petersen Institute for 
International Economics, December 2012. 
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outras parcerias estratégicas e negociações nos fóruns globais, especialmente no 
G20, no FMI e na OMC. No entanto, no que refere‐se a questão crítica da taxa de 
câmbio,  o  fato  de  a  zona  do  euro  estar  em  uma  posição  claramente  neutra  a 
coloca em uma situação privilegiada, a princípio, para ter um diálogo sério com o 
Brasil e trabalhar no sentido de buscar uma base comum para um conjunto mais 
adequado de regras e critérios para ações corretivas. 
Comércio e políticas regulatórias 
É  amplamente  reconhecido  que  a  Rodada  de  Doha  da  OMC  encontra‐se  em 
estado  de  coma,  com  a  consequente  proliferação  de  acordos  preferenciais  de 
comércio  bilaterais,  regionais  e  interregionais.  Não  obstante  este  panorama 
sombrio da OMC, a UE tem apreciado o papel do Brasil nas negociações a nível da 
OMC ao  longo das duas últimas décadas. Como Patrick Messerlin  relata em  seu 
artigo, a abordagem brasileira para assuntos da OMC mudou em 1995, deixando 
para  trás  um  tom  intransigente,  e  efetivamente  permitindo  que  a  Rodada  do 
Uruguai  chegasse  a  uma  conclusão  bem  sucedida.  Na  década  de  2000,  nos 
estágios  iniciais  da  Rodada  de  Doha,  o  Brasil  sugeriu  que  os  países  em 
desenvolvimento e emergentes se comprometessem a fazer algumas concessões, 
mantendo  uma  posição  central  relativamente  construtiva,  ao  contrário  das 
posições  da  Índia  e  China.  Apesar  de  Doha  não  ter  avançado,  os  esforços 
brasileiros  na  diplomacia  do  comércio  multilateral  foram  notados  e 
recompensados  em  maio  2013  com  a  nomeação  de  um  brasileiro  para  ser  o 
próximo diretor da OMC. 
As  negociações  entre  a  UE  e  a  união  aduaneira  do  Mercosul  sobre  um 
Acordo de Associação incorporando um Acordo de Livre Comércio (ALC) estão em 
andamento, mais ou menos ativo,  já há muitos anos. O Mercosul  foi criado em 
1991  e  logo  depois  assinou  um  primeiro  acordo  interinstitucional  com  a UE. A 
decisão de iniciar as negociações de um ALC foi tomada em 1998, mas estas foram 
suspensas em 2004, com a  insatisfação de ambos os  lados com as ofertas feitas. 
Para o Brasil, a proposta de acesso aos mercados agrícolas da UE era insuficiente, 
enquanto a UE queria maior acesso ao  setor de  serviços brasileiro. No entanto, 
após uma  longa pausa, as negociações  foram retomadas em 2010 e ainda estão 
em andamento. Enquanto  isso, o  contexto político no Mercosul  tornou‐se mais 
complexo. Dos quatro membros originais, Argentina, Brasil, Paraguai e Uruguai, 
há problemas evidentes na política econômica Argentina, e um  (provavelmente 
temporário) problema político no Paraguai, cuja adesão está atualmente suspensa 
devido  a  irregularidades  constitucionais.  Além  disso,  a  recente  adesão  da 
Venezuela  ao Mercosul  traz para o bloco um país  cuja políticas  radicais  seriam 
difíceis de conciliar com um ambicioso ALC. 
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Dois  artigos  sobre  este  tema,  de  autoria  de  Renato  Flores  e  Patrick 
Messerlin,  são  bastante  convergentes  em  suas  análises.  Renato  Flores  em  um 
trabalho  anterior7  calcula  que  um ALC  poderia  trazer  benéficos  para  ambos  os 
lados, com os ganhos potenciais para o Mercosul concentrados no setor agrícola, 
especialmente para os produtores argentinos e brasileiros de carne. No caso da 
UE,  os  ganhos  mais  amplos  se  dariam  nos  setores  industrial  e  de  serviços. 
Segundo  Flores  as  duas  partes  poderiam  ter  firmado  um  acordo  em  2004  se 
ambas estivessem dispostas a fazer um pouco mais de concessões. Ele mantém a 
sua opinião de que um ALC simples seria mutuamente benéfico e viável. 
Nas  reuniões de  janeiro de 2013, em Santiago, houve acordo para  tentar 
avançar  nas  negociações,  com  as  duas  partes  concordando,  em  princípio,  em 
trocar ofertas até o final do ano. No entanto, os autores dos nossos dois artigos 
são céticos sobre a profundidade do compromisso político de ambos os lados para 
concluir um ALC. Eles criticam o processo em que ambos os  lados  fazem gestos 
políticos superficiais para manter as negociações oficialmente em curso, quando 
na  realidade  parecem  estar  em  um  impasse.  O  lado  do  Mercosul  está  ainda 
contaminado por um sentimento protecionista, principalmente na Argentina e na 
Venezuela, mais do que no Brasil. Quanto ao lado da UE, Messerlin observa que as 
prioridades da sua política comercial estão focadas de agora em diante no Japão e 
nos  Estados  Unidos,  com  pouco  apetite  a  níveis  políticos  superiores, 
especialmente na França, para avançar em direção a qualquer liberalização radical 
do acesso ao mercado de produtos agrícolas. Nestas  circunstâncias, a  chamada 
explícita da UE para um "ambicioso" ALC parece particularmente  irrealista, dado 
que a sua concepção  implica, para a outra parte, uma extensa convergência aos 
regulamentos e normas do mercado único europeu, que por sua vez exige altos 
níveis  de  compromisso  e  habilidades  administrativas  escassas  para  a  adoção  e 
implementação. Além disso, a economia mundial mudou rapidamente durante os 
anos em que as negociações UE‐Mercosul  se arrastaram,  com as economias da 
América do Sul cada vez mais integradas às dinâmicas economias asiáticas. 
Nestas  circunstâncias,  o  que  deve  ser  feito?  Para  Renato  Flores  ainda  é 
possível  fazer  um  ALC  simples,  com  a  liberalização  de meia  dúzia  de  produtos 
agrícolas por parte da UE e com o Mercosul  liberalizando em torno de 50 a 100 
produtos manufaturados. Quanto ao  setor de  serviços, há maior consciência no 
Brasil  da  necessidade  de  ter  serviços mais  avançados  auxiliando  os  setores  de 
manufaturas  e  commodities.  De  tado,  houve  real  progresso  na  convergência 
                                                     
7 German Calat and Renato Flores, “The EU-Mercosul Free Trade Agreement - 
Quantifying Mutual Gains”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 
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regulatória em alguns desses  setores, como o de  telecomunicações, com alguns 
resultados surpreendentes (ver Box 1). No entanto, dever‐se‐ia ser seletivo sobre 
o  que  é  possível,  ao  invés  de  tentar  abranger  diferentes  setores.  Além  disso, 
enquanto Bruxelas pode  ter‐se orgulhado de ser a "capital regulatória mundial", 
Flores  ressalta  que  algumas  regras  comunitárias  impõem  custos  extremamente 
caros aos exportadores da UE, citando a diretiva REACH para produtos químicos 
como  um  exemplo  importante.  Ele  gostaria  de  um  processo  de  consulta  para 
minimizar barreiras não‐tarifárias disfarçadas. Sua conclusão geral é de que a UE e 
o Mercosul devem visar um ALC rápido e simples, com um prazo definido, como 
dezembro de 2014, ou  fechar o processo de negociação, até que circunstâncias 
mais propícias apareçam no próximos anos. 
 
Box 1. O Brasil encontra a combinação  ideal de políticas  regulatórias para o 
seu setor de telecomunicações 
Em dezembro de 2012 o Brasil e a UE celebraram dez anos de cooperação na área 
de TIC,  com uma  semana  inteira de diálogos e  trocas de  ideias  sobre  inovação, 
pesquisa e regulação. A UE é um ativo exportador de seus modelos de regulação, 
e no setor de telecomunicações o Brasil foi astuto em copiar o padrão regulatório 
europeu  de  2002,  elogiado  pelo  país  como  uma  base  sólida  para  reformas 
liberalizantes. 
No entanto, houve um problema. Em parte por causa das regras europeias 
de defesa da concorrência, uma vez que o pacote de telecomunicações da UE de 
2002  centrou‐se na  crença de que os operadoes do mercado não deveriam  ser 
obrigados a investir antecipadamente em sua própria infraestrutura. Este modelo, 
denominado  "investment  ladder",  exigiu  uma  imensa  acrobacia  para  a  sua 
implementação. Os EUA experimentou um modelo semelhante a partir de 1996 
(chamado  "stepping  stones",  ao  invés  de  "investment  ladder").  No  entanto, 
quando o país passou a estimular o investimento em redes, o sistema regulatório 
norte‐americano  decidiu,  em  2003,  permitir  o  chamado  "regulatory  holydays” 
para as empresas que investiram em redes de banda larga, e assim o investimento 
floresceu. 
O  Brasil  decidiu  adotar  o  melhor  dos  modelos  da  UE  e  dos  EUA, 
principalmente quando abriu uma licitação para 4G de banda larga móvel de alta 
velocidade bem antes de muitos Estados membros da UE. O país baseou‐se no 
pacote  bem  formatado  de  telecomunicações  da  UE,  porém  com  "regulatory 
holydays”  para  banda  larga. Agora,  a  bola  está  no  campo  da UE.  Talvez  seja  o 
momento  propício  para  a  UE  considerar  o  levantamento  de  obrigações 
regulamentares sobre os  investidores. A menos que ela o faça, é provável que o 
Brasil passe a aderir a banda larga de alta velocidade antes da UE. 
Fonte: Andrea Renda, CEPS. 
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Messerlin  concorda  que  a  formação  de  um  ALC  pleno  entre  a  UE  e  o 
Mercosul está  fora de questão, mas rejeita a opção de simplesmente suspender 
as negociações novamente, como  foi  feito em 2004.  Isso encorajaria o aumento 
do protecionismo nos países do Mercosul, e especialmente no caso do Brasil, tem 
a  importante  desvantagem  de  deixar  sua  economia  excluída  da  enorme  e 
crescente  teia  de  “mega”  acordos  preferenciais  de  comércio  negociados 
atualmente na Ásia, no Pacífico e no Atlântico Norte. Ele salienta ainda a grande 
complexidade  técnica dessas “mega” negociações, o que significa que os grupos 
de  negociadores,  desde  o  nível  técnico  até  o  político,  vão  ser  duramente 
pressionados,  deixando  pouco  espaço  para  negociações  difíceis  de  importância 
econômica de segundo nível. Juntos, esses fatores apontam para a elaboração de 
uma nova, mas limitada agenda de tópicos para a negociação com o Mercosul, na 
qual o grande e abrangente número de questões que geralmente aparecem na 
lista de exigências da UE,  seria  limitado  a  certas  áreas, nas quais  seria possível 
progredir  num  futuro  próximo.  A  longa  e  convencional  lista  da  UE  é 
particularmente  inapropriada  para  as  negociações  com  o  Mercosul,  dadas  as 
competências  efetivas  limitadas  dessa  organização. O melhor  seria  priorizar  os 
temas  importantes,  fora  da  competência  exclusiva  do  Mercosul,  que  podem 
tornar  uma  futura  liberalização  do mercado  verdadeiramente  significativa.  Isto 
seria útil seja o acesso ao mercado  limitado ou não.  . Sua seleção de temas que 
respondem  a  esses  critérios  inclui  normas  e  padrões  para  bens  industriais, 
medidas  sanitárias  e  fitossanitárias para  setores  agroalimentares,  regulamentos 
para alguns setores de serviços. A  lista teria uma segunda categoria de normas e 
domínios  de  cooperação menos  diretamente  relacionados  com  o  comércio,  no 
campo ambiental, mudanças climáticas e pesquisa e transferência de tecnologias 
industriais (concordando aqui com os trabalhos de Eduardo Viola e Renato Flores, 
respectivamente). Messerlin chama a atenção para o valor potencial do princípio 
de "reconhecimento mútuo", no qual a UE tem muita experiência, e tem o mérito 
de  ser  flexível, permitindo acordos bilaterais. Algo maior pode, então,  tornar‐se 
possível,  no  seu  devido  tempo,  quando  as  partes  se  aproximarem  do  que 
Messerlin chama de "mesmo humor”. 
Uma forma de desbloquear o acordo UE‐Mercosul é também explorada por 
Alfredo Valladão,  com  ideias que  são bastante  consistentes  com  as de  Flores e 
Messerlin.  Sua  discussão,  entretanto  foca  em  favor  de  um  urgente  pacote  de 
reformas  da  economia  brasileira,  que  incluiria  tanto  reformas  internas  quanto 
externas. As medidas de  liberalização  comercial devem, no entanto,  respeitar o 
imperativo político brasileiro para não danificar o Mercosul, que é o fundamento 
político,  bem  como  econômico  das  relações  do  Brasil  com  seus  vizinhos,  e  em 
primeiro lugar, com a Argentina. Valladão avançou em duas ideias. Na primeira, o 
Brasil deveria  levar  adiante um  conjunto de  acordos bilaterais  com  a UE  sobre 
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todos os  tema com exceção do comércio, ou mais precisamente sobre qualquer 
tema que não  refira‐se  a  tarifas,  levando  adiante  as negociações  sobre normas 
técnicas,  barreiras  não‐tarifárias,  políticas  regulatórias,  facilitação  de  negócios 
etc., onde não há necessariamente  competência do Mercosul. A  segunda  ideia, 
consistente com a primeira, seria a de entrar em um tipo diferente de negociação 
com o Mercosul, permitindo que cada membro do Mercosul  tivesse a  liberdade 
de  adotar  compromissos  de  liberalização  diferenciados,  mais  rápidos  ou  mais 
lentos, de acordo com as possibilidades cada um. A própria UE tem experiência no 
estabelecimento  de  tais  tipos  de  compromissos  nos  seus  próprios  assuntos 
internos, com vários métodos do tipo "two‐ speed", mas também com o Brasil, no 
caso de seus acordos de livre comércio com a Comunidade Andina, com um único 
acordo que contém disposições diferenciadas para Colômbia e Peru. Em geral, o 
enfoque  traz à discussão um  conceito híbrido,  combinando um acordo bilateral 
sobre “qualquer tema com exceção do comércio” com um "regionalismo em duas 
velocidades". 
Mudança climática 
Tanto o Brasil quanto a UE levam muito a sério as políticas de mudança climática, 
sem  levar  a  sério  seus  “negacionistas”  que  existem  em  países  como  os  EUA. 
Ambos possuem grandes conquistas a seu favor em termos de políticas climáticas, 
ainda que de diferentes tipos, ao mesmo tempo em que enfrentam no momento 
sérios desafios para as próximas fases do seu desenvolvimento político. 
O Brasil é um país‐chave nas questões globais de mudanças climáticas e nas 
questões  ambientais.  O  artigo  de  Eduardo  Viola  explica  isso  com  detalhe, 
mostrando que o país  tem a maior área  florestal do mundo do mundo, a maior 
reserva de energia hidrelétrica, a maior reserva de terras agricultáveis, e o maior 
estoque  de  biodiversidade.  No  período  de  2005  a2009  o  Brasil  conseguiu  ao 
mesmo tempo manter um crescimento econômico estável e atingir uma redução 
drástica  das  emissões  de  carbono  de  25%  ‐  um  resultado  único  no  mundo.  O 
principal  fator  que  contribuiu  para  a  redução  das  emissões  de  carbono  foi  a 
contenção do desmatamento da Amazônia, devido a aplicação mais rigorosa, por 
parte das autoridades federais, da  legislação que estava em vigor desde 1997. A 
redução do desmatamento não foi total, mas se deu em uma margem de quase 
três quartos. 
Ao mesmo tempo, o Brasil tem adaptado a sua postura no que diz respeito 
aos processos  internacionais de mudanças climáticas. Até meados da década de 
2000, o pensamento brasileiro foi fortemente influenciado por crenças arraigadas 
em  relação  ao  uso  indiscriminado  de  curto  prazo  dos  recursos  naturais.  Essa 
crença, aliada às suas concepções tradicionais de soberania nacional, tornaram‐se 
fatores  conflitantes  com  a  preocupação  internacional  com  o  desmatamento  da 
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Amazônia.  No  entanto,  em  2006,  na  reunião  da  UNFCCC  em  Nairóbi,  o  Brasil 
propôs  um  fundo  global  para  reduzir  o  desmatamento.  No  plano  dos 
compromissos  estratégicos,  em  2009,  o  Brasil  comprometeu‐se  a  reduzir  entre 
36% e 39% até 2020 suas emissões de gases de efeito estufa, comparável a uma 
projeção do tipo 'business as usual'. Mas, para alcançar essas metas o Brasil agora 
precisa ir além da contenção do desmatamento, direcionando suas políticas para 
áreas onde há maior  resistência à ação  reparadora,  como é  caso do  transporte 
urbano, que apresenta rápido crescimento das suas emissões. 
No plano da diplomacia  internacional  estratégica  a questão  agora para o 
Brasil, como analisado por Viola, é o quanto ou por quanto tempo o país manterá 
sua aliança com seus principais parceiros dentro dos BRICS ‐ China, Rússia e Índia ‐
, que são tipicamente conservadores em termos de política climática, ou se o país 
passará a convergir e cooperar mais com os principais atores da política climática, 
tais como a União Europeia, Japão e Coreia. 
Por sua parte, a União Europeia foi  impulsionada a tomar uma posição de 
liderança em  relação à política climática global quando os EUA  se  retiraram das 
negociações  do  Protocolo  de  Kyoto  em  2005.  A  UE  prosseguiu,  reunindo  as 
assinaturas suficientes para o Protocolo tornar‐se operacional. O estudo realizado 
por Christian Egenhofer e Monica Alessi explica que a peça central da política da 
UE foi o seu “Esquema de Comércio de Emissões” (ETS, em inglês), que começou 
ainda em 2005. A fim de  implementar os seus compromissos, a UE elaborou um 
plano nomeado “20‐20 até 2020”, que  foi definitivamente aprovado em abril de 
2009. O plano consistia na redução de 20% nas emissões em relação aos níveis de 
1990, a ser atualizada para 30% no caso de um acordo mundial, e 20% renováveis 
para  consumo  de  energia  primária;  além  de  outros  elementos,  incluindo  a 
separação das metas por Estado membro. Com uma  cobertura de 2 bilhões de 
toneladas  de  emissões  de  GEE,  o  “ETS”  da  UE  representa  cerca  de  80%  do 
mercado global de carbono. Mas os esquemas  iniciais  revelaram algumas  falhas 
graves no projeto, levando a mudanças a serem negociadas no período pós‐2012. 
No entanto,  sabe‐se  agora que  a meta de 20% não é  suficiente para que  a UE 
garanta sua performance de “descarbonização” em  linha com sua meta de  longo 
prazo de reduzir as emissões entre 80‐95% até 2050 de modo a contibuir para a 
redução  do  aquecimento  global  em  2  graus  centígrados.  Várias medidas  estão 
sendo tomadas pela UE para por a casa em ordem, como por exemplo, ajustar a 
emissão de licenças para venda em leilão público.  
Ao mesmo tempo, para a UE, os aspectos internacionais tornam‐se cada vez 
mais cruciais, uma vez que a sua própria parcela de emissões globais vem caindo 
rapidamente,  de  13%  atualmente  para  uma  expectativa  de  10%  em  2020, 
enquanto os percentuais da China e dos EUA estão em torno de 20%. Além disso, 
a preocupação da UE com a competitividade das suas  indústrias, como resultado 
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de suas políticas unilaterais climáticas, também está crescendo. Neste contexto, a 
tarefa de construção de alianças visando soluções de cooperação  internacional é 
de fundamental importância, e aqui a questão da cooperação entre a UE e o Brasil 
é  altamente  relevante.  Já  nas  reuniões  da  UNFCCC  em  Durban  (2011)  e  Doha 
(2012),  os  negociadores  do  Brasil  e  da  UE  trabalharam  realmente  juntos, 
buscando  preencher  as  enormes  lacunas  entre  os  países  avançados  e 
conservadores  em  matéria  de  políticas  climáticas  (tanto  países  em 
desenvolvimento quanto em alguns países desenvolvidos). O Brasil, em particular, 
que tem um papel fundamental tanto no grupo dos BRICS e quanto no de países 
em desenvolvimento, tem ajudado, em colaboração com a UE, a garantir avanços 
diplomáticos como os que ocorreram em Durban, quando decidiu‐se prorrogar o 
Protocolo de Kyoto e  trabalhar em direção a mecanismos  inclusivos globais até 
2015. 
Pensando  mais  à  frente,  Viola  vê  o  caso  em  que  o  Brasil  reforça  a  sua 
aliança  com  a  União  Europeia  e  outros  países  progressistas  em  matéria  de 
políticas climáticas, enquanto ainda atua como uma ponte entre a UE e os grupos 
dos  BRICS/IBAS.  Essa  aliança  seria  tanto  no  plano  da  diplomacia  internacional, 
quanto através de uma longa lista de possíveis programas bilaterais entre a UE e o 
Brasil, como em temas do tipo biocombustíveis, recursos hídricos, desmatamento, 
energia solar e eólica, captura e armazenamento de carbono, redes  inteligentes, 
transporte público etc. Além disso, Viola vê algum potencial no  futuro de médio 
prazo para a convergência de posições sobre mudanças climáticas entre a UE, o 
Brasil, o Chile e o México. Se esta convergência ocorrer, o processo inter‐regional 
UE‐CELAC  poderia  ser  útil  no  estabelecimento  de  uma  aliança  intercontinental 
mais ampla. 
Em geral, a política climática é um campo promissor para uma cooperação 
ativa entre o Brasil e a UE. Ambas as partes firmaram importantes compromissos, 
embora ambos agora  tenham que enfrentar  tarefas difíceis para passar para as 
próximas fases das suas políticas internas. Do ponto de vista estratégico, esse é o 
caso em que o Brasil e a UE estão mais próximos de seus objetivos comuns do que 
em  relação  a qualquer outro dos  seus principais parceiros  em  suas  alianças ou 
grupos internacionais prioritários (os BRICS e o Ocidente, respectivamente). Isto é 
importante para aumentar as chances de construir alianças climáticas eficazes em 
todo  o mundo,  e mais  ainda  para  atenuar  a  polarização  antagônica  do mundo 
entre "o Ocidente e o Resto". 
Normas de política externa e de segurança 
A  relação UE‐Brasil é completamente desprovida de qualquer  tipo de ameaça a 
segurança  mútua,  o  que  não  se  observa  em  relação  a  um  grande  número  de 
relações entre os BRICS e os países do Ocidente, ou até mesmo entre alguns dos 
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BRICS.  Tanto  o  Brasil  quanto  a UE  partilham  de  compromissos  inquestionáveis 
com as normas políticas e humanitárias de democracia e direitos humanos. Esses 
fatores são um alicerce sólido de confiança e valores sobre o qual baseiam‐se as 
normas de política externa e de segurança mútua. No entanto, o mundo mostra 
que, em geral, a coerência entre as normas internas e externas não é automática, 
com muitos fatores muitas vezes intervindo para separar os dois. Em particular o 
esforço do Ocidente, tanto dos EUA quanto da UE, em promover a democracia e 
os direitos humanos como valores universais pode colidir com a doutrina da “não‐
interferência”  firmemente  defendida  pelos  BRICS  e  por  grupos  tradicionais  de 
países em desenvolvimento que sofreram com o colonialismo. 
O Brasil e a UE estão, de modo bem diferente, emergindo como atores na 
política externa. Alcides Costa Vaz explica em seu artigo que o Brasil emergiu nas 
últimas  décadas,  com  um  conjunto  altamente  diversificado  de  parceiros 
prioritários, em comparação com épocas anteriores, quando a sua política externa 
estava  ancorada  no  eixo  do  Atlântico  Norte  e  nas  relações  com  a  sua  vizinha 
Argentina.  O  papel  ativo  do  Brasil  em  uma  nova  geração  de  coalizões 
internacionais minilaterais,  incluindo a OMC, o G‐20, o BRICS e o  IBAS, o ajudou 
muito a reforçar o seu perfil como um ator global, enquanto mantinha sempre em 
mente o objetivo ainda distante de se  tornar membro permanente do Conselho 
de  Segurança  da  ONU.  O  Brasil  claramente  endossou  o  conceito  de 
multipolaridade como uma desejada estrutura de poder, e construiu o argumento 
de que isso pode funcionar sinergicamente com o multilateralismo, embora, como 
salientou Giovanni Grevi em seu artigo, isso não seja tão evidente. 
Em seu artigo, Grevi observa como a UE  tem desenvolvido a sua visão de 
mundo decorrente de suas próprias experiências formadas a partir da superação 
do duplo trauma das guerras mundiais, pelas quais a Europa foi responsável, e dos 
desastres  ditatoriais  destas  decorrentes.  Isso  colocou  a  UE  no  caminho  para 
estabelecer‐se  como  um  poder  normativo  nas  relações  internacionais,  mesmo 
que  a prática mostre que  isso não é uma proposição  simples. A primeira e  até 
agora única  “Estratégia Europeia de Segurança” de 2003  identificou a UE  como 
defensor  de  eficácia  no  âmbito  multilateral.  Assim  como  o  Brasil,  a  UE  não 
percebe  nenhuma  ameaça  interestatal  para  a  sua  integridade  territorial.  A  UE 
está,  portanto,  focada  nas  ameaças  assimétricas  da  ordem  estabelecida 
(terrorismo,  falência do Estado, proliferação de armas de destruição em massa), 
investindo  fortemente  na  conceptualização  e  instrumentos  de  prevenção  e 
resolução de conflitos, e gestão de crises. Concretamente, a UE tem se envolvido 
em uma proliferação de missões de crise e conflito com pouco apoio militar, bem 
como  apoio  civil para muitas missões de promoção do  estado de direito. A UE 
também tem notado que o Brasil vem se tornando cada vez mais ativo no campo 
da intervenção humanitária, como no exemplo notável de seu papel de liderança 
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no  Haiti.  Em  sua  vizinhança,  a  UE  tem  sido  profundamente  influenciada  pela 
experiência  do  seu  próprio  "poder  transformador"  que  foi  bastante  eficaz  na 
grande  ampliação  no  número  de  seus  Estados  Membros,  em  2005,  quando 
passaram a fazer parte do bloco Estados da Europa Central e Oriental. 
Em 2008, quando o primeiro documento sobre estratégia de segurança foi 
revisado, a noção de "mundo em mudança" entrou no título, o que coincidiu com 
a primeira  reunião do G20  sobre  como  lidar  com  a  crise  financeira  global. Nos 
anos  seguintes,  a  UE  expandiu  e  consolidou  a  sua  lista  de  atualmente  dez 
parcerias estratégicas com os principais países do G20,  incluindo, claro, o Brasil. 
Isso marcou um  importante reequilíbrio nas prioridades da UE entre sua política 
de  vizinhança  e  questões  globais,  com  o  aumento  da  atenção  dada  ao  último 
tema,  sem negligenciar o primeiro. O Brasil, nesse meio  tempo, vem  realizando 
um reequilíbrio ainda maior das suas prioridades em favor de temas globais, como 
ilustrado pelas formações minilaterais das quais ele participa. 
No  que  diz  respeito  a  sua  abordagem  sobre  as  questões  normativas  de 
política externa, o Brasil  tem se envolvido de  forma cautelosa nas questões que 
regem a  intervenção  internacional, dada a sua forte afinidade com a doutrina da 
“não‐interferência”. No entanto,  com o debate que  leva à doutrina da ONU de 
“Responsibility  to  Protect”  (R2P),  o  Brasil  teve  que  definir  a  sua  posição  e, 
finalmente  aprovou  a  R2P,  continuando  a  manifestar  preocupação  com  a  sua 
aplicação excessiva. Em setembro de 2011, inspirados pela experiência da guerra 
da Líbia e da revolta em curso na Síria, o governo brasileiro apresentou na ONU o 
conceito de  “Responsibility while  Protecting”  (RwP), A União  Europeia, por  sua 
vez, na qualidade de signatária da R2P, ficou um pouco intrigada com a iniciativa 
brasileira,  que  continua  sendo  discutida,  sem  tornar‐se  de  forma  alguma 
operacionalizada, dentro das Nações Unidas. A UE não parece ainda certa se essa 
atitude brasileira  seria uma  tentativa construtiva para conectar o Ocidente e os 
países  mais  linha‐dura  dentro  dos  BRICS,  ou  apenas  um  “grande  discurso” 
diplomático. 
Esses  dois  artigos  também  aguçam  o  debate  sobre  os  méritos  da 
multipolaridade.  Para Alcides  Costa Vaz,  a multipolaridade  e  o multilateralismo 
vão bem  juntos. Por outro  lado, Giovanni Grevi questiona se a "multipolaridade 
chegou  tarde  demais",  argumentando  que  os  BRICS  e  outras  potências 
emergentes  são  tão  profundamente  interdependentes  do  Ocidente  e  entre  si 
nesse mundo globalizado que a ideia de polos autônomos torna‐se desatualizada. 
Em outros  textos,  ele  avançou  sobre  a noção de  "interpolaridade” para  refletir 
este  fator  de  interdependência,  que  é  mais  do  que  uma  questão  de  jogo  de 
palavras.  A  questão  é  até  que  ponto  um  multilateralismo  efetivo  é  o  objetivo 
comum de ambos os BRICS e do Ocidente. O Brasil e a UE são, indiscutivelmente, 
os  exemplos  mais  sólidos  nos  BRICS  e  no  Ocidente,  respectivamente,  para 
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promover este objetivo. No futuro, tanto Alcides Costa Vaz quanto Giovanni Grevi 
enxergam uma possível convergência entre o Brasil e a UE sobre questões globais, 
além de perspectivas de cooperação bilateral para desenvolver posições comuns ‐ 
ainda  que  isso  não  aconteça  automaticamente,  requerendo  uma  parceria 
estratégica duradoura. Grevi sugere que iniciativas conjuntas em terceiros países, 
como,  por  exemplo,  a  colaboração  em  projetos  que  abordem  a  relação  entre 
desenvolvimento e democracia, pode ser uma ferramenta utilizada para este fim 
Regionalismo continental 
Tanto  o  Brasil  quanto  a  UE  são  bastante  ativos  em  seus  continentes.  Ambos 
apoiam a ideia de que a cooperação a nível regional é fundamental para garantir a 
paz e a ordem em sua vizinhança. A cooperação regional ou integração são parte 
de seus pacotes de normas políticas ‐ vistos como bens públicos para o mundo em 
geral. Mas, para  além destas  generalidades,  as  comparações  entre o Brasil nas 
Américas  e  a  UE  em  todo  o  continente  europeu,  são  mais  frequentemente 
marcantes pelas diferenças de abordagem. 
As  principais  diferenças  são,  evidentemente,  que  o  Brasil  é  um  Estado 
soberano, enquanto a UE é uma entidade supranacional. Ademais, o Brasil busca 
aprofundar a cooperação com os seus vizinhos, enquanto a UE visa a  integração 
política e econômica. A UE tem permitido a adesão ao bloco de países da Europa 
Central  e  Oriental  que  já  foram  comunistas,  que  estão  sujeitos  a  condições 
políticas  e  econômicas  mais  duras.  Mas  esse  tipo  de  experiência  tem  pouca 
relevância para as Américas, embora a atual suspensão do Paraguai do Mercosul e 
da  Unasul  mostre  que  a  condicionalidade  política  também  existe  nessas 
organizações. 
As  motivações  principais  do  Brasil  em  seu  regionalismo  continental, 
conforme explicado por Susanne Gratius e Miriam Gomes Saraiva em seu artigo, 
são  fortemente  ponderadas  pela  sua  vontade  de  se  tornar  um  poder 
preeminente,  pelo  menos  na  América  do  Sul,  e  rebaixar  o  pan‐americanismo 
historicamente  liderado  pelos  Estados  Unidos  e  ainda  representado  pela 
Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA). Pode‐se dizer que o Brasil está mais 
interessado no valor do poder, ao passo que a UE está  interessada no poder dos 
valores.  Isso  faz  sentido,  uma  vez  que  o  Brasil  tem  todos  os  atributos  de  um 
Estado  poderoso,  e  a  UE,  por  outro  lado,  não  foi  capaz  de  desenvolver  uma 
capacidade  de  projeção  de  um  autêntico  poder  bruto,  mas  tem  um  forte 
compromisso  político  e  jurídico  com  a  promoção  da  democracia  e  dos  direitos 
humanos, tanto em seu território quanto nos países vizinhos. 
Tanto o Brasil quanto a UE estão atualmente testando a evolução de suas 
estruturas regionais, mas de formas bem diferentes. O Brasil vem promovendo a 
cooperação regional nos três níveis do Mercosul (por enquanto apenas pelo lado 
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do Atlântico, mas não do Pacífico); na UNASUL, para toda a América do Sul; e na 
CELAC,  incluindo  também a América Central e o Caribe. Enquanto a cooperação 
com o Mercosul é principalmente econômica, mas também política (por exemplo, 
a definição de sua relação com a Argentina), com a Unasul é basicamente política 
com  alguns  aspectos  relacionados  a  defesa  e  a  infraestrutura  regional.  A 
cooperação  com  a  CELAC  trata‐se,  por  sua  vez,  da  afirmação  de  uma  grande 
identidade  regional  com  a  exclusão  da  América  do  Norte.  A  composição 
geográfica da Unasul e da CELAC agora parece estar fixa, mas a do Mercosul está 
aberta a expansão. A título de comparação, os círculos mais amplos da UE incluem 
o Conselho Europeu, com o desenvolvimento de fortes competências na área de 
direitos  humanos  para  toda  a  Europa,  incluindo  a  Rússia,  enquanto  a  OSCE 
desenvolveu  um  conjunto  de  normas  de  segurança  política  para  a  Europa, 
ampliado  a  fim  de  incluir  todo  o  espaço  pós‐soviético,  os  Estados  Unidos  e  o 
Canadá. 
As dinâmicas de integração regional também são como um grande quebra‐
cabeça para os políticos e acadêmicos. Enquanto a CELAC tem uma agenda menos 
ambiciosa que  a da Unasul, nenhuma das duas organizações  estão  testando  as 
possibilidades de uma integração mais profunda, enquanto o Mercosul vem tendo 
problemas para garantir a  integridade de sua união aduaneira. Na UE, por outro 
lado,  como  explica Michael  Emerson  em  seu  artigo,  a  antiga  “bicycle  theory of 
integration” (isto é, ou mantém‐se em movimento, ou cai) vem a tona novamente 
com  a  atual  crise  da  zona  do  euro.  Isto  pode  conduzir  a  uma  estrutura  mais 
federal  para  a  zona  do  euro,  mas  também  expõe  as  resistências  de  Estados 
eurocépticos, notavelmente o Reino Unido, cujo primeiro‐ministro agora rejeita o 
preceito do “Tratado de Roma” sobre uma "união cada vez mais estreita”. 
Pode  ser  igualmente  interessante  contrastar  a  percepção  dos  Estados 
Unidos  e  da  Rússia  como  as  grande  potências  estrangeiras  mais  próximas  da 
América Latina e da União Europeia, respectivamente. O Brasil estimula a Unasul 
e a CELAC a aumentar sua autonomia em relação ao enorme poder dos Estados 
Unidos.  Já  a  UE  apoia  as  mais  amplas  organizações  regionais  europeias,  o 
Conselho  Europeu  e  a OSCE, na  esperança de  atrair  a Rússia progressivamente 
para o seu sistema de valores políticos. 
Ambos  os  continentes  também  lutam  para  definir  os  contornos  de  suas 
áreas econômicas. No continente europeu, há nesse momento uma competição 
entre  a  União  Europeia  e  a  Russia.  A  UE  pretende  concluir  um  conjunto  de 
acordos de  “zonas de  livre  comércio profundas e mais abrangentes”  (Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, DCFTA, em inglês) com os Estados da ex‐União 
Soviética  (como Ucrânia, Moldávia, Geórgia  e  Armênia).  A  Rússia,  por  sua  vez, 
inicia uma união  aduaneira  com  a Bielorrússia e o Cazaquistão,  com o objetivo 
evidente de fazer com que a Ucrânia alie‐se a ela e desista de associar‐se a uma 
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zona de livre comércio com a UE. Os Estados Unidos, por sua vez, lançou em 1994 
a proposta de criação de uma Área de Livre Comércio das Américas  (ALCA), que 
morreu  em  2005  por  não  ter  conseguido  obter  suporte  vários  países  latino‐
americanos, incluindo o Brasil. Por outro lado, a união aduaneira do Mercosul foi 
ampliada  recentemente  com  a  adesão  da  Venezuela,  e  vem  recebendo  novos 
pedidos de adesão de alguns Estados andinos. 
Questões sobre se a UE é um modelo para a América Latina não são as mais 
a  serem  discutidas.  Vale  notar,  contudo,  que  a  Europa  tem  uma  riqueza  de 
experiências digna de ser apreciada. A parte mais robusta e menos controversa da 
experiência  da  UE  tem  sido  com  o  seu  mercado  único.  Na  década  de  1980, 
concluiu‐se que os benefícios da  integração do mercado europeu não poderiam 
ser  realizados  sem  um  conjunto  extremamente  complexo  de  medidas 
regulatórias, em parte composta de harmonização juridicamente vinculativa e do 
reconhecimento mútuo de normas nacionais para os mercados de bens e serviços. 
Isso,  por  sua  vez,  exigiu  o  estabelecimento  de  fortes  estruturas  institucionais, 
legais e de tomada de decisões (por voto majoritário). 
A  crise do  euro  representa outra  grande  lição  advinda da  experiência de 
como não fazer uma união monetária. O risco assumido pelos fundadores do euro 
era  de  que  um  excelente  e  independente  banco  central  seria  a  única  nova 
estrutura  quase‐federal  necessária  para  a  sua  estabilidade,  enquanto  o 
financiamento público e as funções regulatórias monetárias poderiam contar com 
a  cooperação  intergovernamental  e  regras  suaves.  A  receita  para  o  reparo 
sistêmico agora defendido, através da inclusão de uma união bancária, uma união 
fiscal  e  uma  união  política  no  topo  da  união monetária,  destaca‐se  como  uma 
grande  advertência  para  que  outros  continentes  não  assumam  compromissos 
superficiais de integração monetária. 
Finalmente,  o  Brasil  e  a  UE  aproximam‐se  em  questões  de  inter‐
regionalismo, como  ilustrado na reunião de cúpula UE‐CELAC, realizada em 26 e 
27 de Janeiro de 2013, bem como nas negociações em curso com o Mercosul. A 
UE valoriza essas atividades como uma regra geral, bem como com a ASEAN e a 
ASEM na Ásia, e com a União Africana. Essas  reuniões são grandes celebrações, 
como  as  Assembleias  Gerais  das  Nações  Unidas  de  menor  importância, 
oferecendo oportunidades de socialização entre os líderes políticos, e negociações 
bilaterais  ou  minilaterais  em  suas  margens.  A  Cúpula  UE‐CELAC  foi  o  primeiro 
deste  tipo  incluindo  os  Estados  do  Caribe.  Mas  o  formato  da  reunião  foi 
essencialmente a continuação das seis cúpulas anteriores entre a UE e a América 
Latina  (AL).  As  conclusões  desta  cúpula  permitiram  listar  um  número 
impressionante de atividades de cooperação entre a UE e as várias sub‐regiões e 
Estados individuais: com Chile, Colômbia e Peru, América Central, México, Caribe, 
Brasil e Mercosul. Mas no que diz respeito às negociações UE‐Mercosul, conforme 
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já  indicado no contexto da política comercial, estas falharam ao  longo de muitos 
anos em alcançar  resultados, e exigem uma nova abordagem. O Brasil, por  sua 
vez,  está  disposto  a  desenvolver  outras  iniciativas  inter‐regionais,  tais  como  a 
Cúpula América do Sul‐África e a Cúpula América do Sul‐Países Árabes. 
Que outros negócios? 
Na sua parceria estratégica oficial, o Brasil e a UE definiram  longos e detalhados 
planos de  ação  conjunta. No  seu mais  recente  encontro,  em outubro de  2011, 
forma definidos nada menos que 204 pontos de ação, distribuídos em 28 páginas 
de  texto.  Nós  encontramos  falhas  neste  método.  Os  possíveis  assuntos 
estratégicos estão afogados em um mar de detalhes. Todos os tópicos possíveis e 
imagináveis  são  abordados,  e  onde  não  há  ação  real  prevista,  um  "diálogo"  é 
criado.  A  UE  é  provavelmente  a  maior  responsável  por  isso,  uma  vez  que  o 
formato  do  seu  “Plano  de  Ação  Conjunta”  segue  um  modelo  que  ela  vem 
utilizando normalmente com todos os parceiros que concordam com ele. 
De acordo com a Cúpula Brasil‐UE de  janeiro de 2013, há pelo menos 30 
diálogos  sobre  políticas  setoriais  em  execução.  Estes  não  foram  definidos  em 
nenhuma ordem analítica oficial, mas fazemos a nossa própria apresentação deles 
na Box 2. A maioria desses  títulos cabe bem dentro dos  temas escolhidos neste 
relatório como prioridades estratégicas: política externa e de segurança, política 
macroeconômica,  questões  relacionadas  ao  comércio,  mudanças  climáticas  e 
relacionadas ao meio ambiente. 
A lista de diálogos específicos é, entretanto, muito longa, o que pode fazer 
com que um observador externo seja tentado a ver como excessiva. Há casos de 
sobreposição de temas, que poderiam ser consolidados (diálogo político, questões 
da ONU,  direitos  humanos,  paz  internacional  e  segurança,  desarmamento). Há 
outros casos que têm pouca ou nenhuma importância estratégica ou operacional, 
ou onde a competência da UE é muito limitada. A lista dá uma impressão de que 
quase todos os departamentos das instituições europeias e do governo brasileiro 
devem ter um diálogo bilateral. 
 
Box 2. Grupos de diálogo político estabelecidos entre o Brasil e a UE 
Relação entre política e segurança 
Diálogo Político de Alto Nível 
Aspectos gerais da ONU 
Paz internacional e segurança 
Direitos humanos 
RESUMO E CONCLUSÕES | 47 
Desarmamento e não proliferação
Drogas 
Preparação para risco de desastres 
Relação entre política econômica e social 
Questões econômicas e financeiras 
Serviços financeiros 
Estatísticas 
Mecanismo de consulta de normas sanitárias e fitossanitárias (SPS),  
Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (DPI) 
Diálogos  sobre  regulação  de  industrias  piloto  (têxtil,  siderurgia,  produtos 
florestais, etc.) 
Questões de política de concorrência 
Transporte Marítimo 
Transporte aéreo 
Mudança climática 
Meio Ambiente 
Energia 
Questões nucleares 
Ciência e Tecnologia 
Sociedade da Informação 
Cooperação espacial 
Fortalecimento institucional e modernização do Estado 
Políticas sociais e de coesão social 
Desenvolvimento Regional e Integração Territorial 
Política de Pequenas e Médias Empresas  
Turismo 
Educação 
Cultura 
Fonte: European External Action Service. 
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BRAZIL AND THE EU IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 
DANIEL GROS, CINZIA ALCIDI AND ALESSANDRO 
GIOVANNINI 
Abstract 
The structure of the world economy has changed dramatically during the 
last decade. The emerging global economy is much more fragmented than 
in the past and characterised by different global actors, each one with 
specific features and roles. In this setting, both Brazil and the European 
Union play a role. 
This paper, without claiming to provide a full analysis of the 
European and Brazilian economies, offers a description of their main 
international economic features to understand their current and future role 
in the global order. 
Section 1 looks at the macroeconomics: it first focuses on Brazil and 
assesses arguments that international exchange rate misalignments 
represent a real grievance for Brazilian policy-makers in their struggle to 
get the economy onto a satisfactory trajectory. The attention is then turned 
to Europe, and especially to the euro area, with a focus on the still-
unresolved crisis and its position vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
Section 2 analyses the place of the euro area in the international 
financial institution system. It assesses how far it may be both 
overrepresented in terms of the weight of the sum of its member states, 
while being underrepresented as such institutionally as a major monetary 
union. While this issue may be seen as relevant only for Europe, the 
analysis shows that it has significant implications for emerging economies, 
including Brazil.  
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The conclusions explore macro-policy options for improving the EU-
Brazil partnership and suggest that a new initiative launched by them 
would be economically desirable. 
The macroeconomics of Brazil and the EU in the global economy 
Over the last ten years, Brazil and other developing countries (notably the 
BRICs club – Brazil, Russia, India and China) have been attracting 
increasing attention as a consequence of their growing role in global trade 
and financial transactions and the expectations that sustained future 
growth would ensure that this trend would continue, or even increase, in 
the future.  
However, when it comes to the macroeconomic indicators, it emerges 
that Brazil is a relatively closed economy. The share of trade, both exports 
and imports, in the economy is remarkably low compared to other, much 
larger economies, such as the euro area or China. Current data suggest that 
Brazil is even less open than the US, which is usually characterised as a 
large closed economy. On the other hand, interestingly, Brazil seems to be 
more open on the financial account: indeed, since 2000, Brazil has received 
a substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that is likely to 
have contributed to growth. Comparing the relative size of its trade and 
financial accounts, Brazil emerges as pursuing the opposite of the ‘new 
Washington consensus’ approach, according to which trade liberalisation 
should come before financial liberalisation. Indeed, there is no assertive 
prescription about full financial opening for emerging market economies.  
When it comes to Europe, the main element currently able to 
determine its role in the global economy is certainly represented by its still-
unresolved sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone: there is no doubt that it 
has significantly impacted the growth and unemployment of the entire 
region, and this is expected to continue for quite some time. It is less clear 
whether the impact has also been significant on the rest of the world, and 
on Brazil in particular. Indeed, on the one hand, international trade 
recorded its largest fall in 2009, mainly driven by the post–Lehman crisis 
rather than by the debt crisis in the euro area. As will be shown later, 
Brazil’s exports to the EU, as a share of total exports, have been on a 
declining trend for years and it is difficult to isolate the effect of the crisis, 
but in level terms they increased in 2010 and 2011, after the trough of 2009. 
Similar arguments hold for FDI; there is no evidence in the data to suggest 
that the crisis had an impact on ongoing trends. 
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 Brazil compared with the other major global economies 
Together with China, India and Russia, Brazil is deemed to be part of the 
group of emerging, newly advanced economies that will represent the 
largest share of the world’s GDP in the future, as opposed to the G7. 
Despite the prominence now being given to the BRICs as a group, these 
economies are very heterogeneous in terms of size of population and GDP 
(see Table 1), while Brazil seems to display high specificities.  
Table 1. Comparative figures in 2010 
 Population 
(millions) 
GDP 
($ trillion) 
Openness* Average 
tariff rates 
Brazil 193 2.14 23 13.4 
Russia 143 1.49 51 8.1 
India 1,191 1.68 50 11.5 
China 1,341 5.93 57 7.7 
Euro area 332 12.21 45 1.9 
US  310 14.45 29 2.9 
* Openness is measured as the sum of imported and exported goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Sources: World Bank Indicators, IMF (WEO) and Eurostat for euro area openness indicators. 
 
A relatively closed economy 
Table 1 is indeed quite a revealing assessment of Brazil’s role in the global 
economy. The country emerges as a relatively closed economy, even when 
compared to the others that have a much larger GDP, like the US. This 
feature is even more striking if compared to the other BRIC economies, 
which appear to be very open and (for China and India) exhibit an 
increasing opening trend over time (see Figure 1).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, despite a similar starting point, Brazil 
experienced a completely different path in connecting its economy to the 
global trade system, especially in the last ten years during which its trade 
openness index has shown a slightly declining trend. Brazil is rather special 
within the group, also with respect to its import tariffs, which on average 
are higher than all the other countries in the table. The current rate is even 
higher than in India, which has a strong record of trade protectionism. 
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Figure 1. Trends in openness in the BRICs 
 
Note: As above, openness is measured as the sum of imported and exported goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Bank Indicators. 
Against this background, it is valid to wonder to what extent trade 
can be expected to work as a growth engine for Brazil, under the existing 
conditions. To get a better grasp of the role of the exports in the economy, 
one should look at the relative size of export goods. 
Figure 2 (LHS), which shows the amount of manufacturing exports of 
the BRIC countries and Turkey,8 suggests that the levels for Brazil, India, 
Russia and Turkey were very close until 2001 (China, on a different scale, 
was already almost ten times larger), but that patterns then started to 
diverge. If one excludes Russia, whose trade patterns (surpluses) are 
largely dependent on exports of natural resources with manufacturing 
accounting for less than 15% of total exports (in 2011), Brazil is the country 
with the least progress achieved during the last decade in terms of an 
increase in manufacturing exports. In fact, relative to total exports, the 
                                                     
8 We added Turkey because the pattern of manufacturing exports for the country 
and the BRICs has been almost identical in level terms between 1995 and 2006 
(despite the size of the country); after that Turkey outperformed Brazil. 
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share of manufacturing goods has declined by more than 50% since 2000, 
reaching only 33% of the total in 2011. 
Figure 2. Manufacturing exports (LHS): Brazil commodity and food exports 
(RHS) ($ billion) 
 
 
 
Note: Commodities also include food items. 
Source: UNCTAD, merchandise trade matrix.  
It is often argued that while Brazil performs weakly as a 
manufacturing exporter, it is a champion in the export of agricultural 
goods. Data confirm that in relative terms, Brazil has the largest export 
values among the BRICs. However, as shown in Figure 2 (RHS), in terms of 
value, the amount of such exports is even smaller than manufacturing 
exports. In fact, what the figure highlights is the impressive rise in 
commodity exports, which at the end of 2011 represented about 65% of 
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total exports. While commodity-driven exports usually deliver large 
benefits, these tend to be temporary and unsustainable. When the ongoing 
‘commodity super-cycle’ ends, the Brazilian economy may be severely hurt 
and find it difficult to create alternative sources of growth.  
A trade closure resulting from deliberate policies 
Overall, the main problem with trade in Brazil can be ascribed to the 
existence of high tariffs on imports. While this form of protectionism 
usually aims at protecting the national industry from external competition, 
it may in fact result in a policy that is harmful for domestic industry. The 
main argument to support this assertion reads as follows. In a general 
equilibrium framework, an import tariff is equivalent to an export tax, 
where equivalence means that an import tariff has the same effect on the 
terms of trade as an export tax of the same rate (see among others Gros, 
1987). The argument is based on the proof that an export tax does not affect 
the elasticity of demand; as in the same way a (uniform ad valorem) import 
tariff does not affect the price elasticity of domestic demand for importable 
goods. This implies that the international equilibrium conditions for 
consumers at home and abroad, as well as the trade balance supported by 
an export tax or an import tariff, are basically the same. The main 
differences will materialise in terms of wages and tax revenues.  
This relative closure in trade poses the question how such a marked 
feature of the country fits into the debate about the US as a currency 
manipulator, through multiple rounds of quantitative easing put in place 
by the Federal Reserve, vis-à-vis emerging market economies, and Brazil in 
particular. While it is true that US expansionary monetary policy is likely to 
engender upward pressure on Brazil’s currency and an appreciating 
currency affects the country’s competitiveness, this is unlikely to be the 
central issue for a rather closed economy. In particular, under these 
circumstances, on the one hand, it is dubious that currency appreciation 
makes the country significantly worse off and, on the other hand, it is 
unlikely that a weak currency (achieved either by foreign exchange market 
intervention or capital controls) can boost the economy considerably. One 
key reason for the low weight of trade in the Brazilian economy lies in the 
relatively high tariff rates the country still applies. As already argued, this 
not only affects trade openness through imports but also through exports.  
Following this argument, in order to boost trade and then growth, 
Brazil should consider reducing import tariffs rather than focusing on 
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policies aiming at external devaluation, which is likely to have only a 
limited effect on the real economy.  
The financial account: A negative external position as a source of economic 
growth? 
When moving to the analysis of the financial account, a rather different 
picture of Brazil emerges. Indeed, in contrast to trade, the country appears 
rather open to financial flows. In what follows we focus on stocks rather 
than flows in order to provide a static picture of the country, relative to 
China. It emerges that Brazil’s current negative international investment 
position (IIP) is the result of about one decade of growing financial inflows 
from the rest of the world seeking profitable investment opportunities in 
the country. 
Figure 3 shows the main items of the IIP of China and Brazil in 2010. 
While both countries share the appellation of emerging market economy, 
they appear different in many respects. 
Figure 3. China vs. Brazil: international investment position (IIP) in selected items 
as % of GDP (2010) 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
The first difference relates to the net position, which is positive and 
very large for China (30% of GDP), while negative and very large for Brazil 
(41% of GDP). This negative net position is the result of small gross assets, 
with about half of them represented by reserves and another third by FDI, 
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and large gross liabilities (70% of GDP). The latter, in terms of GDP, are 
much larger than those of China. 
However, the distribution of liabilities between debt and equity is 
rather similar. Combining portfolio equity and FDI, on the one hand, and 
portfolio debt and investment debt, on the other, delivers a proportion of 
about 3 to 1 in both cases, with each class larger for Brazil than for China. 
Overall, this suggests that while Brazil manages to attract 
international investors in a long-term perspective in the form of FDI, the 
country is also accumulating debt through portfolio borrowing. To some 
extent this is consistent with the features of an emerging economy: a know-
how-poor country is expected to be an importer of capital to develop 
production processes, which implies current account deficits, ideally 
funded through FDI. Furthermore, underdeveloped or repressed financial 
markets make it necessary to rely on external funding. When considering 
the flows behind Figure 3, it also emerges how, after 2000, Brazil has 
received a substantial amount of FDI, most likely facilitated by the cheap 
money the US Federal Reserve injected into its economy. In reality, given 
the features of the Brazilian economy, FDI is likely to have had stronger 
impact on growth than currency devaluation. Yet, the problem of Brazil is 
that its current account deficits have been larger than the FDI inflows, 
implying that the country has been accumulating a substantial amount of 
external debt. The cumulated current account balances over the last 30 
years, which provide an approximate measure of the net external debt of 
the country, delivers a negative position of close to $300 billion, i.e. 15% of 
GDP.9 This trend, if it continues, may become a significant source of 
vulnerability, especially if combined with the fact that exports are largely 
dependent on commodities.  
Another specific problem with FDI in Brazil is related to the fact that 
it is a closed economy. Indeed, there is a question of whether it is good for a 
country to open up to financial flows when the real economy is closed and 
distorted, as is the case in Brazil. Under these conditions, the most likely 
outcome is that resources are allocated in the most protected sectors and 
not necessarily the most productive ones, feeding a rent-seeking system, 
which is unable to ensure sustainable growth. If this is the case, Brazil may 
be fated to end up in a different category than the rest of the BRICs. 
                                                     
9 While this may sound low by European standards, one should not forget that 
when Argentina defaulted in 2001 it had zero external debt.  
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Europe in the midst of crisis 
To address the question of the existing and future role of the EU in the 
global economy, the consideration of the still-ongoing euro-area crisis is 
central. To put it simply, this crisis has been the result of two 
interdependent economic problems: i) persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances within the monetary union, despite a balanced external position 
of the area as a whole; and ii) the increase in public debt in peripheral 
countries driven by country-specific financial weaknesses and/or 
structural problems in the competitive structure of the economy. The Greek 
crisis, with its surge in interest rates demanded for sovereign bonds and, 
subsequently, the spread of similar problems to other peripheral countries, 
has placed the emphasis mainly on the second element at the expense of 
the former. However, the correction of internal macroeconomic imbalances 
is fundamental to the resolution of the crisis. 
External balance at the price of internal imbalances 
Europe has almost systematically remained out of the debate on the global 
imbalances throughout the financial crisis. The main reason for this has 
been that Europe (and there is little difference here between the euro area 
and the EU-27), has almost always displayed a rather balanced position vis-
à-vis the rest of the world (see Figure 4). This has been in sharp contrast to 
the US and China, which have exhibited persistent and growing deficits 
and surpluses, respectively. 
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Figure 4. North-South savings gap in the eurozone (EZ) 
 
Note: North EZ includes Austria, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Finland; South EZ includes Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Portugal. 
France is deliberately left out of the sub-grouping, as it does not display the features of 
either the north or the south.  
The north EZ and south EZ are computed as the simple sum of current account 
balances of each country vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This implies that intra-area 
trade is included.  
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission Services (Ameco) data. 
An almost balanced position makes the euro area different from 
Brazil, China or the US, which are net borrowers or lenders. A balanced 
current account means that the area, taken as a whole, has sufficient 
resources to fund the financial needs of all the member countries, including 
those of governments. This may sound odd given the sovereign debt crisis 
that is plaguing several eurozone member states. In fact, it is just evidence 
of the heterogeneity problem within the union against aggregate figures.  
Indeed, the key problem of the euro area is the distribution of savings 
within the region. While there is an excess of savings north of the Alps 
(mainly Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Belgium), northern 
European savers fear crossing the Alps to finance southern countries such 
as Italy, Spain and Greece.  
The relative high and unequally distributed savings rates, which are 
behind the euro area’s balanced current account, also imply that the debt 
crisis is not hitting all the countries in the same way. In general, euro-area 
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savers are looking for investment opportunities and they are usually 
reluctant to invest in foreign currency. Moreover, most regulated 
intermediaries, such as investment funds and insurance companies, have 
little choice but to invest in government securities denominated in euro. 
This means that there is a structurally strong demand for euro-area 
government debt securities and while investors can decide to favour safe 
countries (like Germany) and to stay away from the paper of the less safe 
countries like Greece and Portugal, which accounts for about 10% of the 
total euro government securities market, the strike cannot hit all the less 
safe countries. This implies that capital will start to flow again towards the 
south (at least some parts of it): a process that, as the fall in the sovereign 
spreads of Ireland, Spain and Italy suggests is already happening.  
The evolution of the euro crisis and prospects for its resolution 
As anticipated in the introduction, there is no doubt that the euro area debt 
crisis has significantly impacted the economy of the entire region and it is 
very likely that its effect will still take some time to be fully absorbed. The 
main reason for this is that the euro-area crisis had multiple causes, 
including fiscal profligacy (Greece), housing bubbles (Spain and Ireland) 
and structural problems (Portugal and Italy), and one central, systemic 
element that worked as amplifier and transmission channels across 
countries and sectors: a deep fragility of the banking sector, largely 
ascribable to excessive leverage. Furthermore the clear-cut division of the 
Union between creditor and debtor countries increased the complexity of 
the problem, from both an economic and a political point of view. After 
almost three years of crisis management which have delivered the creation 
of the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the first building 
block of a banking union (the single supervisory mechanism) and 
numerous changes in EU governance aiming at strengthening coordination 
among countries and reducing the gap of a missing fiscal and political 
union, the crisis is still going on but with a low degree of intensity. 
Since the summer of 2012, while several economies are still in 
recession and financial integration is much lower than before the crisis, 
pressure on financial markets has significantly declined and sovereign 
bond yields of (some of the) troubled economies, which had risen to 
patently unsustainable heights, are now back to pre-crisis levels. 
This has been the result of the intervention of the ECB, which has 
promised to do everything necessary to eliminate the risk of a break-up of 
the euro area, but also of a slow process of convergence within the euro 
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area that is taking place through a gradual reduction or elimination of 
internal imbalances. This aspect is indeed the key economic element in 
view of overcoming the crisis.  
 EU-Brazil mutual relevance 
The two sections above have highlighted some of the main features of 
Brazil and the euro area relative to other countries, focusing on their 
external and trade position. By contrast this section intends to focus on 
aspects of mutual relevance for Brazil and Europe.  
Figure 5 shows Brazil’s imports from the EU and exports to the EU in 
levels. The data show an upward trend for both exports and imports, with 
a big slump for both in the first quarter of 2009 (after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers), but trade seems to have resumed thereafter. However, 
when it comes to measuring EU-Brazil bilateral trade relative to total trade 
flows of Brazil, data show that after 2000 both flows have been declining 
and most recently converged at around 20%. This suggests that part of the 
importance of the EU trade has been replaced by other partners. The Box 
below investigates in more detail ongoing trends in Brazil’s exports to the 
EU. 
When it comes to FDI, Brazil seems to be among the preferred 
destinations for euro-area investors. As shown in Table 2, if one excludes 
advanced economies, Brazil represents the largest share among the BRICs, 
with about €180 billion. This seems to be consistent with the characteristic 
of Brazil as an economy with a rather open financial account (unlike 
China). This is confirmed by the figures in Table 3. Similar to the outflows, 
once advanced economies are excluded, Brazil is the main source of 
incoming FDI to the euro area among the BRIC countries, with a clear 
upward trend. 
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Figure 5. Brazil-EU bilateral trade: Brazil imports from EU and exports to EU 
 
Source: IMF, Directions of Trade, October 2012. 
Table 2. Euro area FDI abroad, by destination (% of total outward FDI) 
  Brazil  Russia India China Switzerland UK US 
Rest of 
the World 
2010 3.7 2.1 0.4 1.3 10.0 20.7 18.8 43.0 
2006 2.7 1.1 0.3 0.8 10.1 25.8 20.2 39.1 
Source: ECB, Statistical Warehouse. 
Table 3. FDI in the euro area by origin (% of total inward FDI) 
 
Brazil  Russia India China Switzerland UK US 
Rest of 
the World 
2010 1.69  0.97   0.10   0.12  8.10   31.41  24.88  32.73  
2006 0.39  0.40  0.04   0.11  8.53   38.29  23.05  29.18  
Source: ECB, Statistical Warehouse. 
Interestingly enough, multinational companies investing in Brazil 
may be among the greatest beneficiaries of an economy that is open on the 
financial account and closed/protected economy on the trade account. The 
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goods they produce in loco are most likely to benefit from the advantage of 
existing import tariffs on competing goods.  
Overall, the figures about commercial and financial partnership 
between Brazil and Europe seem to be consistent with the picture of Brazil 
we have depicted earlier. Financial accounts are more open than the current 
account and seem to matter increasingly in the relationship with the EU.  
Against this background, a question arises about whether the euro 
area contributes in any substantial way to the global excess of external 
savings, which makes it more difficult for emerging markets and Brazil, in 
particular, to strengthen their exports. In broad terms one can say that until 
now Europe was rather neutral from this point of view, but the external 
adjustment required in many peripheral euro-area countries, which 
experienced current account deficits for years, may lead to more systematic 
external surpluses of the euro area in the future. This is indeed the direction 
to which the IMF forecasts point. Under such a hypothesis, the euro area 
would become a net contributor to the global excess of savings, which 
would not help Brazil to improve its external position. 
Box 3. Did the euro area sovereign debt crisis affect Brazil’s exports to Europe?  
There is a question of whether the prolonged sovereign debt crisis in the euro 
area has affected Brazil’s trade with Europe and in particular whether the weak 
demand in Europe has hit Brazil’s exports. If one looks at the changes over the 
year 2012, it seems that indeed the effects of the euro area crisis have reached 
Brazil. In November 2012 (latest data reported by Eurostat), Brazil’s exports to 
the EU had fallen by 8% (in nominal terms) relative to November of the previous 
year, and 6% relative to the previous month. If one takes the cumulated exports 
over the year, in order to get rid of possible seasonal components, the negative 
sign remains but the drop is smaller, -4.4% relative to the previous year. Hence 
there seems to be no doubt about falling Brazilian exports to the EU (and at the 
same time increasing imports), however these data are insufficient to establish a 
causal relation with the euro crisis.  
In order to address this issue, Figure A1 (LHS) shows Brazil’s exports to 
the EU-27 on a monthly basis between January 2007 and November 2012.  
In the chart, 2007M1 was set equal to 100 to get a better visual 
representation of the export movements since the start of the global financial 
crisis. It emerges that the fall of 2012 has no exceptional feature and similar 
drops occurred at least three times (2008, 2009 and 2011), with subsequent 
rebounding. In principle, there is no reason to believe this will not happen again.  
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Figure A1. Brazil’s exports to EU-27, 2007M1=100 (LHS) and Brazil imports from EU 
and exports to EU as % of Brazil’s total imports and exports (RHS) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat (LHS) and IMF, Directions of Trade, December 2012 (RHS). 
In addition, and more importantly, if one takes data on Brazil’s imports 
from and exports to the EU as a share of Brazil’s total imports and exports (we 
take IMF data as Eurostat does not provide data on Brazil’s total exports and 
imports) over quite a long period of time, no detectable effect of the euro-area 
crisis can be recognised (see chart on RHS). As shown in the chart, the share of 
Brazil’s exports to the EU (together with imports from the EU) has been falling 
steadily at least since 2000 and, if anything, with a less pronounced downward 
trend after 2008.  
Overall, the data do not seem to support a causal relation running from 
the euro-area crisis to falling Brazilian exports. 
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The eurozone and the EU in international financial institutions 
Having set out the economic foundations of the roles of Brazil and the EU 
in the global economy, it is worth analysing in some detail the place of the 
two economies in the international financial institutional system. Notably, 
how the euro area and the EU are represented in international financial 
institutions (IFIs) compared to the rest of the world and in particular the 
main emerging economies. While this section specifically deals with the 
EU’s role, the analysis provided shows how this debate is highly relevant 
also for Brazil, as a possible reform of euro-area representation in the IFIs 
could profoundly alter the power balance inside these institutions, at the 
expense, or possibly not, of other emerging economies. 
At the moment, the EU’s representation in the IFIs is subject to a 
double dynamic: on the one hand, the pressures to give greater voice to the 
rising economic powers, and on the other hand the case for shifting the 
intra-European representational roles from member states to the euro area 
or the EU. Taken together, these two dynamics are a source of double 
pressure on individual member states to cede space in favour of a single 
European representation as well as in favour of other countries. This 
explains why the process is so sensitive and engenders much 
procrastination. The enhancement of the role of the euro area in the 
international system assumes that the present grave crisis is going to be 
overcome, which in important respects will depend on a strengthening of 
the euro area’s own governance structures.  
Institutional representation of the EU and the euro area in the 
international system 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s role as 
international actor has been enhanced in a number of respects (role of the 
High Representative for foreign and security policy, who now chairs the 
foreign ministers’ Council, role of EU delegations as embassies throughout 
the world, etc.). However, the institutional place of the EU in multilateral 
organisations is moving very slowly,10 largely because of the conservatism 
of member states that wish to hold on to their international roles. As 
regards the global economic governance, the range of situations that sees 
an EU representation is highly diverse, and the euro area is particularly 
weakly represented.  
                                                     
10 One of few examples is its ‘enhanced’ place at the UN General Assembly.  
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Table 4 summarises the status quo. The EU is fully represented in 
G20 as the 20th party. However in the IMF, as at the World Bank, the EU 
and European Central Bank are just observers at some meetings. This 
situation is anomalous and obsolete, indeed, for the IMF, the European 
Central Bank has a global significance comparable to the US Federal 
Reserve and, as regards the World Bank, the EU is the world’s biggest 
donor of aid. 
If the institutional place of Europe appears fossilised, this is not the 
case of the global economy. The financial crisis has accelerated the 
rebalancing of the global economy towards emerging economies. This 
situation strengthens the case for a common euro area voice in a world, in 
which European countries have less influence and are likely in any event to 
gradually lose the weighty positions they have been accustomed to. 
This poses the question how to go about enhancing the voice and 
power of the euro area in the IMF, given the conservatism of member 
states. One possibility is that, in the short term, there would be enhanced 
coordination between finance ministers of the euro area, with preparatory 
meetings in Brussels to determine positions on the agenda. The process of 
institutionalisation of the euro-area ministers of finance is already an issue 
on the table as a result of the euro-area crisis. In the longer term, more than 
just coordination could be achieved in the euro area by using the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) as the institution to represent the governmental 
(fiscal) aspects of euro-area members’ relations with the IMF. A first step 
would be represented by giving observer status to the ESM in the IMF 
Executive Board: as a result, both the ECB (on monetary issues) and the 
ESM (a politically accountable institution on fiscal matters) would fully 
represent the euro area. A further step would consist of merging all 
national quotas of euro members into a single common membership: the 
ESM (on behalf of the whole euro area) would then be represented at the 
IMF by its Managing Director or by a Commissioner with enhanced 
responsibilities for the euro. This would raise a specific issue of voting 
weight, which is discussed in the next section in the broader context of IMF 
quota reform.  
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Table 4. Current representation of the euro area and the EU in selected international financial institutions 
 MEMBER STATES EURO AREA EU 
G-20 
3 euro area MS: 
Germany, France and 
Italy 
1 EU non-euro area: UK 
Another euro area MS 
is a ’permanent guest’: 
Spain 
Euro Group is not 
represented 
EU is a member and is represented by the President 
of the European Commission and the President of 
the European Council at the level of heads of 
government or state 
President of the ECOFIN participates in the 
meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs participates in the 
meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
ECB participates in the meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors and deputies meetings 
IMF All euro area and EU MS  
Euro Group is not 
represented 
EU is not a member 
ECOFIN Presidency presents its opinion on behalf 
of the Union in the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee (IMFC) 
European Commission is an observer in the IMFC 
ECB is part observer in selected Board meetings and observer in the IMFC 
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Table 4. Cont’d 
WB All euro area and EU MS  
Euro Group is not 
represented EU is not a member 
European Commission is an observer in the Development Committee of the 
World Bank 
ECB participates in the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the 
World Bank and the IMF 
FSB 
National financial 
authorities from 5 euro 
area MS: France, 
Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain 
National financial 
authorities from the UK 
Euro Group is not 
represented EU is not a member 
ECB is a member 
European Commission is a member 
BIS 
15 euro area central 
banks  
25 EU central banks 
Euro Group is not 
represented EU is not a member 
ECB is a member of the General Meeting 
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The IMF quota reform 
The issue of IMF reform on the voting weights and Executive Board 
representation of emerging economies has received new topicality because 
of the euro crisis. The new financial resources that Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde has secured, amounting to $438 billion as of June 2012, 
relies heavily on the monetary reserves of several emerging economies, first 
of all China but also Brazil (while the United States declines to contribute). 
These new resources have been put at the disposal of the IMF to make 
possible an intervention in case an emergency plan for a large euro area 
country is required. Since May 2010, around €60 billion has been disbursed 
by the Fund to the distressed euro-area countries, in addition to the internal 
resources mobilised by the euro area member states. This situation has 
contributed to calling into question the position of euro area member states 
inside the IMF, as well as a call for a review of the mechanism that links the 
contribution to the Fund and the representativeness of contributing states. 
Brazil has been the most outspoken in calling for enhanced voting weights 
for large contributors. 
IMF quota reform is a key mechanism for translating the 
continuously changing structure of the world economy into the concrete 
modalities of global governance. Claims of over- and under-representation 
are typically referring to both voting weights in the IMF and to the 
allocation of places as executive directors.  
However the process of revising quotas in the IMF is solidly 
established both historically (14 such revisions so far) and 
methodologically. According to the last quota formula, four 
macroeconomic indicators are combined to provide an objective basis to the 
weight of the countries in the global economy: GDP, openness, economic 
variability and international reserves (each with different weight).11 On 15 
December 2010, the Board of Governors approved the latest revision, 
doubling quotas from approximately 238.4 billion SDR (Special Drawing 
Rights) to approximately 476.8 billion SDR (about €560 billion). This reform 
also allowed for a shift of a little more than 2.5 percentage points of quota 
shares from over-represented to under-represented member countries, 
especially emerging markets and developing countries.  
                                                     
11 For more details, see (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm). 
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Table 5. Voting shares before and after implementation of reforms agreed in 2008 
and 2010 (as a % total IMF voting shares) 
 Post-2008 reform 
Post-2010 
reform 
Hypothesis: Post-2010 
and eurozone pooling 
Advanced economies 57.9 55.3 49.3 
United States 16.7 16.5 16.4 
EU-27 
Of which eurozone 
30.9 
22.4 
29.4 
21.2 
23.6 
15.0 
Other advanced economies 10.3 9.4 9.5 
Emerging & developing 
countries 42.1 44.7 
50.7 
Of which:    
China 3.8 6.0 7.1 
India 2.3 2.6 3.2 
Brazil 1.7 2.2 2.5 
Russia 2.3 2.6 3.0 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Sources: IMF Finance Department and authors’ own calculations.  
Table 5 shows the pre- and post-2010 reform weights12 (the latter not 
yet been fully introduced), as well as in the last column the change in the 
shares that would be implied by a reform in the euro-area representation. If 
the euro area were unified for the purpose of representation at the IMF, the 
logical consequence of this would be to cut intra-euro area trade out of the 
measures used. If this were done hypothetically alongside the 2010 reform 
(i.e. applying the same quota formula), it would see a further redistribution 
of six percentage points in weights from the euro area to other countries. If 
it were decided to make the BRICs and developing countries the only 
                                                     
12 While in the text we refer to quota shares, for which the formula is known, given 
our interest in the representation in IFIs, the table considers voting shares. Due to a 
correction mechanism that allows very small countries to vote, there is no one-to-
one correspondence between the two indicators; however, the picture they provide 
is consistent. 
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beneficiaries of this redistribution, as assumed in Table 5, this would give 
them collectively the majority of the voting shares of the IMF.13 
Clearly this computation represents a mere intellectual exercise. 
However, interestingly enough, among the BRICS, Brazil remains the 
country with the smallest voting share. This is due to two main reasons: the 
fact that Brazil is part of a larger constituency on which the share is 
computed, but also openness – on which Brazil lags behind the rest of the 
group.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has intended to offer both a description of the main 
international economic features of Brazil and EU as well their institutional 
role in the global economy. Against this background we attempted to 
elaborate macroeconomic policy considerations about possible interactions 
and forms of partnership between them.  
From the point of view of Brazil, we have provided the necessary 
grounds for the analysis of the critical, but often overlooked aspect of the 
growing debate about exchange-rate movements. While current Brazilian 
policies (interest rate cuts and barriers of capital inflows) may well be 
preventing appreciation or favouring depreciation of the Real, it remains to 
be seen how effective they are for the real economy. In particular, it is not 
evident how they could work as an engine of growth when the economy is 
in fact relatively closed. The economy should be much more open, but this 
is unlikely to happen if high import tariffs remain in place.  
As far as Europe is concerned, it has been pointed out that if the 
macroeconomic adjustment in the periphery of the euro area continues, the 
area could move from a balanced external position to a surplus current 
account. This would imply that Europe will contribute to the accumulation 
of global savings with the burden to absorb it on the rest of the world, and 
an additional difficulty for emerging economies, including Brazil, to foster 
their exports.  
In this framework, a relevant question arises: Can we envisage a 
more strategic form of partnership between Brazil and the EU? 
                                                     
13 For a detailed explanation of these calculations and of the broader set of issues 
raised in this section, see a report prepared by CEPS for the European Parliament: 
“External Representation of the Eurozone – Study” (Giovannini et al., 2012).  
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Given the strategic interest of Europe in trade 
partnerships/agreements and the potential for the Brazilian economy 
associated with a greater opening up of the economy, a bilateral free trade 
agreement could be valuable. Leaving aside political considerations and 
given the stalled state of the negotiations between Mercosur and the EU, a 
new EU-Brazil initiative would be economically desirable.  
 
References 
Giovannini, A., D. Gros, P.M. Kaczynski and D. Valiante (2012), “External 
Representation of the Eurozone – Study”, European Parliament, 
Policy Department A, Economic and Scientific Policy. 
Gros, D. (1987), “Protectionism in a Framework with Intra-Industry Trade: 
Tariffs, Quotas, Retaliation, and Welfare Losses”, IMF Staff Papers, 
Vol. 34, No. 1, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
Sally, R. (2008), “Globalisation and the Political Economy of Trade 
Liberalisation in the BRICS”, ECIPE publications 
(http://www.ecipe.org/media/external_publication_pdfs/Globalisa
tion%20and%20the%20Political%20Economy%20of%20Trade%20Libe
ralisation%20in%20the%20BRIICS.pdf). 
 72 | 
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Abstract 
The ‘Emergent Brazil’ growth model is reaching its limits. Its main engines 
have been slowing significantly since the beginning of the global financial 
and economic crisis. Even its much-praised predictable macroeconomic 
policy has been eroded by political interference. Inflationary pressures are 
growing and GDP performance is anaemic. As ominous, Brazil cannot 
compensate for its domestic deficiencies with an export drive. Commodity 
exports are suffering with the world economic slow-down and the 
manufacturing industries’ competitiveness is in sharp decline. Brazil has 
put all its trade negotiation eggs into the South American and WTO 
baskets, and now its export market share is threatened by the Doha Round 
paralysis, the Latin American Alianza del Pacífico, and the US-led 
initiatives for a Trans-Pacific Partnership and a trade and investment 
agreement with the EU.  
Paradoxically, this alarming situation opens a window of 
opportunity. There is a mounting national consensus on the need to tackle 
head-on the country’s and its industries’ lack of competitiveness. That 
means finding a solution to the much-decried ‘Brazil Cost’ and stimulating 
private-sector investment. It also entails an aggressive trade-negotiating 
stance in order to secure better access to foreign markets and to foster more 
competition in the domestic one. The most promising near-term goal 
would be the conclusion of the EU–Mercosur trade talks. A scenario to 
overcome the paralysis of these negotiations could trail two parallel paths: 
bilateral EU–Brazil agreements on ‘anything but trade’ combined with a 
sequencing of the EU–Mercosur talks where each member of the South 
American bloc could adopt faster or slower liberalisation commitments and 
schedules. 
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Prolegomena 
The ‘Emergent Brazil’ growth model is reaching its limits.14 Its main 
engines have been slowing significantly since the beginning of the global 
financial and economic crisis in 2008, particularly in the last two years. 
Even its main fundament – a 15-year-old predictable macroeconomic policy 
– has been eroded recently by heavy-handed political interference. 
Inflationary pressures are growing steadily, as are public debts. Trade 
surpluses are shrinking and balance-of-payments deficits are expanding. 
Granted, the domestic consumer market, fuelled by a splurge of 
government-backed credit, is still booming and unemployment is at a 
historically low level. But households’ indebtedness is becoming 
unsustainable and productive investments have fallen to a ridiculously low 
level due to a mounting lack of trust fed by the unpredictability of Brasilia’s 
economic and regulatory policies. The result is a sharp decline of the 
manufacturing industries’ competitiveness. True, there is yet some spare 
cash that can be thrown away to sustain economic activity, and the 
forthcoming FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games of 2016, 
which will be held in Brazil, will certainly give an incidental but medium-
term boost to the country’s anaemic growth rate. Nevertheless, economic 
dynamism is slowly grinding to a halt, and it is becoming more and more 
difficult to hide it.  
Equally ominous is the fact that Brazil cannot compensate for its 
domestic market deficiencies with an export drive and better access to 
foreign clients. In the last decade, the country’s trade negotiating strategy 
has focused on the Doha Round and on securing preferential access to its 
South American neighbours’ economies. Now, the WTO talks are bogged 
down and most Latin American Pacific states are pursuing open trade 
agendas with a flurry of free-trade agreements (FTAs) signed with the US, 
the EU and some Asian partners, while also jumping onto the bandwagon 
of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). With the recent launch of 
US–EU talks on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
Brazil is threatened by huge losses of shares in the markets of two of its 
                                                     
14 All the statistical data in this paper, unless specified, come from the Brazilian 
Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior [Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, MDIC], Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística [Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE] or the Central Bank of 
Brazil. 
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most important commercial partners. And even on its home turf of South 
America, it is being cornered within an enlarged Mercosur made up of its 
most protectionist and even anti-trade neighbours (Venezuela, Argentina 
and, probably, Bolivia and Ecuador). Hence, Brazilian exporters – 
particularly the more value-added manufacturing sector – have to face a 
growing challenge from more competitive players (China and Asian 
producers in general, but also those in the US and Germany), not only on 
the markets of Latin American Pacific Rim countries, but also on their own 
domestic market. And it is not some lonely FTAs with Israel, Palestine and 
Egypt or two modest preferential agreements with India and the South 
African Customs Union that will make a difference.  
A virtuous – and lucky – growth model  
The Brazilian growth model of the first decade of the 2000s was supported 
mainly by huge trade surpluses, in large part attributable to a few 
commodity exports (particularly iron ore and soya beans). Indeed, during 
the last years of ‘happy globalisation’ and extraordinary global growth, raw 
materials reached extremely high prices and export volumes (Figures 6-7). 
 
Figure 6. Iron ore monthly price, January 1998–January 2013 
(US$ per dry metric ton) 
 
Source: IndexMundi. 
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Figure 7. Commodity Agricultural Raw Materials Index, monthly price, January 
1998–January 2013 (index number) 
 
Source: IndexMundi. 
 
Thanks to these big surpluses, the Brazilian government could 
drastically reduce its external debt and build significant currency reserves 
(Figure 8). In 2008, Brasilia could announce that the country had reached 
the position of being a net external-debt creditor. After decades of 
expensive indebtedness, this new situation provided a lot of elbow room to 
pursue a voluntaristic policy of huge social transfers that became the 
trademark of the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The 
main effects of these transfers, combined with responsible and predictable 
macroeconomic management, inherited from the previous federal 
government and pursued during the first six years of the PT (Workers’ 
Party) administration, were a clean-cut reduction of the stubbornly high 
poverty rate, a swelling middle class and the creation of a big and thriving 
consumer market in Brazil. The ensuing consumer boom was good for 
domestic business and importers alike, and attracted an important and 
steady flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from Europe 
(Figure 9). 
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Figure 8. Brazil, reserves of foreign exchange and gold, 2004–11 (US$) 
 
Source: IndexMundi. 
Figure 9. Brazil, net inflows of FDI (current US$)  
 
Source: IndexMundi. 
All carnivals have their Ash Wednesdays 
Since 2009, this virtuous model has clearly been heading straight for a wall. 
Some of the most important parts of the engine – commodity prices and 
buyers’ markets – have been hit by the general economic slowdown due to 
the global recession: the balance of trade surplus in 2011 was just about a 
third of the highest level in 2006 (Figure 10). To preserve domestic growth 
and to protect employment and social transfers, the authorities prioritised 
the boosting of the domestic consumer market through a huge injection of 
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credit – most of it coming from public financial institutions. This 
government-spending binge (Figure 11), which reached an all-time high in 
November 2011, is fuelling rising public deficits and crowding out much-
needed productive investments. 
Figure 10. Brazil, balance of trade (US$ million) 
 
Sources: Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/) and Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (MDIC). 
Figure 11. Brazil, government spending 
 
Sources: Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/), Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). 
In these new circumstances, the traditionally accommodating and 
timorous national industrial sector has focused on the immediate gains 
reaped from the internal market. Exports of industrial, more value-added, 
products have been losing ground to the venerable trade flows of raw 
materials. At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazilian foreign trade was 
made up of 60% of manufactured goods and 40% of commodities. Today, 
the percentages are exactly the other way around (Figure 12). There is no 
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doubt that Brazilian industries are also suffering huge declines in 
competitiveness for lack of government investment to solve the country’s 
economic bottlenecks (infrastructure modernisation, the upgrading of the 
education system, fiscal reform, de-bureaucratisation, regulatory 
predictability…) and for lack of private investment in R&D or even plant 
modernisation. Worse, to protect their advantages in the domestic market, 
many sub-sectors are clamouring for protection (particularly those of parts 
and components, and capital goods), which the government is happy to 
oblige in a piecemeal, supposedly WTO-compatible manner, shielding even 
more the most archaic producers from foreign competition and hampering 
the efforts of those who need better-priced machines or components in 
order to enhance their own competitiveness. As a matter of fact, confidence 
in the direction of the central government’s management of the economy is 
at such a new low that the country’s investment rate is at little less than 
18% of GDP (one of the smallest percentages in the developing world), 
while consumption (private and public) is at about 81% and savings at 16% 
of GDP. That is not sustainable for an ‘emerging’ economy. 
Figure 12. Brazil, exports, 1964–2010 (%) 
 
Source: MDIC/Brazil. 
The consequences of trying at all costs to sustain an economic model 
that is no longer in tune with the global economic realities and constraints 
are worrying. The stock of the federal public deficit swelled to R$2 trillion 
(US$1 trillion); meanwhile, inflation at around 6% (much more for the basic 
popular staples) is dangerously creeping up (Figure 13), threatening to go 
over the government’s benchmark of 4.5%, plus or minus two percentage 
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points; in 2012, investment went down more than 4% and current account 
deficits are getting bigger and bigger, with a historical low reached in 
December 2012 (Figure 14). The more disappointing headline news was the 
GDP growth rate of 0.9% for 2012 after the modest 2.5% of 2011. More 
ominous still is that confronted with this batch of grim numbers, the 
finance ministry has appealed to many – legal – forms of budgetary 
‘creative accounting’ to hide the bad news and has not hesitated to trample 
openly on the dwindling autonomy of Central Bank decisions in order to 
control the interest rate and to manipulate the exchange rate. This attitude 
is undermining the core pillar of Brazil’s decade-old economic success: the 
predictability of macroeconomic policies based on fiscal responsibility, an 
inflation target, a floating exchange rate and Central Bank autonomy.  
Figure 13. Brazil, consumer price index 
 
Sources: Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/) and IBGE. 
Figure 14. Brazil, current account (US$ million) 
 
Sources: Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/) and Banco Central do 
Brasil. 
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Figure 15. Brazil, GDP annual growth rate (% change in GDP) 
 
Sources: Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/) and IBGE. 
‘Brazil Cost’ x ‘currency war’ 
Brazil is entering a vicious cycle: less investment, less growth, more public-
backed credit, more consumer indebtedness (more than 50% of families 
have debts), more public deficits, more inflation, more government 
intervention, less trust in the future of the economy and… less investment. 
In spite of the present full-employment consumer market, private 
investment was 4.5% weaker in 2012 compared with the previous year 
(with a worrying 12% fall in output of capital goods), and industrial 
production has been negative for the last five quarters. President Dilma 
Rousseff herself has been acknowledging that Brazil’s biggest challenge is 
to re-establish its economic competitiveness by finally tackling head-on the 
infamous ‘Custo Brasil’ [Brazil Cost: the tremendous infrastructure deficit, 
the horrendous bureaucracy and tax system (which favours a high level of 
corruption), the lack of any significant private-sector R&D, the lack of 
qualified workers (the education system is in shambles), the near monopoly 
that a few big construction and industrial firms have on cheap credit from 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), leaving SMEs trying to cope 
with loan-shark rates… 
This core problem of the Brazilian economy – and its permanent drag 
on the country’s growth potential – has been discussed at length in the last 
decade. But what is obvious is not always feasible. First, the federal 
government cannot keep on digging deeper into its public deficits. 
Moreover, its ideological bias to prioritise the role of the state in the 
production process has become a concerning source of inflationary 
pressures. Second, in order to attract the private sector to the huge 
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investments that are needed, Brasilia has to promote trust and 
predictability. That means important regulatory changes, a dose of fiscal 
reform, the reestablishment of the Central Bank and regulatory agencies’ 
autonomy and credibility, and a much lighter government footprint on the 
economy. For the current administration, this would be tantamount to an 
ideological revolution. Maybe more painful, it would inevitably threaten 
many powerful vested interests that prosper by controlling the machinery 
of the state’s apparatus, its juicy public or semi-public enterprises and its 
private-sector clients and allies.  
No wonder that in the last two years, Brasilia has tried to put the 
entire blame for the economic slowdown on external causes: the global 
crisis in general and the overvalued exchange rate of the Brazilian real. 
Denouncing a global ‘currency war’ is easier – and sexier – than starting 
painful domestic adjustments. The exchange rate has become the main 
battle horse for Brazilian authorities in the G-20 meetings and at the WTO. 
No doubt that exchange rate manipulations can threaten the whole fabric of 
the international trade system and the global economy, and that it is 
absolutely legitimate to try to find ways to avoid this kind of perilous 
tinkering in a more permanent fashion. But the fact is that in relation to 
Brazil’s specific competitiveness problems, this issue is at most a sideshow. 
This is all the more true given that Brazilian governments, including the 
present one, have a very long history of playing with competitive 
devaluations (Figure 16). In the last two years, HSBC’s “Currency War 
Ranking” has put Brazil in top positions among the currency warmonger 
countries: it held second place in 2011 and fourth place in 2012.  
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Figure 16. BRL/US$ exchange rate, 1994–2013 
 
Source: fxtop.com, 2012. 
 
Brazil as a (little) currency warmonger 
The fact is that there is no strong correlation between the BRL’s exchange 
rate and Brazil’s foreign trade performance. The two Lula governments 
(2002–10) were characterised by a huge initial depreciation of the BRL 
(around 76% between April 2002 and October 2002 – from 2.25 to 3.97 
R$/US$). Then, there was a long period where the currency strengthened 
steadily (around 54% between its bottom in October 2002 and February 
2010 – from 3.97 to 1.86 R$/US$). During most of that time, business was 
booming and nobody was railing against the exchange rate. Brazil had 
huge trade surpluses and growing currency reserves, and it repaid most of 
its public external debt. Its domestic consumer market was also booming 
and naturally attracted big flows of foreign capital, and the Central Bank, 
afraid of inflation, kept interest rates sky-high. Hence, currency 
appreciation was quite an orthodox affair. It was contributing to the 
country’s competitiveness by making the imports of capital and 
intermediate goods cheaper (these types of imports represented around 
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70% of total imports during the period) and providing cheap foreign funds 
for investments.  
Surprisingly, until the beginning of the global crisis in July 2008 and 
in spite of a strong currency appreciation, the percentage of consumption 
goods in total imports varied modestly around a 13–11% ‘band’. This 
percentage shot up only in 2009–10 (around 17% of total imports), just after 
the huge depreciation(!) of the BRL (55% between July and December 2008, 
only partially mitigated by the side effects of the first US quantitative 
easing decision – QE1). A fall in the imports of capital goods, owing to the 
consequences of the global crisis, can explain part of this surge. 
Dilma Rousseff inherited the ‘medium-term’ Lula appreciation trend. 
From her inauguration until July 2011, the BRL gained more than 16% 
against the dollar. But the situation now is not the same. The global crisis 
has reached the ‘emerging economies’. Trade competition has become 
ferocious to keep one’s market share in the huge but dwindling mature 
consumer markets and to conquer the relatively small but more dynamic 
emerging ones. Chinese products are rapidly eating Brazilian quotas in its 
most important markets for value-added exports – Latin America, the US 
and even Brazil’s domestic market itself (consumption goods imports, of 
which China has a big chunk, is now at around 17.5% of total imports).  
With a still faltering political will to tackle seriously the Custo Brasil 
and no drive to modernise the Brazilian industrial sector (in 2012, imports 
of capital goods dropped to a 21st century low – 43% of total imports), the 
most convenient scapegoat for the problems of Brazilian industry has been 
the exchange rate. Finance Minister Guido Mantega had the dubious 
honour of being the first to bluster against the ‘currency war’. But instead 
of facing up to China (which is Brazil’s biggest client, even if it is mainly a 
commodities buyer – iron ore and soya), Brazilian authorities shifted the 
blame to the US, accused of manipulating its currency using QE policies. 
Ideologically, it was easier for a leftist government to take on the US 
instead of its Chinese South–South ‘ally’ and BRIC partner. And for some 
members of the old São Paulo protected and protectionist business 
community, it was a perfect argument to ask for a hike in import tariffs – 
most of Rousseff’s new tariff increases are focused on a very few sectors 
with traditionally strong lobbies. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Brazil, 
under ‘friendly’ government advice, vigorously slashed its interest rate to 
try to keep the domestic market booming, and decided to openly 
manipulate the value of the BRL as a firewall against the supposed 
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‘currency war’. From July 2011 to the end of 2012, the BRL lost 33% of its 
value vis-à-vis the US$ (Figure 17). 
Figure 17. US$/BRL exchange rate, 2006–12 
 
 
Brazilian Real not guilty of dwindling trade surpluses  
Alas, this huge devaluation did not really help Brazil’s manufactured 
exports, or its commercial competitiveness. The exchange rate certainly 
plays its part but the correlation is not really convincing. During the eight 
Lula years, with ups and downs, the BRL had an appreciation of 25% (51%! 
from 2002 to June 2008) in spite of the humongous 55% devaluation during 
the six months following the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Yet Brazilian trade 
grew an incredible 227%, and manufactured exports were up 180%, from 
2002 to 2008 (the sharp drop in 2009 is directly linked to the global crisis). 
During Dilma Rousseff’s first year in power and until June 2011, the BRL 
appreciated 16%, but total exports and manufactured exports grew by 32% 
and 18%, respectively. In 2011, the Brazilian government orchestrated a 
huge, rampant devaluation of the currency (33%) but there were no 
significant changes (only a downward bias) in the trade pattern: more like 
27% and 16% respectively for total and manufactured exports. Hence, the 
so-called ‘currency war’ does not look like the most credible culprit for 
Brazil’s economic woes. Brazil’s export performances are clearly linked to 
the variations of international prices (particularly in commodities), to the 
economic slow-down of its main foreign partners and the incapacity of the 
government and many businesses to address the competitiveness 
conundrum. 
As regards the famous QEs, the consequences for Brazil are 
ambiguous to say the least. QE1 (December 2008–August 2009) did 
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coincide with a 27% appreciation of the BRL. But let us not forget that this 
appreciation followed a huge 55% depreciation of the BRL between the 
summer of 2008 (the Lehman Brothers’ crisis) and December 2008 (from 
R$1.56 to R$2.43 to the US$). If we take the BRL movements from the 
Lehman Brothers’ crisis until the end of QE1, the BRL, in fact, still lost 
about 11% of its value! During QE2 (November 2010–June 2011), this 
depreciated BRL gained about 6.5% and reached R$1.57 per dollar: exactly 
the same as the pre-Lehman Brothers’ level! Numbers are stubborn: the 
exchange rate spillovers of the first two QEs are ‘neutral’ regarding the 
BRL. The third reincarnation of QE, launched in September 2012, has not 
had, so far, any impact on the BRL exchange rate, whose present 
(devaluated) level is clearly and openly defended by the Brazilian Central 
Bank.  
A window of opportunity for trade agreements 
The fact that the Brazilian economy is heading for a wall does not mean it is 
going to crash. There is still a lot of steering power and impressive airbags. 
The FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Rio Olympic Games of 2016 will 
undoubtedly give a big boost to many sectors (construction, transports, 
security, communications, tourism…). And one can also be reasonably 
optimistic about pre-salt oil benefits coming on-stream in the next few 
years. In addition, the domestic market boom still has a lot of steam owing 
to the incurable optimism of the Brazilian consumer, the still impressive 
mandatory wages hikes and the legendary creative flexibility of local 
businessmen. The budgetary numbers are worsening but the country is not 
broken and still has impressive foreign currency reserves. If the global 
economy improves, the trade in commodities will rise again and Brazil will 
be lifted by the tide. Moreover, informed public opinion is unanimously 
clamouring for structural reforms and investments to reduce the ‘Brazil 
Cost’ and President Dilma Rousseff herself has publicly embraced the 
cause of ‘competitiveness’. Brazil has a tradition of doing the right thing 
but only at the very last minute. This minute is arriving fast and that opens 
a real window of opportunity, not only for fixing the domestic problems 
but also for reinvigorating Brazil’s trade negotiation agenda.  
Tackling the Custo Brasil seriously is only one part of the 
competitiveness conundrum. In today’s interdependent world economy, 
Brazilian industries and services will not be able to face the competition 
without much further integration into the global supply chains and 
markets. The TIVA (trade in value-added) research conducted by the 
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OECD and WTO on the world’s trade flows, using value-added criteria and 
not the conventional total values or volumes, has clearly demonstrated that 
in this universe of transnational chains of production, protectionism 
(especially in parts and components, and capital goods) can badly hurt 
national exporters. And that services account for nearly 40% of the value 
added to industrial products. A final producer that is constrained to factor 
into his costs many protected and expensive nationally-produced 
components and services cannot survive for long the competition of those 
who have access to less expensive components and services imports from 
global producers. Let alone the fact that heavily protected industries and 
services do not have any incentive to address their inefficiencies and keep 
losing market share internationally as well as domestically. Brazil already 
saw that film in the 1970s, and knows that there is no happy end. 
The two huge, new initiatives for trade liberalisation, centred on the 
resuscitating American economy (the TPP and the TTIP), can have an 
enormous negative impact on Brazil’s exports to its most important 
markets, particularly in Latin America and Europe. An EU–US agreement – 
say, on the norms and tariffs for agricultural products – would certainly 
displace Brazilian agri-exports to Europe in favour of American producers. 
Indeed, the TTIP is all about harmonising (or rendering compatible) rules, 
standards, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the whole 
battery of non-tariff or technical barriers to trade. A bilateral agreement – 
still an unpredictable endeavour – between the world’s two economic 
giants would create, de facto, a universal regulatory benchmark to which 
everybody else will have to abide. Brazil cannot afford to be left out of this 
new era of negotiations on regulations. So much so, that with the Doha 
Round at a dead end, and only a very small number of paltry trade 
agreements, Brazil does not have a choice. It has to become much more 
active on the trade talks front. 
Leaving to rest the hoopla about ‘South–South’ priorities, Brasilia’s 
authorities seem to put fresh emphasis on the relationship with North 
America and the EU. Brazilian diplomacy is exploring the possibilities of a 
Mercosur–Canada trade negotiation and is clearly trying to upgrade the 
bilateral 2007 Economic Partnership Dialogue with the US. But reviving 
nearly two decades of lagging EU–Mercosur trade negotiations looks like 
the most important near-term goal. During the last bi-regional meeting, in 
parallel with the CELAC15 Summit in Santiago de Chile, in January 2013 
                                                     
15 CELAC refers to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. 
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Brazil pushed strongly to convince its more reticent ‘Mercosurian’ partners 
(especially Argentina) to make a formal commitment to break the stalemate 
in the talks and exchange concrete negotiating offers with the Europeans by 
the end of 2013.  
New scenarios for the EU–Mercosur talks 
Waiting one more year to start doing serious business does not look like a 
good start. But it is also true that EU–Mercosur negotiations are stuck in 
two deep potholes. One is the South American bloc’s lack of consensus on 
this matter, with some members (Argentina and Venezuela) deeply 
opposed to any free trade agreement with anybody. The other is the 
European agricultural lobby, hostile to any concessions and powerful 
enough to hold hostage Brussels’ and European national authorities alike.  
For Brazil, the dilemma is quite straightforward: How to advance 
towards an agreement with Europe without jeopardising the strategic 
relationship with the presently über-protectionist Argentinean government? 
Mercosur is not only a trade integration scheme that is held together by the 
constraints of a customs union. It is also the political mechanism that seals 
the nearly three-decades-old cooperative relationship between Brasilia and 
Buenos Aires, after almost two centuries of strategic competition (including 
a fledging nuclear arms race in 1970–80). This Southern Cone integration 
process is the key to a peaceful and stable South American environment, 
free from the dangerous potential rivalry between the two biggest regional 
powers. Brazil today will not put at risk this foundation of its 
neighbourhood stability, neither by pushing Argentina too hard nor by 
prospecting for a bilateral FTA with Europe, which could lead Mercosur to 
implode. But it is also true that the economic and power gap between the 
two countries has been widening steadily, so Brasilia now has more strong 
arguments to ‘persuade’ Buenos Aires to come along. 
What could be the scenario for squaring this Brazil–Mercosur circle? 
Presently there are two possible parallel paths that could reinforce one 
another. The first is to go ahead with a set of bilateral EU–Brazil 
agreements on ‘anything but trade’ (more precisely, anything but tariffs): 
rules, standards, SPS, investment, taxation, regulations, business 
facilitation, the whole arsenal of technical barriers to trade and non-tariff 
barriers to trade… With some political will, this can be done without 
endangering Mercosur, and it would strengthen the Brazilian hand in 
promoting the second path: the sequencing of the bi-regional talks. 
Mercosur would be kept as a negotiating umbrella under which each 
88 | ALFREDO G.A. VALLADÃO  
member country could adopt faster or much slower liberalisation 
commitments and schedules. The EU has already experienced this kind of 
solution in its negotiations with the Andean Community. In any case, these 
two complementary courses should be greatly facilitated by a fresh look at 
the worn-out stumbling blocks of the bi-regional talks. It is time to take into 
account the new prospects offered by the lessons of the OECD–WTO TIVA 
research, which stresses the importance of interdependent production 
networks and services. 
To have any chance of success, this double-track negotiating strategy 
has to crack two hard nuts. Brasilia has to convince Buenos Aires (and 
eventually Caracas) to follow its lead on that matter without embarking 
upon a dramatic Mercosur mid-life crisis. For any ‘sequenced’ negotiations, 
the initiative has to be taken by the ‘Mercosurians’ – the EU will never 
flaunt such an idea for fear of being labelled a Mercosur demolition squad. 
Brazil by itself has been growing a lot of muscle in the region. But will it 
flex it? The second problem has to do with the EU itself. There will be no 
possibility of an agreement if Brussels does not put on the table a much 
better offer on agriculture, particularly on beef and poultry. More access to 
the EU’s agricultural market is practically the sole main advantage that 
Mercosur member countries could trade for opening their domestic 
markets to Europe’s industrial products and services. Yet that means a lot 
of political willpower from Brussels and the more free-trade-oriented EU 
members, especially in the present times of deep economic crisis and with a 
struggling Socialist government in France, which has to deal with the most 
over-powerful agri-lobby of the whole continent. If these two nuts can be 
cracked, all the other issues – even if still difficult to negotiate – will be as 
cherries on the cake. 
An emerging power forever? 
Whatever the future of this Loch Ness monster of bi-regional negotiation, 
the Brazilian economy cannot remain stuck in its one-time successful ‘Lula 
model’. Stagflation – slow growth and high inflation – is looming on the 
horizon. The country has to accept a big jump into the global economic 
swimming pool, which means a much more open and competitive 
economy and society. A new growth model entails, necessarily, more 
access to foreign markets (and the EU is still Brazil’s more important 
customer) and a serious liberalisation of its domestic market. 
Competitiveness comes at that price and time is running out for deciding to 
pay it or not. New – and crucial – presidential elections will be held in the 
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autumn of 2014. As of today, President Dilma Rousseff, with her sky-high 
numbers in the polls, is by far the strongest candidate, but an economy 
heading towards prolonged stagflation would hardly be the best trump 
card for her re-election campaign. Of course, this challenge could be good 
news (inducing the government to force the pace of liberalisation) or bad 
news (prompting a new demagogic splurge of government money in order 
to guarantee the election’s outcome).  
An apocryphal quote, attributed to General Charles de Gaulle, states 
that “Brazil is the land of the future, and always will be”. Apart from the 
Gallic arrogance, the present dire prospects for the Brazilian growth model 
are threatening the country’s status as an ‘emerging power’. Not that it will 
‘submerge’ again; Brazil is now too rich and sophisticated for that. But 
what if it never ‘emerges’ and stays an emerging power forever? Brazilians 
are haunted by the curse of the voo de galinha [the ‘hen’s flight’]: the 
centuries-old succession of brief periods of strong economic growth 
followed by phases of stagnation and depression. Let us hope that this 
time, it will finally be different. Otherwise, we will witness, once again, the 
glorious cock-a-doodle-doo one-yard flight followed by the inevitable hard 
landing in the middle of the unimpressed hencoop.  
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Appendix. Numbers on the US$/R$ exchange rate and Brazil’s 
exports (weekly averages) 
Lula governments 
October 2001 R$ 2.89 Lula’s election 
Appreciation of the BRL: +22% 
April 2002  R$ 2.25 Three months of the Lula government 
Depreciation of the BRL: -76% 
September/October 2002  R$ 3.97 
Appreciation of the BRL: +29% 
July 2003 R$ 2.80 
Depreciation of the BRL: -12% 
June 2004 R$ 3.15 
Appreciation of the BRL: +50% 
Start of global crisis 
July 2008 R$ 1.56 Lehman Brothers’ meltdown 
Depreciation of the BRL: -55% 
December 2008 R$ 2.43 Start of US QE1 
Appreciation of the BRL: +27% 
September 2009 R$ 1.77 End of US QE1 
Depreciation of the BRL: -07% 
December 2009 R$ 1.74 End of Lula’s two terms 
Appreciation of the BRL during the Lula period (1.1.2002–31.12.2009): 
+25.24% 
Dilma government 
January 2010 R$ 1.73 Dilma takes charge 
Depreciation of the BRL: -07%  
February 2010 R$ 1.86 First month of Dilma’s government 
Appreciation of the BRL: +09% 
November 2010 R$ 1.68 Start of US QE2 
Appreciation of the BRL: +06% 
June 2011  R$ 1.57 End of US QE2 
Depreciation of the BRL: -16% 
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October 2011  R$ 1.83 
Appreciation of the BRL: +06% 
February 2012  R$ 1.71 
Devaluation of the BRL: -18% 
September 2012  R$ 2.02 Start of US QE3 
Devaluation of the BRL during the Dilma period (1.1.2010–17.10.2012): -
17.34% 
R$ and exports – Fundamental movements 
• First Lula government until the Lehman Brothers’ crisis: +51% BRL 
appreciation 
• Total exports (2002-08): +227% 
• Total manufactured exports (2002–08): +180%  
• From Lehman Brothers until December 2008: -55% BRL depreciation 
• Total exports (2009): -22.7% 
• Total manufactured exports (2009): -27.3% 
• First two months of the Dilma government (Lula legacy): +16% BRL 
appreciation  
• Total exports (2010): +31.9% 
• Total manufactured exports (2010): +18.1%  
• The great ‘Dilma devaluation’ (July 2011–June 2012): -33% BRL 
devaluation 
Total exports (2011): +26.8% 
Total manufactured exports (2011): +15.9% 
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EU-MERCOSUR TRADE RELATIONS: 
IMPACTS OF EXCHANGE RATE 
MISALIGNMENTS ON TARIFFS 
VERA THORSTENSEN, EMERSON MARÇAL AND  
LUCAS FERRAZ 
Abstract 
The issue of “trade and exchange rate misalignments” is being discussed at 
the G20, IMF and WTO, following an initiative by Brazil. The main purpose 
of this chapter is to apply the methodology developed by the authors to 
examine the impacts of misalignment on tariffs in order to analyse the 
impacts of misalignments on the trade relations between two customs 
unions – the EU and Mercosur, as well as to explain how tariff barriers are 
affected. It is divided into several sections: the first summarises the debate 
on exchange rates at the WTO; the second explains the methodology used 
to determine exchange rate misalignments; the third and fourth 
summarises the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange 
rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of 
‘misalignment tarification’; the fifth reviews the effects of exchange rate 
misalignments on tariffs and its consequences for the trade negotiations 
between the two areas; and the last concludes and suggests a way to move 
the debate forward in the context of regional arrangements. 
Introduction 
After the financial crisis of 2008, persistent misalignments of exchange rates 
raised the concern of some G20, IMF and WTO members that the issue 
should not be left out of a multilateral debate. Besides discussion at the G 
20 and IMF, Brazil took the initiative to bring the issue to the WTO to 
analyse the impacts of misalignments on trade. In April 2011, Brazil 
presented a submission to the Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance 
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(WGTDF) suggesting a work programme to be initiated by academic 
research on the relationship between exchange rates and international trade 
based on a paper to be elaborated by the Secretariat (WT/WGTDF/W/53). 
In September 2011, Brazil presented to the same Working Group a second 
proposal on the theme, suggesting the analysis of available tools and trade 
remedies in the multilateral system that might allow countries to redress 
the effects of exchange rate misalignments (WT/WGTDF/W/56). The 
WTO Secretariat presented its Note on a Review of Economic Literature, 
dated 27 September 2011 (WT/WGTDF/W/57), as mandated by the 
Working Group. As expected, the conclusions were that a conclusion could 
not be reached because the Secretariat´s work reflected “IMF language”, 
not “WTO language”. Although this work presents extensive research, 
encompassing the effects of exchange rates on economic flows, it did not 
touch on the issue of the impact of exchange rate misalignments on WTO 
principles, rules and its instruments: tariffs, antidumping, subsidies, 
safeguards, rules of origin, GATT Articles I, II, III, XXIV, just to name some 
of the rules that are certainly affected by exchange rates. In March 2012, a 
seminar on exchange rates took place at the WTO. The participants at this 
seminar concluded that exchange rate misalignments can affect trade and 
that the discussion should continue among WTO and IMF members.  
The first research findings on the impact of exchange rate 
misalignments were published by the authors of this paper in the Journal of 
World Trade.16 A methodology was developed to estimate how 
misalignments could affect the level of bound and applied tariffs of Brazil, 
US and China. It also concluded that tariffs of overvalued countries could 
be significantly reduced or nullified, and tariffs of undervalued countries 
could be raised above bound tariffs, affecting their commitments at the 
WTO. It explored how GATT Articles I and II could be affected. 
In November 2012, Brazil presented its third proposal, focusing on 
how the exchange rate was dealt with in the history of the WTO and how 
trade remedy rules are inadequate to deal with the issue 
(WT/WGTDF/W/59). Once again, no conclusions could be reached and 
members agreed to continue the discussions in the WTO, inviting the IMF 
to be represented in the next meetings.  
                                                     
16 See Vera Thorstensen, Emerson Marçal and Lucas Ferraz, “Impacts of Exchange 
Rates on International Trade Policy Instruments: The Case of Tariffs”, Journal of 
World Trade, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2012. 
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The objective of this paper is to study the impact of exchange rates 
misalignments on GATT Article XXIV, on regional arrangements, and to 
draw some lessons to be applied in the negotiations of a preferential 
arrangement of two customs unions – between the EU and Mercosur. In 
summary, one of the most contentious issues is how to neutralise the effects 
of exchange misalignments on the negotiation of tariffs.  
EU-Mercosur PTA negotiations 
The EU and Mercosur have been negotiating a preferential arrangement 
since 1995, when a political decision was reached to launch an ambitious 
trade agreement between two customs unions. Seventeen years later, 
negotiations are still ongoing. All important aspects of the preferential 
agreement have been already tabled, but the main obstacles remain the 
same since the beginning: market access in the EU for agricultural goods 
from Mercosur and market access in Mercosur for industrial goods from 
the EU. 
After huge efforts in the negotiations from both sides, exporters are 
eager to reach new markets but domestic producers are worried about the 
impact of the present economic crisis on their markets.  
This paper argues that negotiations should be diverted from the old 
trade issues of tariffs and tariff quotas, because of the significant effects of 
misalignments on tariffs. A better idea would be to concentrate on non-
tariff barriers as customs practices, facilitation, rules of origin, TBT, SPS, 
private standards, competition and investment, that is, on rules to reduce 
the differences between partners’ practices. And only after a solution to 
neutralise the effects of exchange misalignments on tariffs can be 
negotiated between the partners or at the WTO should discussions on tariff 
reductions be resumed.  
An incomplete debate: to discuss trade without exchange rates in 
the WTO and exchange rates without trade in the IMF  
Since the GATT, the IMF and the World Bank were created in the 1940s, a 
strict division of functions was established: the GATT would be responsible 
for international trade regulation and liberalisation, the IMF would 
maintain the stability of exchange rates and balance of payments, and the 
World Bank would provide funds for Europe’s reconstruction, after World 
War II. The multilateral trade system was created at that time based on the 
dollar/gold standard, and even after it was changed to the flexible 
exchange system in the 1970s, the exchange rate debate remained restricted 
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to the IMF and was not comprehensively discussed either by GATT or 
WTO rules. The relationship between trade and exchange rates has been 
briefly explored both by the IMF and the GATT however,. 
In the IMF – Provisions on the intersection between trade and 
exchange rates and against exchange rate manipulation were clearly set out 
in Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement: 
Recognising that the essential purpose of the international monetary 
system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, 
services, and capital among countries,… 
In particular, each member shall: … (iii) avoid manipulating exchange 
rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of 
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other 
members; … 
With the end of the gold standard and the advent of the flexible 
exchange rates system, Article IV was amended in 1977 to adapt the Fund 
to the new reality of floating exchange rates. In reality, the mandate to 
monitor members’ practices on their exchange rates was never effectively 
realised. Only after the 2008 financial crisis was the debate raised at the G20 
and the mandate changed, thereby strengthening the surveillance function 
and amplifying it to include financial stability. On 18 July 2012, a new 
decision was adopted by the Executive Board of the IMF – Decision on 
Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance, establishing new rules.  
In the WTO – Provisions related to the relationship between trade 
and exchange rates were included in the GATT, at the time it was 
established in 1947. Article XV of the GATT has negotiated rules for 
exchange arrangements. Article XV.4 states: 
“Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent 
of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the 
provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund.” 
So far, there are no examples in the WTO of the application of the 
Article XV.4, due to the fact that no member has ever questioned another 
member’s exchange rate arrangements, as it requires the establishment of a 
panel as well as time for its members to reach a conclusion. Aside from the 
difficult matter of how to define the concept of ‘frustrated purposes’, the 
main question is whether the WTO has to consult the IMF in such cases. 
Due to the escalation of exchange rate misalignments, which is 
responsible for conflict between the US and China, as well as other Asian 
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countries, several experts are examining the issue concerning the exchange 
rate impacts on the international trade regulatory system, in order to define 
whether these misalignments could represent a violation of WTO rules. 
Although many attempts to use trade remedies such as antidumping and 
countervailing measures to offset the exchange effects have been made, the 
results appear to be legally questionable, since trade remedies were not 
negotiated or agreed as mechanisms to inhibit the use of exchange rates as 
unfair trade.  
In other words, the issue of how exchange rate variations affect trade 
has never been incorporated into the WTO rules. The only rule on which 
there is consensus is that the exchange rate is an IMF matter. The problem 
is that the IMF is an international organisation which does not have an 
enforcement mechanism such as the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. It 
decides the relevant issues through an agreement amongst the most 
influential parties (those who wield more voting power) in a political way. 
Unlike the WTO, which decides by consensus, the IMF does not work 
through negotiation. Also, as noted above, since the 1970s the IMF’s role as 
a tight controller of exchange rates has been transformed into a permissible 
survey of balance of payments. 
Since the 1990s, the discussion became more interesting with the 
work of several economists who started to calculate exchange rate 
misalignments, developing methodologies to calculate misalignments of 
exchange rates in relation to some equilibrium rates. There are several 
models for calculating equilibrium exchange rates: the purchasing power 
parity, the equilibrium of current account, the equilibrium of assets and 
liabilities flows, or the exchange rate based on the unit of labour costs.  
When reviewing all these studies, it becomes quite evident that the 
magnitude and the extension in time of these exchange rate misalignments 
for the main currencies are so significant that ignoring their effects on trade 
might undermine the objectives of the whole multilateral system.  
Confronting the numbers, one can even ask whether the discussion 
on manipulation is well placed. Misalignments are presented in almost all 
currencies. To establish an objective criterion to define manipulation will 
not be easy. But the main questions are still unanswered: What can be done 
about trade distortions? How to ensure the efficiency of trade instruments? 
What about the impact on regional agreements? 
The argument that different methodologies for measuring exchange 
misalignments produce different results can no longer be used to prevent 
the issue from being discussed. The main target is not to search for an 
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estimate with an absolute degree of precision, but rather to discover limits 
where misalignments can cause trade distortions. What really matters is to 
find a threshold at which trade policy instruments become ineffective and 
the WTO rules might be nullified. 
The conclusions are clear: exchange rate misalignments are such an 
important issue that discussions in the IMF alone are not sufficient. Their 
effects on trade instruments are so discriminatory that they must also be 
discussed at the WTO.  
Estimating exchange rate misalignments 
There are different methodologies for calculating exchange rate 
misalignments in the literature. The IMF is the most important source of 
data on misalignments. The Fund presents its estimates in the annual 
Reports on Article IV for almost every country. Until July 2012, the 
estimates were carried out by the Consultative Group on Exchange Rates 
(CGER), using three methodologies: the macroeconomic balance approach, 
the equilibrium real exchange rate approach and external sustainability 
(IMF, Research Department, Methodology for CGER Exchange Rate 
Assessments, 8 November 2006).  
On 18 July 2012, a new methodology was modified by the Decision 
on Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance. Under the new External Balance 
Assessment (EBA) methodology, the analysis was broadened from 
exchange rates to detailed examinations of current accounts, reserves, 
capital flows and the external balance. Three methods were developed, of 
which two are based on panel regression: the current account regression 
approach and the real exchange regression approach. The third is based on 
a sustainability analysis, a model-free approach where the current account 
gap is the difference between the level of the projected current account and 
the current account that would stabilise the net foreign asset at a 
benchmark level (IMF, Pilot External Sector Report, 2 July 2012, Annex I). 
Unlike traditional Article IV surveillance reports published by the 
Fund, which concentrate on a single country’s financial and economic 
position, this new exercise focuses on global external imbalances, 
estimating current account targets that better represent the Fund’s 
estimates for selected countries’ fundamentals and best policies. The results 
vary slightly from the averages obtained from each individual Article IV 
report and are available below. 
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Figure 18. IMF estimated misalignment – The multilateral approach 
 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Estimates by the FGV Observatory on Exchange Rates 
The FGV (Getulio Vargas Foundation) Observatory on Exchange Rates at 
the São Paulo School of Economics has been calculating exchange rate 
misalignments since 2009. The Observatory estimates real equilibrium 
exchange rates by using an econometric model of co-integration.17 
Estimates of exchange rate misalignment are made following the 
methodology based on the analysis of long-term fundamentals of the real 
exchange rate using a vector autoregressive model with an error connection 
term as the econometric model. It used as fundamentals the net foreign 
investment position, terms of trade and an indicator of difference in 
productivity in the sectors of tradable and non-tradable goods. There is 
theoretical justification for such choice, and the relationship between the 
real exchange rate and these variables is empirically validated, as shown by 
Faruqee (1995), Alberola et al. (1999) and Kubota (2009). 
In order to allow for some degree of comparability, some selected 
countries estimates for 2012 are presented. 
Following Figure 19, some observations can be made:  
- Brazil, Australia and United Kingdom are substantially overvalued. 
- India, Finland, Mexico, Colombia and China are substantially 
undervalued. 
                                                     
17 The methodology is presented in Thorstensen et al., op. cit. 
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- Unlike IMF estimates, the US is undervalued 
- Inside the EU, Germany, France and Finland are undervalued. 
Figure 19. Selected countries: Exchange rate misalignments - 2012 
 
Source: Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rates - EESP/FGV (2012). 
It is important to stress that different misalignment assessment 
methodologies will produce different results due to the economic option 
adopted. While the IMF focus on current account equilibrium, the 
methodology used by FGV focuses on net foreign asset equilibrium, thus 
resulting in slightly different degrees of misalignment. In any case, besides 
some particular cases of incongruence, the methodologies tend to point to 
similar outcomes, with overvalued and undervalued currencies being 
identified as such by different methodologies. What does vary is their 
degrees of misalignment. 
Examining the effects of exchange rate misalignments on bound 
and applied tariffs 
In order to evaluate the impact of exchange rate misalignment on tariff 
levels, a methodology was developed aiming to convert misalignments on 
tariffs and adjusting bound and applied tariff levels to their full impact. 
This is achieved with a formula that allows the tarification of 
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misalignments, following the tradition of the GATT/WTO negotiations. 
The details of the methodology are presented in Thorstensen et al.18 
Having the estimates of misalignments and a methodology to 
transform them into tariffs, the next step is to examine the effects of these 
adjusted tariffs on the tariff rates notified to the WTO. The effects of 
exchange rate misalignments on either bound or applied rates can be 
analysed through each country tariff profile. Bound tariffs are the tariff 
limits negotiated and agreed upon at the WTO during negotiation rounds. 
They represent the upper limit or ceiling above which countries cannot 
apply import tariffs. Applied tariffs are the tariffs actually applied by 
countries and notified to the WTO – they can be less than bound tariffs, but 
not more. 
Tariffs are GATT’s historical instrument for trade protection and one 
of the main negotiating subjects included in multilateral rounds. In the 
cases of preferential agreements, they should be at the core of the 
negotiations, since GATT determines that duties and other restrictive 
regulations should be eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the partners (GATT Article XXIV-8).  
The concepts of tariff and tarification are the core of the GATT/WTO 
logic. Estimates of ad valorem equivalent rates of several duties expressed 
on a monetary basis, such as specific rate duties, can be obtained and are 
published by the WTO Secretariat. As demonstrated in the preceding 
section, exchange rate misalignments can also be tarified through the 
calculation of a tariff equivalent. Just like tariffs, the effect of the exchange 
rate can be transferred to imported and exported goods’ prices.  
The tariff profile of each WTO member can be shown by a figure 
showing tariff averages for each chapter of the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System – HS (97 chapters), which includes: 
foodstuff, mineral, textiles, machines, electronics, vehicles and aircraft, 
amongst others.  
Impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariff levels 
With the tarification of exchange rate misalignments, some simulations can 
then be developed based on the estimates of these misalignments and their 
tariff equivalents, or, in other words, with the tarification of exchange rates. 
                                                     
18 See Thorstensen et al., op. cit. 
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It is important to emphasise that this exercise is not searching for the 
precise value of the exchange rate misalignments, but the threshold beyond 
which trade policy instruments and rules can be undermined. Negotiators, 
with these numbers at hand, could figure out how to neutralise the effects 
of exchange rate misaligments on trade and to regain the effectiveness of 
their tariffs and other GATT/WTO rules.  
The values of tariffs used in this paper were obtained in the WTO 
database (Tariff Analysis Online) and dated from 2011-12. The EU tariff 
profile includes ad valorem as well as specific tariffs. In this exercise, the EU 
tariff profile is portrayed at HS 2 digits, including only available ad valorem 
simple averages (no specific tariffs or AVE – ad valorem estimates were 
used), in the same manner as published by WTO database.  
The following simulations present a comparison of bound tariffs, 
applied tariffs and adjusted tariffs (after the tarification exercise), 
measuring tariffs as a simple average at HS 2 digits. For exchange rate 
misalignments, this paper uses approximated values calculated by the FGV 
– Observatory.  
Simulations 
i) Effects of Brazilian exchange rate overvaluation on Brazil´s tariff 
profile 
Brazil´s tariff profile is presented here in HS 2-digit simple averages with 
its 97 chapters. Brazil bound tariffs (in blue) vary from 16% to 50%, while 
its applied tariffs (in green) vary from 0.5% to 35%. 
Introducing the exercise of exchange rate misalignment tarification 
and using the estimated misalignment of the Real for 2012 (+20%), a 
different tariff profile is presented for Brazil: 
• 2012: 20% overvaluation 
- Brazil’s average bound tariffs, which currently vary from 16% to 
50%, due to the exchange rate overvaluation, were varying from -
10% to +19% (red line). 
- Brazil’s average applied tariffs, which currently vary from 0.5% 
to +35%, due to the exchange rate overvaluation, were varying 
from –20% to +8% (orange line). For this level of misalignment, 
only products classified between chapters 57 to 64, mainly textiles 
and clothing still presented positive degrees of protection. 
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Figure 20. Brazil tariff profile and adjusted tariffs: Effects of Brazil exchange rate 
overvaluation (2012) 
 
Note: Simple averages at HS 2 digits. 
Sources: Tariffs – WTO (2012) / Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rates - 
EESP/FGV (2012). 
The impacts of the Brazilian exchange rate overvaluation on its own 
tariff profile are made clear by the above exercise. It means that the 
overvaluation of the Real is nullifying Brazilian applied tariffs. Even if 
Brazil used its right to apply tariffs at the upper limit of the bound ones 
negotiated at the WTO, the resulting adjusted tariffs to the overvaluation 
effect would not offer much protection. 
ii) Brazil´s market access for some European countries 
Following the tariff profile of Brazil, one can examine the market access 
granted for products from different European origins, each adjusted to 
their own exchange rate misalignment added to the Brazilian exchange rate 
overvaluation. 
For 2012, the consequences are: 
• Brazil’s average applied tariffs, which currently vary from 0.5% to 
+35%, vary considerably due to European exchange rate 
misalignments.  
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• The only cases that include some positive values are the Greece and 
Spain because they also present overvalued currencies (+12,8% and 
+4,5%, respectively), although in lesser degrees than the Real 
overvaluation, which partially offsets the misalignment effect on 
tariffs. 
• For some other European countries, Brazil´s adjusted tariffs will be as 
low as –44%. As a consequence, adjusted tariffs are negative, meaning 
that Brazil has no tariff protection. The most interesting case is 
Finland, in which Brazil´s adjusted tariffs vary from –44% to –25%. 
Figure 21. Brazilian market access for selected European countries (2011) 
 
Note: Simple averages at HS 2 digits. 
Sources: Tariffs – WTO (2012) / Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rates - 
EESP/FGV (2012). 
 
iii) EU market access  
The same simulation can be made for the EU. 
The EU´s bound and applied rates have average values that vary 
from 0% to +18%, with a notable exception for Chapter 24 for which the 
tariff rate average reaches 45% (tobacco). 
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Assuming the euro exchange rate is in equilibrium, the access granted 
to the EU market will vary depending on the misalignment of other 
countries: 
• For Brazil, the EU adjusted tariffs varied, in 2012 (20% overvaluation), 
from +20% to +41% (excluding Chapter 24); 
• For China, the EU adjusted tariffs vary from –17% to -2,5%. 
• For the US, the EU adjusted tariffs vary from –5% to +12%.  
As a consequence, the EU tariff profile, when adjusted by exchange 
rate misalignments, due to the overvaluation of Brazil, will be higher than 
the bound rate notified to the WTO. For China and the US, on the other 
hand, due to both countries’ exchange rate undervaluations, the EU tariff 
profile will be negative, representing no protection to the EU market and 
better access by the US and China compared to Brazil. 
Figure 22. Selected countries’ adjusted access to the EU market 
 
Note: Simple averages at HS 2 digits – Exchange rate misalignments for 2011-12. 
Sources: Tariffs – WTO (2012) / Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rates - 
EESP/FGV (2012). 
In conclusion, the co-existence of two kinds of exchange rate 
misalignments, one of overvaluation and the other of devaluation, when 
substantial and sustained for extended periods of time, represent a serious 
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distortion for many international trade policies. This observation is 
especially true for tariff policy, which is one of the core trade instruments, 
not only at the WTO, but for all preferential trade agreements.  
Final conclusions 
For seven decades, the discussion on exchange rate misalignments was 
monopolised by the IMF. But as shown in the preceding pages, the IMF lost 
its function as supervisor of exchange rates in the 1970s with the end of the 
dollar/gold standard. After the reforms of 1997 and 2007, exchange rate 
misalignments returned secondarily to become the focus of the Fund, and 
only in 2012, with a new mandate from the G20, was a decision reached for 
the Secretariat to start examining the impact of members’ exchange rates 
policies on other members’ economic stability, through new bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance mechanisms. It is too early to see the results, but 
the prospects do not seem particularly promising as an instrument of trade. 
The discussions are to be treated as confidential between the Fund and each 
member, and even after the multilateral surveillance finds a member 
practising currency manipulation, the decisions of the Board are not 
mandatory. The IMF has no political leverage to bring a member into 
conformity, as in the WTO.  
As a consequence, even after the IMF reforms, the impact of 
misalignments on trade instruments was not addressed. Tariffs are a good 
example to highlight. Tariffs are still an important international trade 
policy instrument for many WTO members, representing the single 
instrument allowed for market protection in accordance with WTO rules. 
For decades, negotiations on tariffs were the main objective of the GATT 
rounds. For preferential trade agreements, tariffs are still the main topic of 
negotiations. 
This paper presents clear evidence of the effects of exchange-rate 
misalignments on tariffs, as follows:  
• For countries with overvalued exchange rates, depending on the level 
of such appreciation, their bound and applied tariffs can be nullified 
and become negative, implying that the country is granting a 
stimulus to imports and waiving the tariff protection level negotiated 
within the WTO. 
• For countries with undervalued exchange rates, depending on the 
level of such depreciation, their bound and applied tariffs can be 
increased in greater proportions than the exchange rate. For countries 
with a small difference between applied and bound tariffs, any 
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depreciation may imply that applied tariffs surpass the limits 
negotiated within the WTO, violating GATT Article II, establishing 
that no member can apply tariffs bigger than the bound tariffs. 
• Considering bilateral misalignments, even GATT Article I – non-
discrimination among nations – can be affected because the tariffs 
between every pair of countries will vary under the effects of their 
exchange rates, which may result in different levels of protection vis-
à-vis third countries, in violation of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment obligation.  
• Considering preferential trade agreements, exchange rate 
misalignments can affect the general incidence of tariffs to third 
countries when compared to tariffs prior to the formation of these 
agreements. Moreover, these misalignments are undermining the 
elimination of tariffs among parties. Both rules were determined by 
GATT Article XXIV. Finally, rules of origin, when based on value 
added, will also be affected, distorting the rules negotiated by parties 
to have access to the preferential market, adding additional degrees 
of uncertainty to the institutions.  
One can raise some questions concerning the main impasse facing the 
WTO at the present time. Examining the reasons behind the blockage of the 
Doha round of negotiations and analysing the demands of some developed 
members such as the US and the EU related to the concessions from 
emerging countries, one can question the real level of market access offered 
by these countries, given that their exchange rate policies might even 
nullify all their offers in the negotiations. The level of market access 
granted by members that practise long-term exchange rate devaluations 
can be called into doubt and one can question the real level of concessions 
or tariff cuts offered in the last few years of negotiations.  
Against the reality of exchange rate misalignments, it is no longer 
acceptable to allow the continuation of the present situation. It is time to 
start negotiating a mechanism to neutralise exchange rate effects on tariffs, 
which, when effectively applied, would allow the maintenance of the level 
of market access previously established. 
Some proposals have already been presented by experts. Bergsten & 
Gagnon (2012) from the Petersen Institute use the concept of currency 
manipulation to offer a methodology to identify 20 countries that are 
undervaluing their currencies due to large foreign reserves and other 
foreign assets. In retaliation for these currency activities, they propose that 
the US should take four sets of actions: i) undertake countervailing 
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currency intervention against countries with convertible currencies by 
buying amounts of their currencies equal to the amount of dollars they are 
buying themselves, to neutralise the impact on exchange rates; ii) tax the 
earnings on, or restrict further purchases of, dollar assets acquired by 
intervening countries with inconvertible currencies to penalise them for 
building up these positions; iii) treat manipulated exchange rates as export 
subsidies for purposes of levying countervailing import duties and iv) 
bring a case against the manipulators in the WTO that would authorise 
more wide-ranging trade retaliation.19 
Lima-Campos & Gaviria (2012) from the College of Law at American 
University analyse undervaluation as a case of export subsidies and 
propose a pure WTO remedy – the initiation of countervailing measures. 
They argue that the effects of undervaluation are different by product and 
by sector, suggesting a full investigation of each case.20  
Suggestions for the EU–Mercosur negotiations 
Considering the analysis above on the effects of exchange rate 
misalignments on tariffs and their importance on the bi-regional 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur, some suggestions can be made. 
First, after almost two decades of negotiations between the parties, 
one can agree that the reduction or elimination of tariff barriers is still an 
important issue blocking the achievement of a final result. Second, the 
economic crisis of 2008 and the consequent euro crises are reducing 
economic growth to levels near depression. This scenario is forcing 
governments to use trade as a means to bring economic activities to higher 
levels. 
In the case of goods, agricultural and non-agricultural ones, 
competitiveness is affected by exchange rates, interest rates and 
infrastructure costs. In Mercosur, after many years with overvalued 
exchange rates, imports from different sources have significantly increased. 
The same can be said for some European countries. As a result, there is no 
                                                     
19 F. Bergsten and J. Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the 
Global Economic Order”, Policy Brief 12-25, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C., December 2012. 
20 A. Lima-Campos and J. Gaviria, “A Case for Misaligned Currencies as 
Countervailable Subsidies”, Journal of World Trade 46, Issue 5, 2012.  
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political support from industries in Mercosur to advance negotiations or 
from agricultural producers in Europe. 
Exchange rate misalignments are one of the main uncertainties 
behind the negotiations. There are ways to help unblock the impasse, 
however, as suggested below: 
• Negotiate an exchange rate misalignment clause or a special 
safeguard between the parties, either by country or by region. There 
are many examples of bilateral and sectoral safeguards in the EU 
agreements. 
• Negotiate who will be in charge of the calculations of 
misalignments – the IMF, the European Commission or the 
Mercosur Secretariat.  
• Negotiate a band of fluctuation of bilateral misalignments and a 
period for the misalignment. A possibility is a band from +15% to –
15% and a period of six months. Each time two countries approach 
the limit, their governments could start monitoring imports and 
identifying products causing concern to parties. 
• Negotiate thresholds to establish triggers to the safeguard based on 
import growth. 
• Negotiate safeguards based on tariff quotas for agricultural goods 
and tariffs for non-agricultural goods for a limited period of time, 
until misalignments are reduced. 
The alternative would be to wait for either the WTO or the IMF to 
start negotiations and reach a practical solution on exchange rates and 
trade. 
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THE MERCOSUR-EU FTA:  
A VIEW FROM EUROPE 
PATRICK MESSERLIN 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the likelihood of a preferential trade agreement 
(PTA) between Mercosur and the EU, and its possible content. The term 
PTA, adopted by the WTO Report [WTO 2011], is preferred to “free trade 
agreement” for two reasons. First, the content of the 350 (notified to the 
WTO) to 550 (allegedly signed) FTAs does not qualify automatically for the 
“free trade” term. Most of these “FTAs” have very poor market access 
provisions in trade in goods, often none or WTO minus in trade in services 
[Adlung and Miroudot, 2012] and in topics (non-tariff barriers, investment, 
public procurement, etc.) that are an integral part of 21st century trade 
agreements. The second reason is that one Mercosur’s economy – Brazil’s – 
is large enough in some sectors to have some impact on world prices. A 
trade agreement with another large economy, such as the EU, has the 
potential to generate notable discriminatory effects on the economies of the 
rest of the world. In such a context, the term “preferential” is a useful 
reminder that PTAs among large economies may increase trade among the 
signatories, but at the detriment of trade between the signatories and the 
rest of the world. 
This chapter is organised in three sections. Section 1 aims to assess 
the economic and political importance of Mercosur for the EU interests in 
the short and medium run – say, for the next one or two decades or so. As 
Mercosur’s size is largely determined by Brazil’s size, this section focuses 
on Brazil – although the chapter assumes that, from Brazil’s perspective, a 
Brazil-EU PTA is a non-starter. Section 2 then aims at positioning the 
Mercosur-EU (MEU) PTA in the current EU trade policy. In particular, it 
tries to assess whether, once one takes into account all the crucial goals to 
be met by the EU, the EU is likely to find the time and the resources 
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necessary to deal properly with a MEU PTA-made particularly complicated 
by the very divergent views on the trade role between Brazil on the one 
hand and Argentina and Venezuela on the other. Finally, section 3 
examines the PTA options that can be seen as reasonably do-able in the 
light of sections 1 and 2. It suggests that, unless there are dramatic changes 
in the Mercosur current trajectory, the goal of negotiating a fully-fledged 
MEU PTA should be set aside for some time – for a decade or so at least,. 
Section 3 then argues that doing so does not mean to leave the negotiating 
table, but rather to focus on negotiating topics that remain attractive for 
both sides in the current context, and manageable and flexible enough to 
overcome the broad general problems confronted by Mercosur and the EU. 
Mercosur and Brazil viewed from the EU 
From the EU perspective, the importance of Mercosur is largely related to 
the importance of Brazil, particularly since Argentina has shifted to a 
strong protectionist stance – hence offering little, if any, prospect for 
fulfilling the EU general demand of deeper market access. The importance 
of Brazil for the EU can be measured in two ways. 
A broad political perspective 
From a broad political perspective, Brazil is one of the few key emerging 
economies with which the EU should interact on a permanent basis. This is 
because Brazil has been successful at establishing itself firmly as a key 
‘voice’ of the emerging and developing economies in the trade and 
economic debates since the mid 1990s, but even more since the early 2000s. 
This new Brazilian approach started in 1995 when Brazil dropped its 
uncompromising tone with respect to the Uruguay Round, allowing a 
successful conclusion of this Round. 
In the 2000s, it was clear that no deal in the Doha Round could be 
done without Brazil’s support. Brazil’s positions in the Doha negotiations 
were essential in many instances for the EU because Brazil was suggesting 
some concessions from the emerging and developing countries (compared 
to the more radical Indian views and to the more cryptic Chinese positions) 
while the EU was trying to do the same on the industrial countries side 
(compared to the more radical US views). This relatively ‘central’ position 
of Brazil has had the same appeal for the EU in other issues than trade, 
such as climate change or security. 
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However, the tough but constructive dialogue between Brazil and the 
EU during the active years of the Doha Round is unlikely to survive the 
Round failure in June 2008 and the economic crisis since then. 
• In Brazil, the balance between offensive and defensive interests has 
clearly shifted in favour of the latter since the Rousseff 
Administration, for purely domestic reasons but also under the 
increasing pressures of the anti-trade approach followed by 
Argentina and Venezuela. 
• In the EU, the economic and monetary crisis has captured the full 
attention of the top decision-makers, leaving trade a frozen issue on a 
sidetrack – no additional market opening but no substantial 
protectionist measures – until recently. 
There has been a widening gap between Mercosur and the EU in 
recent months. On the Mercosur side, the drift to protection continues, and 
has even de facto amplified when issues such as trade and exchange rates 
have been put on the table. By contrast, late November 2012, the Council’s 
decision to give a mandate to the Commission for negotiating a PTA with 
Japan suggests a drastic change of approach of the top EU policy-makers to 
PTAs. But, it must be stressed that this change of approach focuses on the 
US, Japan, Taiwan and China – all economies much larger, directly or 
indirectly, than Brazil. The other EU trade initiatives, such as the recent 
launch of the trade negotiations with Thailand, remain largely driven by 
the Commission, with little interest from most EU member states (EUMS), 
except when some narrow and key offensive or defensive EUMS vested 
interests are involved (a situation which often creates sharp intra-EU 
conflicts during the final moments of a trade negotiation). 
Economic attraction 
This economic size factor deserves more attention. The fading of the EU 
political attraction to Brazil could be countervailed by economic forces. But, 
in this respect, there are forces of opposite direction which, once combined, 
suggest that Brazil is not so high up on the EU’s economic and trade 
agenda. 
On the one hand, the economic crisis requires that the EU open its 
markets in priority to economies which fulfil three conditions: they have to 
be very large, well regulated and well connected with the rest of the world 
by being the ‘hub’ of PTAs [Messerlin, 2012]. Only such economies have the 
necessary weight and energy to tract the huge stuck EU27 train because 
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they offer scale and scope economies large and deep enough to have an 
impact on the EU’s domestic relative prices. (Economic analysis shows that 
relative prices determine the comparative advantages of the trading 
partners, hence the gains from trade.) 
Table 6 shows that, in the early 2010s, Brazil did not look the most 
attractive country with respect to these three conditions. Its GDP represents 
only 11%of the EU GDP, much behind the US (86%), China (36%) or Japan 
(34%). Moreover, during the next two decades, Brazil is not expected to 
increase substantially its share of the world GDP, meaning that there are 
more dynamic – hence attractive – economies for the EU. Not surprisingly, 
all these more attractive economies are located in East Asia, and – en passant 
– they are the industrial locomotives needed by resource-rich Brazil. Lastly, 
Brazil’s ranking in terms of governance is far behind that of the US, Japan 
or Taiwan. For the sake of comparison, Table 6 provides similar 
information on two countries (India and Russia) which have today the 
same size than Brazil. 
Table 6. Brazil’s relative attractiveness 
 
Adapted from Messerlin [2012]. Notes: Chiwan: Taiwan GDP and GDP operated in China by 
Taiwanese firms. [a] and [b] Ranks of countries: the highest the country’s rank, the poorest 
its regulatory performance. [a] Ease of doing business [Doing Business 2012]. [b] Overall 
index, Global Competitiveness Index [World Economic Forum 2011]. Sources: Buiter and 
Rahbari [2011] for growth estimates and WTO Trade Profiles for the GDP of the individual 
countries and regions. Author’s calculations. 
On the other hand, Brazil is large enough to be a major international 
actor in some sectors: agriculture, raw materials, a few industrial sectors, 
"Hub" quality
2010 2030 [a] [b]
1 2 3 4 5
EU 100.0 100.0 5 to 100 2 to 83 Korea, Turkey
Korea 6.3 6.7 8 22 EU, US, ASEAN, China
Brazil 12.9 23.5 126 58 Argentina
India 10.7 49.7 132 51
Russia 9.1 20.2 120 63
Japan 33.9 36.1 20 6 ASEAN
Taiwan 2.7 7.6 25 13 China, NZ, Singapore
Chiwan 5.1 14.6 (na) (na) (China)
China 36.2 168.6 91 27 Taiwan, ASEAN
EU market expan‐
sion (% EU GDP)
Regulatory
quality
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including some intensive in highly skilled labor, such as aircraft. But this 
sectoral importance does not create a situation propitious to the 
negotiations on a PTA with the EU for the following reasons: 
• EU offensive interests interested in trade negotiations with Brazil are 
limited to a few sectors where Brazil has traditionally strong 
protectionist or opposite interests: manufacturing, investment, public 
procurement, intellectual property rights, etc. 
• EU defensive interests against Brazil’s comparative advantages are 
also limited and concentrated in some EU member states, as best 
illustrated by EU agriculture. The absence of EU top policy-makers 
ready to invest in strong support to a Mercosur-EU Preferential Trade 
Agreement (M-EU PTA) gives a lot of power to these vested interests, 
even if they are tiny, as best illustrated by the many years of 
negotiations with little progress on tariff quotas in beef or other 
narrowly defined farm products. 
• Last but not least, some defensive interests in Brazil are closely 
connected with key EU firms, as best illustrated by the car industry. 
Indeed, some EU member states have crucial defensive interests in 
Brazil as well as in the EU—a relatively rare occurrence in the world 
trade system. This is the case of France, with the opposition of some 
(not all) French farm vested interests protected by the Common 
Agricultural Policy and of French carmakers happy to operate in 
Brazil behind high tariffs. 
In sum, the political economy of trade negotiations in the EU leaves 
little hope of meaningful results in negotiations on a fully-fledged MEU 
PTA. 
Positioning the MEU PTA in current EU policy 
Trade policies are matters to be assessed in relative terms. It could have 
been the case that the EU’s political and economic attraction to 
Brazil/Mercosur could have been limited, but that there was no more 
attractive region than Mercosur in terms of trade policy for the EU. This is 
not the case. In fact, the EU has a few other more attractive negotiating 
options that will be very intensive in time and human resources. In other 
words, the EU will have to make priorities. What follows demonstrates that 
a MEU PTA does not pertain to the likely set of priorities. 
Everything flows from the fact that the Doha Round is stuck. The key 
question is for how long, and answer to this question depends on the 
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causes of this stalemate: they are so many and diverse that optimism is not 
on the agenda. 
First, the Doha stalemate is related to trade issues. Indeed, there are 
plenty of reasons to explain this: the existing agreements on the general 
liberalisation formulas in manufacturing and agriculture are unfinished 
business, the exceptions to these formulas are only in draft form. There has 
been no serious examination of liberalisation in services, and there is a host 
of topics – such as trade facilitation, duty-free quota-free, rules, etc. – that 
may look easy and close to a deal at a first glance but which have ended up 
the source of deep disagreement in the tense and bitter mood that has 
prevailed at the Doha negotiations since June 2008. 
Second, the Doha stalemate is not so much about trade issues as the 
vision on international governance – that is, a much deeper and wider 
cause. The June-September 2008 period revealed the fundamental 
opposition between the US and China. The US view is that the emerging 
economies – China being the first – should abide by the same rules as the 
developed countries, and that these rules and disciplines should be 
‘strengthened’ – meaning being much more similar to US rules and 
regulations than the current WTO disciplines. In sharp contrast, China, 
followed by all the emerging economies, argues that the current WTO 
regulations are quite adequate for the emerging countries, including the 
“special and differentiated treatment” provision (the ‘bête noire’ of the US 
trade policy since the early 1990s). 
In this context, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should be 
perceived as an attempt by the US to create a ‘WTO version 2.0’ that is 
much more favourable to US views than the current WTO. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that Susan Schwab (the US Trade Representative in 
2008) who had the authority to strike a deal at the 2008 WTO ministerial 
meeting left the negotiations table in June 2008, and made the US pivotal 
shift to East Asia in September 2008 when she announced the US intention 
to join and lead the TPP. 
The second cause (global governance) suggests that the Doha Round 
has been in a coma for a long time. Such a situation opens the door to a 
totally new game in the world trade regime – the emergence of ‘mega-
PTAs’. The largest world economies (China, EU, Japan and the US) are 
starting to look for bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among 
themselves in order to harness their domestic growth on larger, more 
dynamic and better regulated markets. This is a decisive shift away from 
the usual PTAs, which have largely been limited to bilaterals among a 
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large/very large economy and among much more smaller economies 
[Messerlin, 2013]. It introduces an additional motive for the EU to focus on 
PTAs with countries like Japan or Taiwan: such PTAs offer the best 
insurance policy against a successful Trans-Pacific Partnership and a 
successful China-Japan-Korea PTA. 
Combining the ‘growth’ argument of section 1 (the necessity for the 
EU to focus on large, dynamic and well regulated trading partners in order 
to boost its growth) and the ‘insurance’ argument (the dramatic shift of the 
world trading system to ‘mega’ PTAs among large economies) leads to one 
strong conclusion for the EU: for the decade to come, in addition to an EU-
US PTA, the EU should concentrate its trade negotiating strategies on two 
PTAs – Japan-EU and Taiwan-EU (the attraction of the latter being related 
to the links between Taiwan and China Mainland) [Messerlin, 2012].  
This conclusion relies on three additional factors: 
• the first is largely based on political economy aspects. Only these 
three PTAs (four with a China-EU PTA) will be able to attract the 
attention of the top decision-makers in Europe, and hence avoid the 
risks of being captured by relatively small lobbies. No EU Head of 
State or government will neglect a PTA with these three countries. 
• the second argument is technical. One should realise how complex 
such negotiations will be if one wants to have the expected pro-
growth impact of PTAs on EU domestic growth. These three PTAs 
have to be truly deep and comprehensive, and hence address very 
difficult issues which, for many, have never been solved satisfactorily 
in existing PTAs (including in the EU internal market, the archetypal 
PTA): mutual recognition in norms for goods and in market 
regulations in services, the right legal framework for intellectual 
property rights, state-owned enterprises, investment rules, etc. 
• last but not least, these PTA negotiations will be sequential – not 
concomitant like those in the WTO forum. In other words, negotiators 
of the Japan-EU PTA should care about the negative consequences of 
this PTA on the Korea-EU PTA so that EU and Japanese firms 
investing in Korea should not be hurt by discriminatory provisions of 
the Japan-EU PTA. Similarly, negotiators of the Taiwan-EU 
agreement should keep in mind the future negotiations on a China-
EU PTA – a must if the Doha Round is stuck for years (as China will 
then be the largest world economy, and the EU will be smaller in 
relative terms, the EU will need to harness its growth to the large 
Chinese economy). 
118 | PATRICK MESSERLIN 
In this context, the fragile EU decision-making process will struggle 
to devote all the necessary attention in the years to come on negotiations on 
PTAs with countries such as Brazil (or India) that are dragging their feet 
and that will become truly attractive in economic terms to the EU only 
within a couple of decades – when Brazil (or India) will be big, dynamic 
and better regulated enough, compared to the EU economy. It is only then 
that these countries will attract the attention they deserve from the top EU 
decision-makers and hence will avoid being captured by a few EU 
offensive interests and fought over by a few EU defensive interests. 
What should be done? 
If a successful fully-fledged MEU PTA is beyond reach, what then should 
be done? A first option would be to suspend the negotiations, as happened 
in 2004. This option is unsatisfactory because it leaves the ground free to 
the powerful protectionist forces in Mercosur. It assumes that Brazil will 
not be exposed to the ‘growth’ and ‘insurance’ arguments that are driving 
EU trade policy, and that it will be only driven by its Mercosur strategy. 
This may be the case, and protectionist vested interests in Brazil will 
certainly push for a strong Mercosur focus. But, it may also be the case that 
Brazil wants to insure itself against the emerging ‘mega’ PTAs. In 
particular, the TPP includes countries, which are efficient exporters of 
agricultural products and of commodities – and hence has the capacity to 
make life very difficult for Brazilian exports to Japan, for instance. In this 
perspective, Brazil would become increasingly favourable to a fully-fledged 
MEU PTA. 
This section looks at the alternative option: which are the topics 
where negotiations could continue with a good chance of successful 
conclusion to prepare a return to the negotiation table of a fully-fledged 
MEU PTA in the coming decade or so? 
Answering this question requires a method and some attention to the 
negotiating process per se, that is, to the choice of the most efficient 
negotiation instruments. 
Identifying the topics to keep on the negotiating table  
Column 1 of Table 7 lists the topics that seem out of reach in the current 
context. It includes all those closely related to trade and to market access, 
such as tariff cuts or disciplines on export barriers. Since the Mercosur 
countries have currently lost interest in market opening as a support policy 
for their growth, these topics should be removed from the current 
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negotiating table until such time as both parties are ready to negotiate them 
with a serious chance of economically meaningful results. Trying to achieve 
a few tariff cuts here and there, often under the economically unsound 
form of tariff-quotas, is likely to have little positive economic impact. By 
contrast, it is likely to have considerable politically negative effects since 
any disturbance in the sectors subjected to complicated liberalisations 
would be systematically attributed to the liberalisation by the protectionist 
lobbies, even if these liberalisations are insignificant (‘reluctant’ 
liberalisations relying on complicated mechanisms are self-defeating). 
That said, Column 1 includes investment because what has recently 
happened to foreign firms running businesses in Mercosur (from oil in 
Argentina to retail trade in Venezuela) leaves few doubts that this topic is 
not on the negotiating agenda. However, as investment is not a Mercosur 
competence, there remains the possibility of negotiations between the EU 
and some members of the Mercosur. The same observation could be made 
for trade in services. It would be useful to review the list of services to see 
whether bilateral agreements between some Mercosur countries and the 
EU in some services could be envisaged. 
Column 2 of Table 7 lists all the topics at the ‘periphery’ of trade 
matters that are systematically tabled in the context of a ‘comprehensive’ 
economic and trade agreement negotiated by the EU. It is a long list of 
items of a very different nature, often political (and indeed politically 
sensitive) – from illegal immigration to corruption to human rights. The 
absence of a fully-fledged PTA between Mercosur and the EU, and the 
current inward-looking political mood in many Mercosur countries are 
likely to make the negotiations on these topics awkward and unsuccessful. 
However, once again, the fact that almost all these topics are not under 
exclusive Mercosur competence leaves the possibility of bilateral 
agreements on some of these topics between the EU and the interested 
Mercosur members. 
Finally, Column 3 of Table 7 presents the topics that seem to be the 
best candidates for successful negotiations in the current context. All of 
them are characterised by three main features: 
• they are useful whether market access is limited or not, 
• they are very important for making any future market access 
liberalisation truly meaningful, 
• they are not under exclusive Mercosur competence, hence offer a 
degree of flexibility for willing Mercosur Members to go ahead. 
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Table 7. Identifying topics to keep on the negotiating table  
 
Note: Topics marked with an asterisk could be the subject of negotiations between the EU and some Mercosur members. 
Source: Adapted from Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir [2009]. 
. 
Trade topics preparing
market access
1 3
Industrial tariffs & equivalents Anti‐corruption Information society  Customs administration 
Agricultural tariffs & equivalents Approximation of legislation  Labour market regulations  Technical barriers to trade
Export taxes & equivalents Audiovisual  Mining  Sanitary & phytosanitary measures 
Antidumping & Safeguard Civil protection  Money laundering  Industrial cooperation 
Countervailing measures  Consumer protection  Nuclear safety  Research and technology 
State trading enterprises Cultural cooperation  Political dialogue Environmental laws 
Competition policy  Data protection  Public administration  Financial assistance 
State aid  Economic policy dialogue  Regional cooperation  Visas for workers
Public procurement Education and training  Small and medium enterprises 
Intellectual Property Rights Energy  Social matters 
Trade in services agreement  * Health  Statistics 
Trade‐related investment measures * Human rights  Taxation 
Investment & movement of capital * Innovation policies  Terrorism 
Illicit drugs  Visa for asylum, illegal immigration
2
Non‐trade topics often included 
in "comprehensive economic and trade agreements"
Trade topics focusing
on market access
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This list is composed of two very different elements. First are topics 
related to ‘norms’, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures for 
agricultural products, norms and standards (technical barriers to trade) for 
industrial goods (and regulations in services if some services pass the test 
of interest at this stage of the Mercosur-EU relations). They are also related 
to domestic goods governance – another way to prepare an economically 
sound fully-fledged trade agreement. Finally, as these topics raise complex 
problems, they often require time and trust to be solved. Time can be 
shortened if the MEU negotiators agree to look at similar agreements 
already concluded between Chile (or Mexico) and the EU on such topics, 
and to check whether, mutatis mutandis, those agreements could not be 
adapted to Mercosur members willing to negotiate on such issues. 
This list also includes environmental issues, such as those related to 
climate change (Viola, 2013), energy (Brazil is doomed to become a major 
oil producer (de Oliveira, 2012)), research, industrial cooperation and 
transfer of technology (a topic high on the Brazilian agenda (Flores, 2013) 
and cooperation at the borders (customs administration, trade facilitation, 
visa for workers). 
Identifying the most efficient negotiation instruments  
A key issue in the current Mercosur-EU negotiations is that each side – 
negotiators and markets – has lost trust in the process (and often in the 
other partner). The first goal to keep the negotiations on track is to re-create 
such trust by delivering substantive results. Such a goal requires a careful 
choice of negotiation instruments. The history of trade negotiations shows 
that such instruments can make a lot of difference. For instance, the simple 
formula of annual and equal cuts on all the goods, with no exception, 
included in the Treaty of Rome (1957) has proven a very efficient way to 
dismantle the tariffs among the founding EU members – despite the stark 
differences among these countries on the role of trade in growth (Germany 
and Benelux countries being convinced by trade as an engine of trade, 
France and Italy being quite sceptical); indeed to the great surprise of most 
observers of this time.21  
                                                     
21 There were two exceptions to this rule: bananas and green coffee, with bananas 
having been the source of a long list of disputes between the EU and certain 
trading partners. 
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Since a major field of potential agreements to be successfully 
negotiated by Mercosur and the EU in the current context consists of norms 
and, more generally, of regulations, what follows focuses on defining the 
most efficient way to negotiate, that is, the ‘mutual recognition’ approach. 
The ‘mutual recognition’ principle was stated by the 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
ruling of the European Court of Justice (Messerlin, 2011). It gave birth to 
two operational forms. 
First, mutual recognition can be ‘conditional’ upon a core of common 
principles (‘essential requirements’ in EU legal parlance) to be defined by 
negotiations among the trading partners. This has been the traditional 
approach of the EU following the 1979 Court ruling. Initially, this approach 
raised huge hopes in the EU to solve the problem created by the 
insurmountable difficulties of harmonising the existing regulations of the 
EU member states.  
However, conditional mutual recognition has rapidly shown its 
limits. Many forces (from political pressures to anti-competitive business 
pressures) have induced to expand the core conditions – an option open by 
the extremely wide definition of the essential requirements as those aiming 
“to cover all hazards related to public interest that it intends to protect” 
(European Commission, 2000, p. 9). Crude evidence of such a drift over 
time can be found by comparing the initial version of some New Approach 
Directives with their latest version. For instance, the essential requirements 
of the two 2009 Directives on simple pressure vessels and on toys safety 
require four and two times, respectively, more words than their respective 
1987 and 1988 initial versions. Moreover, it is not rare that one product face 
essential requirements stated by different Directives: the net of essential 
requirements from overlapping Directives leaves little degree of freedom, 
or essential requirements can be inconsistent, as best illustrated with the 
case of the REACH and Cosmetic Directives (the former allows animal 
testing while the second one prohibits it). All these factors have made 
conditional mutual recognition increasingly close to harmonisation. This 
evolution has not been propitious to generate trust among EU member 
states, some member states accusing others to use mutual recognition as a 
way to practice ‘regulatory dumping’ by offering ‘cheap’ substitutes to EU 
regulations or ‘loose’ enforcement, with the Commission using these 
disputes as an incentive to add a layer of essential requirements. 
The second, alternative, form of mutual recognition can be defined as 
‘unconditional’: the two signatories feel that they trust their respective 
regulations each other enough to be able to recognise unconditionally the 
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partner’s regulations. An essential element of unconditional mutual 
recognition is to require systematically a preliminary step—that is, a joint 
process of mutual evaluation of the regulations in question by the 
negotiating partners. This mutual regulatory review step does not exist in 
the conditional mutual recognition approach. However, it is crucial because 
it offers the unique opportunity to build, or restore, trust among the 
signatories. Moreover, such a step requires the participation from the 
regulating bodies of the negotiating countries—not only from the 
traditional trade negotiators (such as DG Trade in the EU case). Enlarging 
the set of ‘negotiators’ to skilled ‘evaluators’ should also be seen as an 
opportunity to create some dynamism of trust among negotiators, and 
more broadly among consumers from all the negotiating countries. 
The EU is still torn apart between conditional mutual recognition (the 
dominant principle in norms and standards (with the ACAA and its 
increasingly tight regulations) and the dominant principle in services 
during the 1980s and 1990s) and unconditional mutual recognition 
approach (the principle driving the Services Directive). 
However, the emerging world challenges this situation. It would be 
naïve to assume that a conditional mutual recognition approach so prone to 
shift to harmonization is a workable principle in the coming ‘mega’-PTAs 
(with the US, Japan or Taiwan-China). No partner to such PTAs would be 
in the position to impose its own version of conditional mutual recognition 
(own version meaning de facto a recognition biased towards harmonization 
to its own regulations). 
In this broad context, Mercosur-EU negotiations on norms relying on 
the unconditional mutual recognition approach would be the best option to 
consider, all the more because it has two additional advantages. First, such 
negotiations can be easily held in a bilateral setting (Brazil-EU, Argentina-
EU, etc.) giving much-needed flexibility to the Mercosur members. Second, 
the negotiating teams (trade and regulatory experts) can be kept small. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has stressed the long-term natural ‘partnership’ that has 
emerged between Brazil and the EU in the trade fora during the two last 
decades – particularly in the Doha negotiations. However, recent years 
have witnessed an increasing reluctance on the part of some Mercosur 
members to use trade as an engine of growth and, as a result, to open their 
markets – putting a somewhat more hesitant Brazil in a difficult position. 
124 | PATRICK MESSERLIN 
At the same time, the EU urgently needs to conclude trade 
agreements with countries large enough, well regulated enough and well 
connected to the rest of the world enough to boost its own growth and to 
make its macroeconomic and fiscal policies politically sustainable. The EU 
also needs to move urgently in order to insure itself against the 
discriminatory impacts of the other emerging ‘mega PTAs’ (Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, China-Japan-Korea, etc.). In this context, the countries which 
will fully absorb the EU negotiating energies in the near future are Japan, 
Taiwan and the US – not Brazil, which is not expected to fulfil the above 
criteria (size, regulation, connection) during the coming decade. Moreover, 
negotiating trade agreements with Japan and Taiwan may not put strong 
pressure on EU agriculture, but negotiating with the US will – a situation 
unfavourable to EU initiatives in agriculture with Brazil (even when 
leaving aside the macroeconomic context). 
All these factors leave little hope for a successful conclusion of a fully-
fledged Mercosur-EU PTA in the coming years. 
By contrast, the chapter argues that a lot can be achieved on arguably 
less high-profile, but nevertheless crucial matters: norms in goods 
(particularly in agriculture), regulations in some services (particularly 
exercises in mutual evaluation of the regulations existing on both sides of 
the Atlantic and of their implementation), and a climate change, energy and 
technology package.  
Successful negotiations on norms in goods and on mutual evaluation 
in services would not change the existing level of protection of Mercosur 
and EU markets. But, they will allow full use to be made of the existing 
market access. Far from being a handicap, this feature could facilitate 
negotiations on such complex issues and ultimately lead to better 
agreements because such negotiations would not be conducted under the 
threat of large-scale market opening. Negotiations on norms and 
regulations will also create the much-needed trust between the two sides of 
the Atlantic. They will also remedy the deleterious atmosphere generated 
by a decade of hyperbolic official speeches followed by no action. Last but 
not least, these negotiations will allow maximum benefit to be gained from 
the negotiations on market opening per se – once the Mercosur members 
and the EU are better prepared to open these files.  
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IN SEARCH OF A FEASIBLE EU-MERCOSUL 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
RENATO G. FLÔRES 
Abstract 
This chapter aims at identifying ways to pursue the EU–Mercosul 
negotiations leading to a free trade agreement (FTA). After reviewing their 
already long history, the main point is that, given the prevailing conditions 
on both sides, an agreement to be signed within a reasonable time must be 
modest, i.e. along the described lines. It then clearly sets up the decisions 
confronting the negotiators: either to pursue the modest, feasible option or 
to terminate negotiations under the FTA heading. The latter, however, does 
not imply an end to the dialogue. Many actions and measures may be taken 
– which are easier to discuss and fix – that could pave the way for a closer-
to-ideal FTA to be considered again in due time. These are the subjects of a 
last section. 
Prologue: Rêver l’Impossible, Rêve 
On 29 May 1992, a Joint Institutional Cooperation Agreement was signed 
between Mercosul’s Common Market Council and the European 
Commission. On 15 December 1995, an Interregional Framework 
Cooperation Agreement (FA) was jointly signed by the European Union 
and the four Mercosul countries. Faithful to the pompous, ambitious and 
seductive rhetoric of Brussels, the FA comprised a broad set of initiatives 
and commitments, including economic issues and, notably, trade. In June 
1996, under the umbrella of the FA, the first of several meetings of a Joint 
Commission on Trade took place. After three years of preparatory studies 
and discussions, the European Commission decided, in July 1998, to 
negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with Mercosul (and Chile). 
Meetings and discussions started in the same year. 
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As inevitably happens in FTA negotiations involving the integration 
of two regions – one more developed and sophisticated than the other, 
though in the latter case there was a big economy and somewhat 
diversified trader – the process was slow. On the Mercosul side, the great 
asymmetry represented by Brazil obliged a careful attitude by this country, 
in order to avoid hurting both the feelings and intentions of its smaller 
partners. On the European side, a developed bloc notoriously more 
protectionist than the US, the question of the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) – unacceptable to the competitive, agribusiness commodities 
exporters of Mercosul – plagued many of the discussions.  
Even so, negotiations moved on.  
In the more external realm, Mercosul – at that time – still struggled to 
attain an institutional level minimally comparable to that of the EU. The 
lack of this, though not an impediment to negotiations, was often raised by 
the European Commission as a nuisance, if not a real hindrance to the 
process. The EU, forced by exogenous pressures and powerful allies, sped 
up an enlargement that gave way to administrative and governance 
difficulties, many still prevailing today, beyond bringing further unknowns 
to the issues on the table. 
From the European Commission, the head of the process was Pascal 
Lamy, then commissioner for DG Trade. Mr Lamy many times asserted 
that the enlargement had no influence at all on the process; a point not 
exactly confirmed by the analyses in Flôres and Perez-Liñan (2004). He 
strongly supported the EU position that systemic issues, like the CAP – and 
consequently any pledge related to it, including liberalisation – should be 
left to the ‘forum for systemic issues’, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
Mercosul tried to find acceptable liberalisation schedules that would 
consider a plethora of queries: from the specific aims of the Argentine 
producers of galletitas [biscuits] (many with considerable traces of 
transgenic soya – a nutritional sin for the sacred EU food regulations), to 
the fears and quarrels between the European carmakers and their own 
Mercosul-established plants (the former opposing liberalisation for fear 
that, thanks to an unexpected exchange-rate misalignment, their home 
markets would be ‘flooded’ by the cheaper clones made in Mercosul). At 
the same time, the industrial sectors in Brazil and Argentina experienced 
pains in finding a common liberalisation stance and, more difficult yet, one 
acceptable to the EU manufacturers. 
Even so, negotiations went on. 
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It is the subjective feeling of this author that, at the end of Mr Lamy’s 
mandate in 2004, with a little luck the FTA could have been signed. Yet, 
trifling arguments and vacuous objections – some frankly ridiculous – led 
to a lost opportunity. Naming and shaming ensued, useless and pointless: 
both sides had perhaps the same degree of responsibility for the failure. 
In May 2005, the ‘enlargement of the ten’ took place, setting the 
number of EU member states at 25. 
As usually happens after such anti-climaxes, the FTA idea hibernated 
for a while, with expectations being fixed on Geneva, where the Doha 
Round was still active. 
But then the world changed surprisingly fast.  
An encompassing financial crisis, with deep roots and a wild 
unfolding, took hold of the developed world and nowadays poses serious 
problems to the subset of EU countries in the eurozone – problems whose 
solution perhaps does not exist within the present architecture of the zone.  
The WTO Doha Round also reached a climax, but optimists were 
defeated at Potsdam – an ironically gloomy place for fixing a positive, solar 
agreement. Since then, it has been trailing the usual path of moribund 
rounds: it will not die at all, but provided half a dozen ‘ifs’ take place, it 
will be concluded in a low-key manner. 
The dynamics of several internal markets have changed accordingly.  
The entry of Asia as a global customer, particularly though not only 
China, has opened new opportunities for commodity exporters, Mercosul 
countries included. The CAP did change and continues to do so, owing to 
many constraints, demographic ones helping, but the point is that it 
became less relevant to Mercosul exporters.  
The invasion of Asian goods in the developed markets has 
contributed to altering perceptions on many sides. Trade alliances are 
progressively shifting; South–South trade, which used to be mocked as a 
silly diversion by a few emerging countries, is now taken seriously, and the 
big US and EU markets, though still big (if declining), are looked at with 
different eyes. Technology, more than prospective buyers, is what the 
emerging horde wants. 
During all these tempi sconvolgenti, like a Pirandellian or Samuel 
Becket character, the EU–Mercosul FTA would irregularly surface to 
quickly fall back again into oblivion a few months later. As expected, the 
rhetoric of the authorities involved remains impeccable: Brussels pursues 
its florilège of niceties and fatherly lectures on how to do things properly – 
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i.e. just mirror its way – and announces that the coming agreement will be 
very ambitious. Mercosul leaders gather their best possible faccia di legno 
(wooden faces) and second their European counterparts in singing the 
affirmative ομιλία. The Sturm und Drang of the whole affair, apparent even 
to a fifth-rate Schiller, is deftly swept under the table. 
In the midst of the present euro-hurricane, while Mercosul lives 
temporarily with a suspended Paraguay and a newly received Venezuela, it 
is again trumpeted that the FTA will move on. Rêver l’impossible rêve, sang 
the great Jacques Brel... 
The following sections outline what seems feasible nowadays as the 
Mercosul–EU FTA, taking into account the stage set in this prologue. 
Section 1 deals with trade in goods, 2 with services and 3 with other 
themes. Section 4 sketches some political economy considerations, most of 
them working against the negotiations. Section 5 is a needed pause, 
inviting a serious, definite positioning in this already half-rotten, half-
ridiculous affair, while the last section outlines a constructive, more 
realistic path to be trodden. 
The classical arena: Trade in goods 
In spite of the many years in which the EU–Mercosul FTA has been 
discussed, there are not many quantitative studies of the impact of such an 
agreement on the trade flows.  
Among the perhaps half-dozen existing efforts, Calfat and Flôres 
(2006) is a pervasive, partial-equilibrium analysis of the prospective gains. 
Although the base years for the simulations are the couples 1997–98 and 
2000–01, the study is still useful.  
On the Mercosul side, in spite of the significant trade deviation to 
China and southern partners in general, as the exercise is a partial 
equilibrium one, most of the effects are at least valuable as an upper bound 
for gains at the individual product level. On the EU side, the situation is 
more debatable, as its trade pattern might have changed in a more 
pronounced way. The overall message, however, that EU gains are much 
more widespread, distributing themselves among various manufactured goods, 
while Mercosul will reap advantages from a few commodity exports, still seems 
plausible today. 
Adherence to the above reasoning implies that, even now, a 
minimally acceptable agreement regarding the flow of goods is not very 
difficult. It suffices that the EU makes a (not necessarily) bold gesture of 
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fully liberalising half a dozen agricultural goods, most in the broad ‘meat’ 
category, and the Mercosul arrives at conceding immediate or short-run 
liberalisation to a spectrum of about 50-100 manufactures, for the outcome 
to move quickly to the neighbourhood of a Pareto optimum. 
Is this feasible? This author thinks it is, provided two mechanisms are 
successfully at work: 
i) the EU couples its nice words to its gestures and really ensures the 
liberalisation of the few commodities. The evolution – or 
optimistically, progressive dismantling – of the CAP and the present 
crisis might be intelligently used in favour of this argument; and 
ii) Mercosul mainly selects recalcitrant Brazilian protectionists and quite 
a few sectors of Argentina’s vanishing manufacturing industry and 
manages to agree to an upfront liberalisation that would nevertheless 
still give room for protecting so-called ‘sensitive items’ with longer 
liberalisation periods. 
The above conditions are not easy, but are not insurmountable either; 
in fact they are fairly attainable. They also presuppose that both sides lower 
their expectations and work towards the possible, not the ideal agreement. 
Trade in services 
During the second phase of the Uruguay Round, the EU joined forces with 
key developing countries, notably Brazil and India, in trying to fashion a 
more conservative format for the inclusion of services in the (then) General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (and soon after the WTO), contrary to the 
more aggressively free trade stance of the US. Ironically, during the FTA 
negotiations, the European Commission tried to enforce a much broader 
and encompassing liberalisation of services, not exactly congenial to the 
mood prevailing among Mercosul members. 
Brazil, within the regional market, had consistently kept a fairly 
conservative position towards services trade, and small Uruguay had 
skilfully and successfully managed to keep its peculiar and not exactly 
open view on this matter, something that spilled over into the negotiations. 
Time, however, has changed this state of affairs. For select sectors, 
like telecoms, the technology and investment dynamics have significantly 
altered the status quo. Most European operators – such as Telefónica, 
Telecom Italia and Vodafone – are present in Mercosul, and the local 
regulatory framework has advanced considerably. Moreover, for most of 
them, these are the markets where they reap the biggest profits nowadays, 
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compensating many times for losses in their domestic (European) turfs. 
Finally yet importantly, the presence of the same operators on both sides of 
the Atlantic has raised awareness of the need for closer cooperation, in the 
regulatory frameworks as well as in their (somewhat tense) relations with 
value-added providers, many US-based.  
The pressing requirements for infrastructure upgrading and better 
logistics have also been slowly making Mercosul conscious that it actually 
(and desperately) needs the know-how of sophisticated ancillary services 
for the functioning of the manufacturing and commodities production 
networks, if not for the whole productive system. The recent arrival of the 
fragmentation wave in South America will also eventually contribute to a 
more open mentality as regards the need for such services.22 
In a less positive tone, veiled or diplomatically justified protectionist 
trends have been promoting the revival of state champions in key service 
sectors in Mercosul, telecoms being but one relevant example. But the euro 
crisis has probably also exacerbated protectionist views on the European 
side, in certain important sectors. The most notorious examples are in the 
financial and insurance domains where, contrary to its free trade rhetoric, 
the European Commission has been a fierce advocate of the conservative 
positions of individual member states. 
What is then possible within this context? 
Again, the approach must aim at the feasible, which would amount to 
liberalisation in specific, workable areas and not an encompassing attempt 
at many sectors. Some aspects of telecoms might be on board, with a few 
other examples being industrial services and those related to energy 
generation and extraction, retail and distributive trade, and some parts of 
air and maritime transport.  
                                                     
22 Production fragmentation, usually coupled with international value-added chains, 
though well known for decades in select manufacturing sectors like the car 
industry, gained momentum with the rise of China, when the US, Japan and later 
South Korea strongly displaced different production stages to Chinese territory. 
The successful way in which China managed its climb up the value-added chains 
led to a sizeable spill-over of the phenomenon to South-East Asia, with the chains 
now, beyond the three original providers, heavily interwoven with Chinese firms 
themselves. See, among many, Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) and Flôres 
(2010a). 
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Professional services, especially those related to Mode IV (presence of 
natural persons) and, in a few instances, also to Mode III (right of 
establishment) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, offer an 
interesting case in point. Moura (2003) draws attention to the fact that, in 
spite of its varied needs, the EU was adamant in opening a negotiating 
position on this area.  
The present situation, with unemployment rates at unimaginable 
levels in many member countries, is at first sight a strong motivation for 
the EU to close ab initio any prospects along this line. At the same time, 
Mercosul, particularly Brazil, faces shortages of qualified people, partially 
owing to its demographic evolution.23 Although this could be a bargaining 
asset for Mercosul, in case the EU spreads its ambitions across too many 
areas, an innovative compromise could be struck here.  
Other themes 
Another characteristic of FTA negotiations during the years following the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, was to include on the agenda for 
the agreement a series of issues, some still in direct line with WTO texts, 
like property rights and subsidy policies, while others were of a more 
debatable nature, like labour and environmental clauses or money 
laundering.  
In the present context, these inclusions should be kept to a bare 
minimum. Actually, only property rights, and even then not in a TRIPS-
Plus endeavour but rather as a mutual commitment to joint enforcement 
against specific and costly violations, seems possible. Although quite 
reluctant to take any further step in this area, Mercosul countries have 
moved to a position where discussion, at least, is accepted. EU countries, in 
their turn, should profit from this gap in a pragmatic way: rather than 
asking for progress in rules or further regulations, they should secure the 
full protection of their rights for those goods, brands or designs where they 
identify the greatest losses. 
A new point, however, owing to the regulatory frenzy of the 
European Commission, producing directives that end up creating serious 
trouble and costs for its trading partners, could be treated as part of this 
item. 
                                                     
23 For more on this see Rios-Neto (2005) and the report by OECD (2011). 
IN SEARCH OF A FEASIBLE EU-MERCOSUL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 133 
Directives like REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemical Substances, published on 18 December 2006), 
which triggered an incredible amount of red tape and imposed unwontedly 
high costs on exporters of anything that contains chemical substances – 
from the substances themselves to goods, like furniture or toys, where 
painting, varnishing or the addition of any chemical compound took place 
– are actually a technical barrier to trade.  
A mutual agreement on trade facilitation measures, in which not only 
the European Commission would agree to help its partners comply with its 
myriad of excessive regulations, but also a common dialogue is established 
in order to minimise the effects of REACH-like directives, would be a plus. 
Of course, reciprocity in consultation when elaborating rules affecting trade 
would be mandatory.  
The political economy of the proposed talks 
The negotiating environment, as previously noted, could perhaps not be 
worse. If the European state of affairs does not need any qualification, in 
Mercosul one cannot say that conditions are auspicious. More than the 
‘Paraguayan incident’, which will be streamlined in one way or other, the 
situation in Argentina demands care and attention: the country is living 
through a most unfavourable period, with actually no mindset for a 
negotiation like the one at stake.24  
Moreover, in comparison with the classical locus of long trade 
negotiations, the WTO, the prospects are even worse. The Uruguay Round 
lasted 8 years, while the Doha Round has just completed 11 years of 
unfinished negotiations, although it is progressing and new ideas have 
arisen. The EU–Mercosul FTA debate has already reached 14 years of no 
progress at all, and more than 16 if we include the preparatory years when 
much effort was spent! How can this pursuit still be credible? 
Brazilian multinationals are looking at Singapore, Jakarta, Hanoi and 
even New Delhi and other bases to penetrate in the Asian market. Studies 
and projects are underway to connect them to global production chains in 
the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) region, plus Japan, 
South Korea and of course, China (ASEAN+3). The ASEAN+3 FTA, pre-
                                                     
24 To this must be added the recent (official) query by Bolivia to become a full 
Mercosul member, and the slight likelihood of Ecuador following suit within a 
year or two. 
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empted by many as impossible, will be a reality in maybe less than ten 
years. Irrespective of the fate of the more doubtful Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), it will change the pattern of world trade.  
Mercosul countries, now with the addition of the important 
Venezuelan market (a key Amazon country), are also concerned with their 
South American neighbourhood where China has been slowly gaining 
market share. Developments are expected under the umbrella of the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUL) – beyond the very successful 
cooperation in joint defence and public health actions – not only in 
infrastructure and services but also in production complementarities. 
The EU and eurozone configuration will perforce change, at least in 
regulatory terms, entailing new dynamics in the common market and, very 
likely, in many services sectors. At present, not only reforms aiming at a 
common – or something resembling it – fiscal policy, and a really unified 
banking system for the eurozone, are stumbling along. Progress is not 
absent, but far from the minimally ideal levels. Moreover, financial markets 
for European securities are still volatile, if not shaky, bringing further 
uncertainty to a negotiating mood. 
Alongside the above matters, sooner or later, the eurozone will have 
to face the question of the euro exchange rate. The current levels are 
unsustainable, and this transition (and to what new level) is a huge 
unknown. The US, for its part, is abusing the quantitative easing (QE) 
device, causing macroeconomic trouble not just for strong allies in South 
America, such as Chile and Colombia,25 but for nearly all of the emerging 
countries, including Brazil and South Korea. This exacerbates a declining 
euro trajectory. 
This author, while recognising the inevitable relationship between 
exchange-rate policies and trade, is not quite in favour of ideas aired by 
friends and foes alike, on tying such measures, under certain 
circumstances, to WTO-like trade defence mechanisms.26 That 
notwithstanding, it is an old truth that trade agreements need minimally 
                                                     
25 See the interesting statement by Felipe Larrain, “Remember the effect of QE on 
the emerging economies” (Financial Times, 5 February 2013), Chile’s minister of 
finance. The piece is doubly significant given that the country of its author is 
perhaps the most faithful follower of the US spirit in South America. 
26 I’m aware that this theme is going to be discussed as part of another sub-topic of 
the Project, and I’ve no intention to encroach upon this discussion here.  
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stable currency markets, at least among the nations involved, and this is 
hard to foresee in the near future. 
Finally, the recently re-elected US President, Barack Obama, has 
signalled that two main trade agreements will rank high in his priorities. 
These are the TPP and the long-dreamt of bilateral EU–US transatlantic 
trade deal. Despite scepticism about the former, as noted above, the official 
launch of negotiations for the transatlantic deal will amount to a 
considerable diversion of the already feeble incentives for the other, 
southern Atlantic FTA.27  
Ironically, at the time of writing, both the EU and the US announced 
this pursuit. All the headaches plaguing the EU nowadays, briefly outlined 
in this section, also act as deterrents to these negotiations, and the size of 
the two partners is a double-edged sword, cutting knots as well as hurting 
deeply. But in spite of all the difficulties in this venture it will unavoidably 
reduce the tepid enthusiasm for the Mercosul deal.  
Intermezzo: The lento pace of the negotiations 
The problems outlined in the previous section, and the modest stances 
favoured in the preceding ones, lead to the tough conclusion that at least for 
the next two to three years, the priority of this (already) zero-credibility FTA 
is, in plain English, close to zero.  
What is the way out? Is it possible to change the lento pace to at least 
a larghetto, or better yet, andante? 
Two alternatives are offered here, the second having a nearly 
mandatory follow-up: 
i) the first is to engage, as soon as possible, in a restricted agreement 
along the lines of sections 1-3, keeping in mind that the top priority is 
to sign something within a very sharp deadline, say December 2014. 
This amounts to a substantial change in the ambitious and vapidly 
proud announcements of an encompassing FTA, and a deeply 
concerned endeavour for arriving at minimally (WTO) acceptable 
results; and 
ii) the second starts by putting a full stop to the lingering rhetoric of the 
FTA. Close the book: no more cheap talk about a meeting that will 
turn the state of world affairs, no more Panglossian-smiling 
                                                     
27 This view is also shared by Patrick Messerlin in his paper, dual to this one. 
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authorities saying that the FTA is alive and well, in the best of all 
possible trade-negotiating environments. Finito. More than precious 
time, über-precious credibility has been lost! 
Once – and if – both sides have gathered sufficient courage to take 
this healthy, transparent decision, signalling a frank and realistic 
Weltanschauung, a simple, progressive strategy may be adopted. Its purpose 
is to strengthen trade ties and prepare the ground for a likely closer trade 
association that would start afresh, two to three years from now. The 
outline of such a route is in the next, concluding section. 
Conclusion: (Re)starting from the very beginning, a very good 
place to (re)start 
Mercosul displays weak governance and needs technology; the EU’s 
governance often puts those who interact with it al borde de un ataque de 
nervios and plenty of trouble, but still holds solid technological capital.  
Why not start with a comprehensive, honest and Pareto-improving 
agreement on technology transfer? Brazil has signed a model one with 
Canada, which has been bearing extremely interesting fruits; it can be a 
source of inspiration. The French are reasonably good in this area – the 
contract on nuclear submarines with the Brazilian Navy, including a 
progressive transfer of technology, makes another interesting source. The 
UK can also do this very well, if motivated, while Germany is an old and 
solid partner and the Belgians and Dutch can, without much effort, come 
on board.  
The family of FAs always mentions and opens moves in this 
direction, though reasonably vapid. Moreover, we are not talking about 
education, the exchange of either students or professors; the focus should 
be on industrial, business applications that would generate connections 
and more business, and put in closer contact plants, laboratories and SMEs 
on both sides.  
Such an approach, if seriously undertaken, would take one or two 
years. But it would produce something concrete – reasonably independent 
of the crises on both sides of the Atlantic – to be presented to decision-
makers and to the business community, the ultimate engines of trade 
negotiations. 
Then we should move to regulations.  
Here, the European Commission, with the help of the European 
Parliament, should make a bold gesture and create a mechanism to give 
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Mercosul a word in the making of directives and all kinds of rules.28 It does 
this already, though in an imperfect way and with oscillations in its 
commitment, with the US. Mercosul is a much less menacing competitor 
and, precisely because of this, it would be easier to craft a scheme for it. 
Mercosul would undoubtedly be proud to participate – even if indirectly 
and with strings attached – in such an effort. Until now the effects of the 
present lack of dialogue, at least for Brazil, have been devastating to our 
trade relations. 
The methodology proposed by Messerlin (2013) of mutual 
recognition, could be a relevant stepping stone towards deepening mutual 
confidence and establishing a positive environment for joint actions and a 
closer, transparent collaboration in this context.  
An additional, valuable complement would be a wise probing of 
existing Mercosul legislation that would either open specific service 
markets to EU providers or globally facilitate trade in services. As 
previously noted, the telecommunications sector, where sizeable gains of 
the EU operators come from Mercosul, is a significant example. In air 
transport, Brazil signed the Open Skies agreement with the US – something 
deemed nearly impossible 20 years ago – beyond having countries like 
Qatar as partners in similar treaties. Although the one with the EU is still 
hostage to bureaucratic details, an encompassing EU–Mercosul deal on 
open skies is not inconceivable. 
Moving from the above to a streamlining of cross-investment 
legislation in both regions is not a very bold step, and could open the way 
to creating incentives for more diversified and substantial investment 
flows, either greenfield or under the fragmentation logic. 
These initiatives may be pursued by specific, thematic groups, which 
are less demanding in human resources, time and complex political 
considerations. The targeted sectors or regulations should be directly 
addressed and bottlenecks or constraints clearly identified. Deadlines 
would be easier to set and higher-level coordination could be conducted at 
the trade organisms of both blocs. The initiatives would also serve as a 
preliminary display of seriousness and commitment. 
At the same time, Mercosul, and notably Brazil, should do long-
overdue homework. The common external tariff must be thoroughly re-
examined and a wise reformulation, keeping in mind the modern realities 
                                                     
28 See Flôres (2010b) on possible roles for the Parliament in this context. 
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of world production and the new requirements of its members, should be 
undertaken.  
Perhaps this is the most difficult task outlined in these pages, 
aggravated by the present protectionist sentiment in the bloc. It is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for (later) fixing the agreement, but 
beyond helping considerably in future negotiations, it is something that 
should be undertaken as a top priority by Mercosul itself, independent of 
any existing or likely negotiation. 
If two or three of the above issues are fixed, something like three 
years from now will have elapsed. That is enough time to see how far the 
euro streamlining went, to evaluate the mood about Doha and to settle the 
Mercosul quibbles. Then there might be incentives to open negotiations for 
a very well-defined FTA: a classical, somewhat restricted one, with the 
broad lines for achieving it being those set out above in sections 1-3. 
If this classical FTA is signed, and only then, this author believes that 
enough credibility will have been restored to go for more ambitious 
settlements. 
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BRAZILIAN CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: 
CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE 
EDUARDO VIOLA 
Abstract 
In the five-year period 2005-09, Brazil has dramatically reduced carbon 
emissions by around 25% and at the same time kept a stable economic 
annual growth rate of 3.5%. This combination of economic growth and 
emissions reduction is unique in the world. The driver was a dramatic 
reduction in deforestation in the Amazon forest and the Cerrado Savannah. 
This shift empowered the social forces for sustainability in Brazil to the 
point that the national Congress passed (December 2009) a very 
progressive law internalising carbon constraints and promoting the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. The transformation in Brazil’s carbon 
emissions profile and climate policy has increased the potentialities of 
convergence between the European Union and Brazil.  
The first part of this chapter examines the assumption on which this 
paper is based, mainly that the trajectory of carbon emissions and 
climate/energy policies of the G20 powers is much more important than 
the United Nations multilateral negotiations for assessing the possibility of 
global transition to a low-carbon economy. The second part analyses 
Brazil’s position in the global carbon cycle and public policies since 2005, 
including the progressive shift in 2009 and the contradictory dynamic in 
2010-12. The final part analyses the potential for a transition to a low-
carbon economy in Brazil and the impact in global climate governance. 
The emissions trajectory of the major powers 
According to most scientific evidence, a solid transition to a low-carbon 
economy assumes three principal dimensions: the continuous reduction of 
carbon emissions in developed countries; an accelerated decrease in the 
emissions growth curve – and the establishment of a stabilising year – for 
142 | EDUARDO VIOLA 
emerging mid-income countries before 2020; and, an accelerated decrease 
in the carbon intensity of GDP globally. In the case of rich countries, there 
should be an accelerated decrease in the per capita emissions, and in the 
cases of mid-income countries, an accelerated reduction in the carbon 
intensity of GDP and a light and continued fall in per capita emissions. 
Poor countries would still be allowed space to increase their per capita 
emissions (Stern, 2009; Viola et al., 2013).  
Emissions of GHGs grew by 3% during the first decade of the 21st 
century.29 Including figures on deforestation and agriculture of diverse 
sources for some countries, the leading emitters in 2010 were: China, 
responsible for 25% of the global total (and a 5% annual growth over the 
last decade), the US with 17% of total emissions (and 0.8% annual growth), 
the European Union (27 countries) at 12% of the total (growing at 0.4% 
annually), India with 8% of the total (growing at 6% per year), Russia with 
5% of the total (and annual growth of 4%), Indonesia with 4.5% of the total 
(growing by 5% per year), and Brazil at 4% of the total (4% annual growth 
until 2004, which drastically reduced between 2005 and 2009).  
The G20 countries are responsible for over 80% of global emissions 
and constitute three critical groups of super, great and medium powers 
(Viola, Franchini & Ribeiro, 2012). Since 2008 the G20 forum has itself 
became crucial in terms of the potential for building up much needed 
global governance, both in economics and climate. The peak attempt for 
developing global climate governance in the G20 framework was at the 
London Summit in April 2009. The initiative had the support of Germany, 
France, the US, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and the European Union. The 
then new Obama administration was at the peak of its commitment to 
climate change mitigation, consistent with its electoral campaign platform. 
But there was strong opposition from China, India, Russia, Brazil, South 
Africa, Argentina, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. After the COPS 15 failure in 
December 2009 at Copenhagen, the subsequent summits of the G20 showed 
stagnation in developing global governance both in economic and climate 
policies. Nevertheless, it remains the most important arena for building up 
global governance in these fields. The G20 meeting in Los Cabos in June 
                                                     
29 According to data from The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(http://www.pbl.nl/en/). 
BRAZILIAN CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE | 143 
2012 approved a soft declaration in favour of a gradual elimination of 
subsidies for fossil fuels.30 
The three super powers – the US, the European Union and China – 
share three highly relevant characteristics: 
• First and most essential, each one is responsible for a high proportion 
of global carbon emissions (at least 12%) and of global GDP. 
• Second, they possess important technological and human capital for 
decarbonising the economy. 
• Finally, they have veto power over any global international accord 
that could be effective. 
The three super powers represent one-half of global GDP and 54% of 
global carbon emissions. The European Union is isolated in its defence of 
an effective global architecture for a rapid transition to a low-carbon 
economy. The US and China resist a global agreement on a transition to 
low-carbon.  
Five major countries (India, Russia, Japan, South Korea and Brazil) 
are important players in addition to the climate super powers. India is 
growing very fast in terms of its share of the total and will likely surpass 
the European Union and the United States at some point in the present 
decade. Japan already has one of the least intensive carbon economies and 
has a strong human and technological capacity for the transition to a low-
carbon economy. Russia is the most difficult country: it has a very intensive 
carbon economy and high per capita emissions and a significant part of its 
elites and population believes that climate change could be beneficial. 
Brazil has the least carbon-intensive energy matrix of the relevant countries 
and will be the focus of this chapter. South Korea is the more reform-
minded of the great powers since 2008, as is reflected in its public policies 
and its strong human and technological capacity for decarbonising the 
economy.  
The recent performance of the middle powers in terms of trajectory of 
emissions and climate/energy policies allows us to classify them into two 
groups: conservatives (Canada, Indonesia, Argentina, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia) and progressives (Mexico, Australia and South Africa). Canada is 
conservative because of the strong power of the oil-rich province of Alberta 
                                                     
30 For an extended development of that argument and the problematic aspect of the 
whole first part, see Viola et al., 2013. 
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in the complex federal arrangement, and Australia was definitively 
conservative until 2007, but it began to enter the progressive camp in 
September 2011 when it approved a carbon tax.  
The failure of the Copenhagen Conference to reach a binding 
agreement increased the questioning of the United Nations’ multilateral 
negotiations framework. It is very difficult to conduct consistent 
negotiations among 170 countries (this count considers the 27 European 
Union countries as one) when around 140 of them do not play a significant 
role in the production of the problem nor its potential solution, although 
most of them are very vulnerable to climate change. There is an increasing 
perception among analysts and decision-makers in the most important 
countries that the prevailing approach will soon be bottom-up and that the 
main reference already exists in the form of the commitments submitted by 
these countries to the Copenhagen Accord at the beginning of 2010. The 
precarious agreement reached at the 17th COP in Durban 2011 didn’t 
change the situation in any significant way.  
The formation of a successful de-carbonisation alliance in the world 
depends on positive changes in the stance of the United States and an 
acceleration in the new Chinese energy policy initiated in 2008. Positive 
changes in each one of the super powers will likely affect the others and 
will re-energise the European commitment. Once these changes in the US 
and China are achieved, a coalition of the US, the EU, Japan, China, Brazil, 
South Korea, Mexico, Australia and South Africa could put pressure on 
Russia, India, Canada, Turkey, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to 
accelerate decarbonising measures in their respective economies. The 
extensive negotiations of this process would take place in multiple arenas: 
bilaterally, mainly US-China, China-EU and US-EU, but also Brazil-US, 
Brazil-EU, etc…; trilaterally (US, China, EU); and, multilaterally, the G20 – 
where South Korea, Mexico, Australia and Brazil could play an active 
reformist role vis-à-vis India, Russia and conservative middle powers. 
Once a consistent agreement is reached in the G20, the capacity of 
persuasion over all United Nations countries will likely be very strong and 
a formal multilateral agreement could be signed.  
Brazil in the global carbon cycle and public policies since 2005 
Brazil is a key country in the world in terms of the carbon cycle and natural 
and environmental resources because it possesses:  
• the most important carbon stock in forests in the world, 
• the largest stock of biodiversity in the world, 
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• the largest reserve of agricultural land and the most competitive 
agribusiness in the world, 
• the third largest stock of fresh water in the world, after Russia and 
Canada, 
• the most efficient and second largest – after the US – production of 
ethanol in the world (Goldemberg, 2007) and 
• the largest reserve of hydropower in the world that could be easily 
used because it has a globally competitive industry in the field. 
According to the Second National Emissions Inventory 
Communication (SNEIC),31 in 2005 Brazil generated around 2.2 billion 
tonnes of CO2e – methane and nitrous oxide. In 2005 Brazil accounted for 
around 5% of global carbon emissions. In 2005 Brazil was the fifth-largest 
emitter in the world after the US, China, the European Union and India. In 
terms of per capita emissions in 2005 Brazil produced approximately 11.5 
tonnes of CO2e, which was 60% that of the Americans, 20% more than the 
European Union, twice the amount of China and seven times that of India. 
In 2005, the carbon intensity of the Brazilian economy was around 1.7 
tonnes of carbon per $1,000 of GDP; higher than the US and the EU, but 
lower than China and India.32 
Between 2005 and 2009, however, Brazil broke the trend and was able 
to reduce GHG emissions by approximately 25% – the largest reduction 
ever recorded. This dramatic decrease was caused by a remarkable fall in 
Amazonian deforestation: from an annual average of almost 21,000 km2 in 
2000-04 to 6,200 km2 in 2009-11 (Brazil, 2010b). Deforestation reduction in 
the Amazon was a product of the following drivers:  
i) Strong commitment to reducing deforestation by the Ministry of the 
Environment, headed by the senator from Acre state Marina Silva, 
dating from the start of the Lula administration (January 2003). After 
almost two years of procrastination by the president – with 
deforestation increasing during 2003 and 2004 – the minister was 
powerful enough to impose a shift in Amazonian policy. Since 2005 
until 2009, deforestation reduction in the Amazon was at the core of 
                                                     
31 Brazil (2010a). 
32 In considering carbon intensity, current exchange rate dollars were used in this 
paper and not purchasing power parity, but the author recognises that there would 
be good reasons to argue in favour of the latter.  
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the federal government’s programme. Since 2010 the federal 
government no longer aims to reduce deforestation, but rather to 
avoid a new increase.  
ii) Dramatic increase in law enforcement by the federal government 
once the presidency of the country ordered the Federal Police and 
other federal agencies to increase cooperation with the Minister of 
Environment to stopp illegal deforestation. In 1997, Brazil passed a 
law strongly limiting deforestation to 20% of the private property in 
the Amazonian region. No capitalist country in the world has seen 
such severe interference in private property as Brazil in the Amazon. 
But the resistance to the law had been very strong until 2005, with 
unwillingness of the federal government to enforce the law and 
strong opposition from most state governments.  
iii) Strengthening of the scientific and technological capabilities of the 
Institute of Space Research (INPE) in charge of satellite monitoring of 
deforestation. INPE became a major global player in assessing 
deforestation and regional climate modelling.  
iv) Formation of multi-stakeholder coalitions against exportation and 
domestic consumption of soy and beef coming from deforested areas. 
These coalitions were composed of international, national and local 
entities, some corporations, the scientific community, some 
universities and some local governments.  
v) Increased impact of NGOs and the scientific community on the media 
- and consequently on the federal government – through different 
reports and campaigns showing the irrationality of deforestation.  
vi) Creation of new national parks and other conservation units that 
introduced new constraints into areas where deforestation was 
advancing. 
Since 2007 the capacity of the state to control illegal deforestation in 
large areas has increased so dramatically that much of the remaining 
deforestation has been reduced to small areas that are more difficult to 
detect by satellite. It is important to highlight that this process was carried 
out without any negative impact on economic growth (Moutinho, 2009). 
The deforestation reductions also changed the carbon intensity of the 
Brazilian economy: it fell in the Amazonian states and grew in the rest of 
the country.  
In spite of the relatively improved situation of Brazil in the modern 
global economy compared to the previous decade and the progress made 
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in emissions reduction at national level, its GHG trajectory has deteriorated 
in some relevant economic sectors in recent years. Brazil is the only 
important economy in the world in which there was an increase in carbon 
intensity if deforestation is not taken into account (UNEP, 2009). In the 
period 1994-2007 there was a 50% rise in emissions derived from 
production and consumption of energy out of a GDP growth of 38%. Three 
factors explain this trajectory: a large expansion of diesel consumption – 
used mostly by trucks – resulting in a dramatic increase in traffic 
congestion in large cities and key roads; the increase in the proportion of 
electric power coming from fossil fuels – from 11% to 15%; and a strong 
increase in oil refining (Abranches & Viola, 2009).  
Brazilian emissions are set to continue to grow at a rate of around 2% 
a year, in light of the significant decline in the rate of deforestation that had 
taken place in the period 2005-2012. Emissions from the other relevant 
sectors of the economy will certainly rise because the annual rate of GDP 
growth is estimated at around 3% for the period 2013-16.  
In the international United Nations negotiations, Brazil has so far 
assumed a general alliance with emerging countries with an energy matrix 
heavily dependent on fossil fuels (China, India and South Africa). The 
advantages of the energy matrix were always subordinated to the 
disadvantages of Amazonian deforestation in the formation of Brazil’s 
position (Viola, 2004). However, at the 12th COP in Nairobi, December 2006, 
Brazil started to change its historical position, proposing the creation of a 
global fund for slowing down deforestation.  
Brazil’s role in the global politics of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation lagged behind its potential until 2009 because of two major 
driving forces. First, entrenched traditional ideas and attitudes about the 
short-term use of natural resources had remained strong throughout the 
whole society and prevailed in the frontier society. Second, a traditional 
conception of national sovereignty that is poorly adapted to the challenges 
of the global information society has remained very strong among most 
decision-makers, particularly within the military and the Foreign Service. 
This approach has undermined most efforts at achieving the necessary 
convergence between the Brazilian national interest and the universal 
interest in relation to deforestation in the Amazon.  
Following and intensifying the previous trend, in 2009 there was a 
strong increase in public attention on the climate agenda: media coverage, 
public events, scientific conferences, mobilisation by NGOs and corporate 
meetings (Viola, 2010). More and more the traditional Brazilian 
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government position was under siege in Brazilian society, with two major 
claims to changing course: assuming goals for emissions in 2020 and 
supporting REDD+ (Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation).  
In this line, governments from Amazon states – under the leadership 
of Amazon and Mato Grosso – created the Amazon Forum in July 2009 and 
pushed for a change in the Brazilian international position in relation to 
forests. They wanted Brazil to accept the inclusion of REDD+ into the CDM 
or any other market mechanism. Also, three corporate coalitions launched 
documents in September 2009 asking the political authorities to modify the 
Brazilian climate standing – both domestically and internationally (Viola, 
2010).  
In October 2009 the Minister of the Environment Carlos Minc, 
increased his pressure to change the Brazilian position in COP15. Finally, 
after overcoming heavy resistance from Foreign Affairs and Science and 
Technology, the new position was announced both by Minister Carlos Minc 
and Minister Dilma Rousseff – the latter of whom was already designated a 
future presidential candidate.  
The Brazilian commitment announced 13 November 2009 has the 
following characteristics (Viola & Machado Filho, 2011): 
i) It is voluntary, meaning that Brazil decided to go beyond its 
obligations according to the Climate Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
ii) It refers to the carbon emissions growth curve in relation to a 
Business As Usual (BAU) scenario and it is not an obligatory target in 
reference to a baseline year, unlike those commitments adopted by 
the EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Norway. 
iii) Brazil commits itself to reduce GHG emissions between 36% and 39% 
having as a baseline the year 2005 and having as future reference the 
projected emissions for the year 2020 within a BAU scenario. This 
scenario assumes that in 2020 Brazilian emissions will increase to up 
to 2.7 billion tonnes of CO2e. The voluntary commitment will reduce 
the emissions to 1.8 billion tonnes, which implies a reduction of 36% 
to 39%, having 2005 as a baseline and approximately the same 
amount of emissions as the year 2009.  
Parallel to the movements in the executive power sphere, the Federal 
Congress also began to deliver measures regarding climate issues. In 
October 2009, the House of Representatives passed the climate change bill, 
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after significant efforts were made by the trans-party environmental bloc. 
Under the influence of the new pro-climate public atmosphere, the Senate 
debated and approved the bill in December 2009. The same process that 
framed the sanction of the federal law also resulted in the creation of the 
Climate Change National Fund (CCNF- law 12,114), conceived as an 
instrument to assure the necessary financial support for mitigation and 
adaptation projects.  
In order to correctly evaluate the growing climate awareness in 
Brazilian society, it is important to highlight that in the first round of the 
presidential elections – 3 October 2010 – the Green Party candidate Marina 
Silva came third with 19% of the total valid vote, excluding abstentions and 
null votes. Moreover, a survey in December 2012 by the prestigious 
DataFolha Institute showed Marina Silva with 18% of vote intentions, 
second – after the President Dilma Rousseff – in the race for president in 
the election of 2014.  
The Brazilian stance in the COPs of Cancun, Durban and Doha 
mostly showed continuity with the past. Brazil kept the BASIC (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) alliance as its priority and its main goal is to 
ensure the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 with 
commitments of emissions reduction coming only from Annex 1 countries 
and no commitments from non-Annex 1 countries, at least until 2020. 
However, within the BASIC alliance, Brazil has been pushing for some kind 
of commitments from non-Annex 1 countries, starting in 2020. The 
individual positions of the four BASIC countries showed regularity in the 
three last COPs and could be ordered from more progressive to more 
conservative in the following way: Brazil, South Africa, China and India.  
During the Durban COP, Brazil attempted to bridge the differences 
among the major players – mostly behind the scenes – trying to narrow the 
gap between the position of the European Union and the other BASIC 
countries; particularly by trying to persuade China and India of the need to 
be more flexible and also by trying to make the American position more 
flexible. At the Doha COP, Brazil was extremely engaged – and convergent 
with the EU – in achieving some continuity of the Kyoto Protocol. In spite 
of the moderately positive diplomatic statements about the Doha 
agreement by representatives of most countries, the opinion of this author 
and researchers linked to its network is that the meeting was a failure.  
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Global climate governance and the transition to a low-carbon 
economy 
The adoption of commitments for emissions reductions by Brazil in 
November 2009 launched a debate inside the government about how to 
position itself in the Copenhagen COP 15. The conservatives wanted to 
keep the strong alliance with China and India. The reformists wanted to 
distance the country from those that adopted goals much less ambitious 
than those of Brazil. The conservatives prevailed during the conference, 
since Brazil stated that the type of ambitious commitment that was adopted 
should not apply as a parameter to other emerging countries.  
Indeed, during 2011-12, a conservative coalition in Congress 
approved a reform of the Forest Code, which gave a partial amnesty to 
farmers that deforested beyond the legal permit until 2008. Many analysts 
fear that the new Forest Code could increase deforestation in the Amazon. 
Even if this does not happen, for sure it will increase deforestation in the 
Cerrado Savannah, the key agriculture frontier of Brazil.  
However, there are some positive prospects for Brazilian agriculture. 
Sectors of the government are trying to disseminate the idea of a low-
carbon agri-business, where gains in productivity do not mean more GHG 
emissions. This discourse is based on the agricultural potential of degraded 
lands, a more technological use of the land already exploited and the 
progressive expansion of the ‘no-till’ system (Cerri, 2010). Agriculture has 
historically been an area of clash between Brazil and the protectionist 
policies of the European Union and this is likely to continue in the area of 
low-carbon agriculture.  
In the area of energy, the pace and scale of pre-salt oil exploration is a 
source of uncertainty in the sector. Initially, there was some risk that the 
pre-salt would put some constraints on Brazil’s foreign policy in relation to 
the transition to a low-carbon economy (Lucena, 2009). In fact, there has 
already been a preview of this effect, with the moderation of the ethanol 
diplomacy since late 2007. In relation to potential consequences of pre-salt 
over the country’s carbon emissions, the prospects are not good either, 
since the expansion of refinement and the petrochemical industry is 
already on course. The key to overcoming this emissions expansion is to 
use carbon capture and storage in the extraction/refinement of oil and in 
the petrochemical industry. Five years after the announcement of the pre-
salt discoveries there is clear delay in the exploration and some doubts 
about its future: a nationalist trend has limited the participation of foreign 
companies and Petrobras has been badly managed in recent years and is 
BRAZILIAN CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE | 151 
strapped for cash to make the huge investments needed. Moreover, the 
shale gas and tight oil33 revolution in the US and other recently discovered 
reserves elsewhere in the world have diminished the attractiveness of the 
Brazilian pre-salt.  
The future expansion of ethanol production in Brazil is tied in part to 
the commoditisation of the good in the international market, in a way 
similar to oil. However, if Brazil tries again to consolidate the ethanol 
policy, it has to guarantee that the production of bio-fuels won’t be done 
through deforestation. This is easy with ethanol but a little more complex 
in the case of bio-diesel because its main raw material is soy, which could 
retake the penetration in the Amazon, as happened before 2005. Despite the 
arguments by some European leaders that the ethanol production in the 
centre-west and south-west has pushed the soy and cattle ranching frontier 
further into the Amazon, the dramatic decline in the region’s deforestation 
rate in recent years shows the capability of Brazil to transform sugar 
ethanol into a sustainable global commodity. An important challenge for 
ethanol is how fast the more backward sugar-cane cultivating regions will 
move from labour intensive – primitive labour conditions – to 
mechanisation. The certification of ethanol production could be done in a 
way that constrains the backward part of the ethanol sector. Due to the 
high acceptance of ethanol policies in Brazilian society, these measures 
could have strong support. However, in the last two years there has been a 
dramatic stagnation in the production of ethanol due to several factors: the 
government signalling its priority for oil exploration, a freeze on gas and 
diesel prices that undermined the competitiveness of ethanol and the lack 
of development of new infrastructure for ethanol transportation (ethanol 
pipelines).  
The construction of new thermoelectric power plants based on oil or 
coal seems to be over for now, although there would be an increase in 
natural gas thermoelectric plants in the whole country, particularly in the 
Amazon because of the exploration of significant gas reserves in the centre-
west Brazilian Amazon, relatively close to the city of Manaus. This is the 
most important city in the world located in the middle of a tropical forest, 
with around 2 million inhabitants and a huge industrial sector. On the 
other hand, hydropower is back. Today, less than 10% of the total 
                                                     
33 Tight oil (also known as light tight oil, abbreviated LTO) is a petroleum play that 
consists of light crude oil contained in petroleum-bearing formations of relatively 
low porosity and permeability (shale). 
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hydropower production comes from the Amazon, but the expansion of this 
activity will be concentrated in this region and should be done with high 
efficiency with respect to the conversion of forests. The plans and the 
already ongoing construction for two large hydropower plants on the 
Madeira River, in the border area with Bolivia, are environmentally 
friendly for the first time in Amazonian history. It remains to be seen how 
deep the shift will be in the final outcome. A third large dam in Belo Monte 
(in the state of Para), whose construction was initiated in 2011, has given 
rise to much controversy.  
For the Brazilian mindset, hydropower is fully equal to wind and 
solar as a renewable energy. The fact that the European Union has an 
approach with some restrictions on hydropower is an area of dispute 
between both entities. A change to a friendlier hydropower approach by 
the European Union would be a major factor of convergence.  
There is no planning at present for future deployment in solar 
photovoltaic power, despite its huge potential, and there is a strong lobby 
among the decision-makers and infrastructure-building corporations in 
favour of hydropower (cheaper) that blocks any advance (Marcovitch et al., 
2010). Strong subsidies would be needed for photovoltaic and this is an 
area where the scientific community could play a key role, but it would be 
difficult to implement. Conversely, in the case of wind power, a favourable 
trend has begun to take shape since 2009 (Dutra & Szklo, 2008).  
In the critical area of transportation – both cargo and public for 
passengers – the climate law and Brazil’s submission to the Copenhagen 
Accord have been negligent. Especially if we consider the sector’s terrible 
performance over the last two decades. Among some crucial options to 
reverse this situation are the following: upgrade the road network and 
hubs, replace old vehicles, expand the railroads, integrate road and 
railroads, introduce the hybrid electric car and improve conventional ones 
and establish fast bus systems following the example of the city of Curitiba 
(McKynsey, 2009). Some European systems of public transportation, in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Germany for example, are an inspiration and 
point of reference for Brazilian reformist forces. This is an area of 
significant potential for more cooperation between both entities.  
The transportation sector has remarkable and highly visible co-
benefits between climate and quality of life, since the poor transportation 
infrastructure is crucial in degrading the everyday life of most urban 
residents (traffic congestion, pollution, much time lost in commuting). 
Besides this, transportation – together with public security – poses the 
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greatest bottlenecks for successfully organising the two sports mega-events: 
the 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. However, 
the enormous amount of investment needed and the prospect of positive 
results (and political gains) materialising only in the mid-term, conspires 
against a more rational management of the situation. The lobby of the 
automotive sector has also been an obstacle to the transition to a less 
carbon-intensive and less road-based paradigm. In 2010, for instance, 
within the Lula da Silva administration, pro status quo interests were able 
to stop a project that encouraged the use of electric cars. Although with 
very limited chance of success, a political strategy focused on those co-
benefits could be used to advance mitigation policies in the area (Viola & 
Franchini, 2011).  
Despite their limited impact in reducing carbon emissions, 
improvements in basic sanitation and waste disposal – including the 
construction of power plants fed by methane – are areas offering high co-
benefits and other big improvements, because they encounter low 
resistance. Another policy that could be easy to implement would be 
promoting a culture and organisation development of civil defence, an area 
where Brazil is very poor and in which recent extreme climate events 
(flooding, droughts, severe storms) have raised awareness about the risks 
of climate change. The partnership with the military is very important since 
they have good capabilities in this area.  
Conclusions 
Summarising the prospects regarding the past and the future GHG 
emissions reduction trajectory and policies in Brazil, one can say the 
following: 
First, the best mitigation opportunities in the country can be found in 
deforestation control – and the occupation of degraded lands – and in the 
energy sector – improving the efficiency and the progress of ethanol. The 
transportation sector, however, presents a pessimistic scenario, where the 
consumption of diesel oil is growing apace.  
Second, up to now, the advances made by Brazil in reducing GHG 
emissions have been located in low resistance sectors. As already reported, 
a big part of that mitigation effort came as a result of deforestation control, 
a sector that is irrelevant in terms of economic growth. Because of this 
situation, the Brazilian government never had to invest heavily in strategies 
to reduce the political cost of mitigation actions.  
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Third – but profoundly related to the previous point – in order to 
advance with mitigation options in more resistant areas, it would be 
necessary to build up more robust climate coalitions than in the past. A 
clear example of this situation is the poor state of the transportation system.  
Brazil’s role in the global politics of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation has lagged behind its potentiality so far, because of two major 
factors: entrenched traditional ideas and attitudes about short-term use of 
natural resources and a traditional conception of national sovereignty that 
is poorly adapted to the challenges of the global economy, particularly 
among military officers and diplomats. There has been some progress, but 
very modest until very recently.  
The presence of Marina Silva, as the Green Party presidential 
candidate, introduced the transition to a low-carbon economy as a topic in 
the electoral campaign and her performance in the first round of the 
election gives tentative assurance that the issue will remain on the public 
agenda for the next few years. 
The National Congress passed a climate change law that establishes a 
voluntary emissions reduction target and in that way partially internalised 
the issue into the country’s legal structure. The Ministry of Environment 
progressively raised its profile during 2009 and finally defeated the 
powerful conservative sector of the federal government when the new plan 
of reduction targets was announced.  
There are of course, many doubts regarding the future 
implementation of the Brazilian commitment, but this new legislation and 
the targets assumed by the country in the context of the Copenhagen 
Accord are fundamental steps in relation to the future trajectory of the 
foreign, economic, energy, agricultural, forest and climate policies. 
There are two new important questions from 2013 to the near future. 
The first is how big will be the implementation gap of the new climate 
policy. The second one is how long Brazil will maintain the recently created 
imbalance between its domestic climate policy with reduction targets and 
the alliance with the more conservative emerging powers like China, 
Russia and India. Given the interests and relative power of different 
economic sectors and the dynamics of public opinion, it is probable that 
this imbalance will not last long, and the Brazilian position will tend to 
converge with the more advanced EU, Japan and South Korea.  
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Areas of potential cooperation between the EU and Brazil 
For this and other reasons, the potential is high for more convergence and 
cooperation between Brazil and the EU. A lot will depend on the skills of 
European diplomacy, the behaviour of the progressive European 
corporations and on the advance of reformist socio-economic forces inside 
Brazil. In particular, the areas of potential cooperation between the 
European Union and Brazil may be the following:34 
• Biofuels. Elimination of barriers for international trade and promoting 
joint technological development in second-generation ethanol. 
Starting negotiations of a Free Trade Area in biofuels between the EU 
and Mercosur.  
• Hydropower. The EU might move to a friendlier approach towards the 
development of hydropower.  
• REDD+. The EU is promoting the reduction of deforestation in Brazil, 
which should contribute specifically to the Amazonian Fund 
(Norway is already contributing). Brazil and the EU should work 
together on REDD+ in Latin America, Africa and Asia.  
• Solar and Wind Power. The EU (particularly Denmark, Germany and 
Portugal) and Brazil can promote direct investment in Brazil, with 
joint technological development.  
• Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Joint technological development, 
strengthening the role of Norway, the Statoil Corporation and the EU 
in Brazil. Increasing interdependence of services in the oil and gas 
industries will strengthen environmental protection.  
• Systemic Energy Efficiency. Joint technological development and 
transferring of managerial and organisational capabilities from the 
EU to Brazil.  
• Smart Grids. Promoting technology transfer from EU to Brazil and 
joint technological development.  
                                                     
34 These potentialities are based on the author’s assessment according to players 
and opinions that are relevant in Brazilian society, but they have not prevailed in 
government so far. None of the potentialities is likely to materialise in the near 
future, at least not before the EU overcomes the more critical phase of the economic 
crisis and Brazil chooses a new president and Congress in 2014. 
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• Nuclear energy. Increasing cooperation between the European Union 
(particularly France) and Brazil in technological development, safety 
and non-proliferation.  
• Public transportation and urban mobility. Brazil can learn from some EU 
countries (particularly the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark) on 
how to make a dramatic shift in urban mobility and promote the 
development of public transportation, including trains, metro and 
boats. The EU supports the recent initiative of the Brazilian 
government to promote a major development in railway systems. 
Increased European investment in Brazil’s mass transportation, joint 
technological development and transferring of managerial and 
organisational capabilities.  
• Systematic consultation and convergence in the UN multilateral 
negotiations and the G20. Brazil could act as a bridge between the 
European Union and BASIC/BRICS on global climate governance.  
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EU POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
MITIGATION SINCE COPENHAGEN AND 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER AND MONICA ALESSI 
Abstract 
The EU has long assumed leadership in advancing domestic and 
international climate change policy. While pushing its partners in 
international negotiations, it has led the way in implementing a host of 
domestic measures, including a unilateral and legally binding target, an 
ambitious policy on renewable energy and a strategy for low-carbon 
technology deployment. The centrepiece of EU policy, however, has been 
the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade programme 
launched in 2005. The ETS has been seen as a tool to ensure least-cost 
abatement, to drive EU decarbonisation and develop a global carbon 
market. After an initial review and revision of the ETS, to come into force in 
2013, there was a belief that the new ETS was ‘future-proof’, meaning able 
to cope with the temporary lack of a global agreement on climate change 
and individual countries’ emission ceilings. This confidence has been 
shattered by the simultaneous ‘failure’ of Copenhagen to deliver a clear 
prospect of a global (top-down) agreement and the economic crisis. The 
lack of prospects for national caps at the international level has led to a 
situation whereby many member states hesitate to pursue ambitious 
climate change policies. In the midst of this, the EU is assessing its options 
anew. A number of promising areas for international cooperation exist, all 
centred on the need to ‘raise the ambition level’ of GHG emission 
reductions, notably in aviation and maritime, short-lived climate 
pollutions, deforestation, industrial competitiveness and green growth. 
Public policy issues in the field of technology and its transfer will require 
more work to identify real areas for cooperation. 
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Introduction 
As is well known, the EU has identified tackling climate change as one of 
the world’s greatest challenges. It has repeatedly confirmed its position that 
an increase in the global, annual, mean surface temperature should not 
exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. After the withdrawal of the US from 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU found itself being catapulted into global 
‘leadership’ on climate change. While few had bet at the time that the 
Kyoto Protocol would survive, instead (not least owing to active EU 
diplomacy) Japan, Canada and Russia ratified the Protocol to bring it into 
force in 2005. As a result, the EU has adopted numerous laws both to fulfil 
its commitments and to prepare the path for a new post-2012 agreement, or 
at least a framework. Among them have been a host of policies to support 
renewable energy, improve energy efficiency, decarbonise transport and 
advance a strategy on low-carbon technology deployment. The centrepiece 
of the EU’s climate change policy has been the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), which started in 2005. Yet the outcome of the 
Copenhagen summit in December 2009 and the continuing economic crisis 
have triggered a rethink of the EU’s strategy. The new strategy is still 
emerging, with its implications for relations with third countries being 
unclear. Nevertheless, a few pointers and issues for further discussion can 
be highlighted. 
The EU’s climate change policy in the run-up to Copenhagen 
Identifying the scope for cooperation between the EU and emerging 
economies like Brazil requires an understanding of the EU’s climate change 
‘narrative’ prior to the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen. It also requires 
acknowledging how difficult it is to change a once-achieved consensus or 
modify a negotiation position of the EU, which for strategically important 
issues, such as the long-term international strategy, requires a broad 
consensus within the EU. The current situation, in which Poland plus a 
number of other Central and Eastern European member states are 
continually opposed to an increase in the level of ambition, i.e. more 
onerous targets, is a case in point.  
The climate and energy package 
The EU’s climate change policy has long been based on the EU’s long-term 
target to limit the global temperature increase to a maximum of two 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. To achieve this, the EU set a 
number of targets as well as a host of accompanying policies, generally 
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referred to as the ‘climate and energy package’ or the ‘20 20 by 2020 
targets’: 
1) a binding, absolute, emissions reduction commitment of 30% by 2020 
compared with 1990 conditional on a global agreement, and a ‘firm 
independent commitment’ to achieve an average reduction of at least a 
20% over the period from 2013 to 2020, calculated as follows: 
Year  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Reduction vs 1990 -14% -15% -16% -17% -18% -19% -20% -21% 
Reductions vs base 
year -17% -18% -19% -20% -21% -22% -23% -24% 
Source: EC (2012) Commission Staff Working Document – Preparing the EU’s Quantified 
Emission Limitation or Reduction Objective (QELRO) based on the EU Climate and Energy 
Package, SWD (2012) 18 final. 
2) a binding target to reach a 20% share of renewable energy sources in 
primary energy consumption by 2020; 
3) a binding minimum target of increasing the share of renewables in each 
member state’s transport energy consumption to 10% by 2020 (this 
target initially focused solely on biofuels, but was later widened to 
include other forms of renewable energy sources); 
4) a 20% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2020 compared 
with projections (non-binding); and 
5) a commitment to enable the construction of up to 12 large-scale power 
plants using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.  
The climate and energy package was finally adopted in April 2009 
and contains six principal elements. These entail a directive for the 
promotion of renewable energy sources, a revised EU ETS starting in 2013, 
an ‘effort sharing’ decision that sets binding emission targets for EU 
member states in sectors not subject to the ETS, a regulation to reduce by 
2015 average CO2 emissions of new passenger cars to 120g/km, new 
environmental quality standards for fuels and biofuels (aimed at reducing 
by 2020 GHG emissions from fuels by 6% over their entire life-cycle) and a 
regulatory framework for CCS. Prior to that, the EU had already published 
the Strategic Energy Technology (SET-)Plan to strengthen research, 
development and demonstration as well as early deployment help for new 
low-carbon energy technologies.  
While climate change was the main driver, the ‘package’ was also 
meant to address energy policy challenges. Domestic energy resources 
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have been dwindling at the same time as government intervention in the 
energy industry has been on the rise in precisely those countries that could 
potentially fill the gap. In this context, the EU and its member states have 
been examining domestic and external policy options to move to a more 
sustainable and secure energy supply. These include, among others, 
investing in renewable energy sources, promoting CCS technology and 
investing in nuclear energy in member states that wish to do so. 
Renewables policy has been guided by the need for large-scale deployment 
to bring down the costs of technology.  
Additional real or perceived advantages of the EU’s climate and 
energy package have included the following: 
• the renewable energy policy can provide for technological leadership 
in sunrise technologies; 
• renewable electricity can reduce long-term electricity prices and their 
volatility; 
• the substitution of fossil fuels combined with renewables may reduce 
the pricing power of Russia (notably on gas); and  
• the introduction of the EU ETS can lead to the retention by importing 
countries of some of the economic rent of producer countries. 
To offset the higher prices for both industry and domestic consumers, 
energy efficiency has been perceived as a central piece, certainly for the 
transition period until new technologies and new fuels become available on 
a large scale. With increasing prices, reducing consumption offers a 
reasonable prospect of keeping the energy bill constant. 
There has been an additional aspect of the ’20-20 by 2020’ targets that 
is often overlooked. The first phase of the EU ETS showed that setting a 
hard cap on GHG emissions in the EU is next to impossible without some 
sort of legally binding constraint. In a scenario of a post-2012 agreement 
without absolute caps, it was and still is difficult to see how the EU ETS 
could continue to exist in a meaningful way. Member states and the 
European Commission would most likely not be able to impose an 
ambitious emissions ceiling on industry without a legally binding 
constraint. The ’20-20’ targets were meant to address this risk. 
At the heart of the agreement are the ’20-20 by 2020’ targets. In 
addition to the revised EU ETS – covering power and industry emissions – 
which has fixed by law a legally binding target for perpetual, annual 
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reductions by 1.74%,35 implementation of these targets has been 
operationalised by the introduction of legally binding targets for GHG 
emission reductions at the member state level ranging from -20% to +20%, 
depending on the member state.36 Also, the 20% renewable target by 2020 – 
which translates into roughly a 35% share of renewables in the power 
sector – has been broken down into differentiated national targets (see 
Table A1 at the end of this chapter) for the share of renewable energy 
sources in final energy consumption and introduced.  
The EU’s cornerstone: The Emissions Trading System  
The EU ETS has been designed as a domestic policy, largely ‘protected’ 
from carbon markets that at the time were seen as emanating from the 
Kyoto Protocol. The principal reason has been concerns over compliance 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. For an efficient 
trading system to work there has to be a guarantee that compliance is 
ensured with a possibility of recourse to a court in case of litigation.  
By covering currently some 2 billion of GHG emissions in the EU and 
the European Economic Area (EEA),37 by most estimates the EU ETS makes 
up some 80% of the global carbon market. Strictly speaking a regional 
carbon market, its size nonetheless means that prices for EU allowances 
(EUAs) under the ETS set the prices for the global carbon market. With 
demand from those countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol fast 
decreasing, the EU ETS will become – at least temporarily – an even more 
important component of the global carbon market.  
ETS beginnings 
The well-publicised initial problems of the ETS were partly the result of the 
rapid speed with which the ETS was adopted, motivated by the EU’s desire 
to show its strong determination to tackle climate change. This should, 
however, not hide the fact that the ETS suffered from some serious design 
flaws (e.g. Egenhofer, 2007; Swedish Energy Agency, 2007, Ellerman, 
                                                     
35 This figure allows for a 21% GHG emissions reduction in 2020 compared with 
2005. 
36 These are referred to as ‘effort sharing’ targets, covering transport, building or 
waste and amounting EU-wide to a 10% reduction below 2005 levels by 2020.  
37 The EEA countries Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are fully integrated into 
this market.  
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Convery and de Perthuis, 2010). The initial allocation of allowances by 
member states on the basis of National Allocation Plans led to a ‘race to the 
bottom’, i.e. member states were under pressure by industries not to hand 
out fewer allowances than their EU competitors received. This led to over-
allocation and ultimately to a price collapse. During the period when the 
EU allowance price was high, free allocation also generated ‘windfall 
profits’, mainly but not only in the power sector. Some of these issues were 
addressed in phase 2 (2008–12) as a result of member state cooperation and 
the European Commission being able to reduce member states’ allocation 
proposals. Still, throughout both phases, by and large the ETS has managed 
to deliver a carbon price. One result has been that the carbon price has now 
clearly entered boardroom discussions (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). 
In the absence of a global agreement and ‘uneven’ carbon constraints, 
the answer to concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage has been 
free allocation. Free allocation constitutes compensation, potentially 
creating an incentive to continue producing carbon in Europe (Ellerman, 
Convery and de Perthuis, 2010).  
Experiences from phase 1 and 2 have greatly helped the European 
Commission to propose and adopt radical changes to the EU ETS, which 
were not even thinkable before its initial adoption in 2003.38 The principal 
element of the new ETS is a single EU-wide cap, which will decrease 
annually in a linear way by 1.74% starting in 2013. This linear reduction 
continues beyond 2020, as there is no sunset clause. 
The revised ETS Directive also foresees EU-wide harmonised 
allocation rules. Starting from 2013, power companies will have to buy all 
their emission allowances at an auction with some temporary exceptions 
for ‘coal-based’ poorer member states. At the same time, the industrial 
sectors under the ETS that are exposed to significant non-EU competition 
and thereby potentially subject to carbon leakage will receive 100% of 
allowances free of charge up to 2020.  
Other changes include restrictions to the total volume of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)/Joint Implementation (JI) credits, the use 
of 300 million EU allowances to finance the demonstration of CCS and 
innovative renewable technologies. Furthermore, there is a general – non-
legally binding – commitment by EU member states to spend at least half of 
                                                     
38 See e.g. Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (2010), Skjærseth and Wettestad 
(2010) and Egenhofer et al. (2011) for a full overview. 
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the revenues from auctioning on tackling climate change in both the EU 
and developing countries, including on measures to avoid deforestation 
and increase afforestation and reforestation in developing countries. In 
addition,  
• the system will be extended to aviation, the chemicals and aluminium 
sectors and to other GHGs, e.g. nitrous oxide from fertilisers and 
perfluorocarbons from aluminium; and  
• member states can financially compensate electro-intensive industries 
for higher power prices. The European Commission has drawn up 
EU guidelines to this end.  
As in the previous periods, access to project credits under the Kyoto 
Protocol from outside the EU will be limited. The revised ETS will restrict 
access to no more than 50% of the reductions required in the EU ETS to 
ensure that emission reductions will happen in the EU. Leftover CDM/JI 
credits from 2008–12 can be used until 2020.  
The economic crisis 
At the time of the hard-won compromise of the ETS review for post-2012, 
there was a general conviction that the new ETS would be ‘future-proof’, 
i.e. be able to cope with the temporary lack of a global climate change 
agreement and address competitiveness, yet able to drive de-carbonisation 
of the EU economy. The 2008–09 economic crisis, however, has destroyed 
that confidence by a seemingly permanent dramatic lowering of EUA 
prices due to a rapid and dramatic decline in economic output. Ever since, 
EUA prices have been lingering below €5 per tonne of CO2, going as low as 
around €2. Without political intervention, EUA prices are not expected to 
climb much higher throughout the period up to 2020, largely because of the 
possibility to bank unused allowances between the second and third phase 
(European Commission, 2012). 
When measured against 2007 levels, the EU’s current pledge of 20% 
compares poorly with the pledges of other industrialised countries. The 
current -20% pledge is inferior in terms of the effort required to those of the 
US or Canada, while a 30% reduction pledge would still be weaker than the 
upper-end pledges of Australia and Japan (e.g. Spencer et al., 2010; Den 
Elzen et al., 2009).  
The implication of the lack of ambition goes beyond the EU’s 
domestic decarbonisation strategy. The EU’s minimum target is likely to lie 
above the trajectory implied by a linear reduction from current levels 
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towards a 2050 target to reach the long-term target of reducing “emissions 
by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels”, the EU’s politically accepted 
objective. This would mean that an EU reduction target of 20% would not 
seem to enable the world to reach its envisaged objective under reasonable 
assumptions (e.g. Ward and Grubb, 2009). This has been indirectly 
acknowledged by the European Commission in the Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the 26 May 2010 Communication, which states that “internal 
reductions by 2020 at a higher level than the reference case (which achieves 
the -20% target internally) is more in line with a 2ºC compatible scenario” 
(European Commission, 2010b). 
A low level of ambition in the EU is equally unlikely to facilitate an 
ambitious international agreement consistent with long-term objectives and 
economic efficiency. The European Commission’s own analysis back in 
2009 (European Commission, 2009) noted that a 30% reduction target 
combined with a carbon market for the group of developed countries 
would cut global mitigation costs by about a quarter. Sticking to a 20% 
target would forego these potential benefits. 
Finally, a lack of ambition is in gross contradiction to the EU’s 
rhetoric on how to generate financing for mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change in developing countries. The EU envisages the majority of 
these financial flows coming through the carbon market. Under a 20% 
reduction pathway and the possibility to import credits through the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, the resulting EU carbon price is likely to be 
too low to generate a significant portion of the $100 billion p.a. post-2012 
that has been agreed.  
Implications 
The EU’s low level of ambition affects its influence in international fora 
when discussing climate change policy. The emergence of new, important 
global players (in particular BRIC39 countries) with a large potential to 
reduce emissions – but also to increase them if no action is taken – requires 
a delicate diplomatic effort, as well as willingness to support effectively a 
change of track. The share of EU emissions in global emissions is 
decreasing (due in large part to the increases in emerging economies), 
which in turn brings adverse domestic incentives and puts into question 
the EU’s climate policy. There is thus a need to reconcile the EU’s rhetoric 
                                                     
39 BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
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with its own ambitions, first by putting its house in order and second by 
engaging more meaningfully with emerging countries willing to participate 
constructively in reducing emissions. 
Putting its house in order will take time 
The first implication is that the EU will need to get its house in order. An 
initial step has been taken with a European Commission proposal40 to 
stagger the release of EUAs to be auctioned; a practice that is generally 
referred to as ‘back-loading’. Once adopted, this would mean that fewer 
EUAs are released for auction initially and more later, towards the end of 
the trading period in 2020, which in the Commission’s view would be able 
to address this ‘temporary’ market imbalance. At the same time, the 
European Commission has initiated a discussion on the need for 
‘structural’ measures, in particular to address the root cause of the current 
imbalance (European Commission, 2012). Numerous options exist, 
including such one-off measures as cancelling a certain amount of 
allowances, introducing systemic adjustment measures or even creating 
new bodies (see e.g. Egenhofer et al., 2012). Whatever the final political 
solution, decision-making will take years to complete. The development of 
the EU’s international strategy cannot be seen in isolation from the 
intricacies of the international discussion, notably since there is no 
consensus on either the domestic or the international aspects. 
Differences of interest among member states within the Council are 
multi-faceted, and there is a cleavage between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ member 
states, i.e. those member states that were already members in 2004 when 
the new and newly ‘independent’ member states of the former Soviet area 
of influence joined the EU. These internal differences bear some 
resemblance to tensions at the international level, and this is often not 
understood by negotiating partners. Generally, the new member states 
have a far lower GDP per capita than the older member states. The poorest 
                                                     
40 The proposal consists of the following elements: i) a proposal to amend the EU 
ETS Directive and clarify the prerogative of the EC to make changes to the 
auctioning profile within a trading period through the Climate Change Committee; 
ii) an amendment to the Auctioning Regulation that does not include the number; 
and iii) a Staff Working Document (SWD) that outlines, in some detail, the 
rationale behind back-loading as well as at least three different options on how to 
implement such action. The SWD showed, by calculations using three different 
models, the potential impact of back-loading.  
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EU member states recorded a GDP per capita of €12,600 (Romania) and 
€13,800 (Bulgaria). These are levels comparable to Brazil at €11,900 and 
South Africa at €11,100. In many cases, this is coupled with a power sector 
that is predominantly coal-based. Poland is the most extreme example, 
with coal-based power production being responsible for a bit more than 
90% of total power, which translates into 56% of total primary energy 
consumption. The Europe OECD average figures for comparison are 24% 
and 17% (Spencer, 2012). Finally, energy efficiency in industry is 
considerably below that in old member states. Polish energy intensity is 
about 2.2 times higher than the EU-27 average and 2.5 times higher than 
that in the old member states.41 This situation represents a kind of 
contradiction between intra-EU developed versus developing countries. 
The EU’s share of global emissions is falling fast  
It is also becoming increasingly clear that the EU’s share of global GHG 
emissions – currently at around 13% of the global share – is decreasing fast 
and will fall to around 10% in 2020. This compares with shares for China 
and the US each of around 20%. According to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in Paris, the EU’s cumulative savings over the period 2008 to 
2020 – the period for which the EU has capped its emissions – would 
represent around 40% of China’s expected annual CO2 emissions (IEA, 
2008). 
Figure 23 shows that even if the EU, the US and other developed 
countries follow an aggressive reduction pathway, such as reducing total 
emissions by 90% in 2050 compared with 1990, emerging economies 
(possibly excluding India due to its low per-capita GHG emissions) will 
need to reduce their emissions by a similar degree, although with a delay of 
one decade. To be able to reach a situation in which the global average 
mean temperature increases do not exceed 2°C, the GHG emissions of 
emerging economies would need to start falling absolutely by 2020.  
 
  
                                                     
41 This is based on Eurostat figures: Polish energy intensity is 373.859 kgoe/€1,000 
GDP; that of the EU-27 is 167.99 and the EU-15 is 150.942. 
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Figure 23. A thought experiment, showing the global emissions budget that entails 
a 15-30% risk of exceeding 2ºC (top line), the Annex 1 trajectory 
assuming an aggressive reduction of 90% below 1990 levels by 2050 
(bottom line), and the remaining carbon budget available to the non-
Annex 1 (middle line)  
 
Source: Kartha et al. 2008 (ECP Report No. 5). 
 
While there is no renouncing the notion of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, as enshrined in 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ratified by 
more than 190 nations worldwide (including the US), it is nonetheless clear 
that EU reductions on their own may be laudable but are far from sufficient 
to address the problem. Hence the EU’s insistence on a common framework 
for all Parties, which was subsequently agreed in Durban when Parties 
agreed to “launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all 
Parties” to be finished by 2015 (for 2020). The increasing awareness of this 
situation makes the EU’s unilateral commitments increasingly a hard sale. 
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Industrial competitiveness does matter 
Closely related to the differentiation between developed and developing 
countries has been the lack of progress in ‘industrial competitiveness’42 
issues. The risk of carbon leakage, whether real or perceived, will become 
an increasingly important impediment in the EU to raising its ambition 
level. Prior to Copenhagen, pressure from EU industry was relatively 
modest, essentially for two reasons. First, there was a prospect of some sort 
of global deal able to establish a ‘level playing field’. Second, ETS design 
has been able, if not to address for good, at least to park the issue. With the 
prospect of a global deal pushed farther away, competitiveness has again 
become an important matter on the EU’s agenda. Competitiveness issues 
will be further aggravated because more European industry will need to 
contribute to the ‘deep’ costs of decarbonisation or energy transition, such 
as for renewable intake and massive new investment in energy 
infrastructure. To date, industry in all member states has largely been 
exempted from contributing. But as costs rise, households will become less 
willing or able to cover the full burden.43  
In the past, ‘competitiveness’ was addressed by free allocation in the 
ETS. Free allocation constitutes a form of compensation, potentially 
creating an incentive to continue producing in Europe. Electro-intensive 
industries can be compensated by state aid for additional costs stemming 
from carbon-induced increases in power prices.  
Carbon crediting mechanisms are a second tool to address 
competitiveness. The extent to which crediting mechanisms are able to 
positively affect the competitiveness of industry in Europe by reducing 
compliance costs remains complex and depends on numerous conditions.  
A third possibility is to include importers in the ETS or to impose an 
import tax on the content (i.e. including the embedded carbon) of CO2 of all 
goods imported into the EU from countries that do not have their own cap-
                                                     
42 This term has never been defined, although roughly speaking ‘competitiveness’ 
in the context of EU climate change policy and the ETS has assumed a micro (i.e. 
firm or sector-specific) perspective, meaning the ability to sell, keep or increase 
market share, profits or stock market value or all of these at once.  
43 In the case of Germany, all costs related to the ‘energy transition’ of the power 
sector are borne by household customers. In 2012, these costs amounted to almost a 
quarter of the retail electricity price.  
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and-trade system or equivalent pricing measures (see the further discussion 
below, in section 5.2). 
A fourth possibility to deal with competiveness is to reinforce 
innovation and innovation policy to facilitate the transition of an industrial 
sector towards a low-carbon future. Such a transition will require a focus 
on the new value chains that a low-carbon sector could unlock. The paper 
and pulp industry’s 2050 Roadmap to a low carbon bio-economy (CEPI, 2012) 
takes such an approach. According to the document, the “sector has the 
ambition to be at the heart of the 2050 bio-economy, an essential platform 
for a range of bio-based products and the recycling society”. Transitions 
towards unlocking new value chains have happened and continue to 
happen in other sectors, such as steel and chemicals (see also CCAP, 2013). 
Building a global carbon market  
The above analysis makes it clear that the principal direction for the EU’s 
domestic and international climate change policy will be to establish a 
global carbon market as soon as possible. Cap-and-trade programmes to 
reduce GHG emissions, or at least as a substantial element of a climate 
change policy, are proliferating in many regions of the world. The Kyoto 
mechanisms of CDM and JI have created a constituency that is likely to 
promote the use of emissions trading.  
For the EU, emissions trading has the following attractions: 
• over time it will create a global carbon price or at least a bandwidth 
of prices; 
• such a price has the credible potential to address EU competitiveness 
concerns;  
• carbon crediting mechanisms as an integral part of emissions trading 
operate in several ways; in the transition towards a global carbon 
price, they can address competitiveness concerns in the short term, 
they help capacity building and they link different markets; 
• a global net of emission trading systems – as long as they are linked – 
will go a long way towards meeting the EU’s aspirations for a global 
framework; 
• if properly regulated, emission markets are efficient tools to achieve 
climate change objectives; and finally, 
• they can be a major source of financial transfers to support least 
developed countries in their decarbonisation efforts.  
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For the EU, it can be seen as a success that the international climate 
change negotiations in Durban in December 2011 opened the way towards 
the creation of new market mechanisms (Marcu, 2012).  
In parallel, this has triggered a review of the existing or planned 
mechanisms that have been under discussion for some time, for example a 
bilateral offset credit mechanism, sectoral crediting mechanisms, REDD-
plus markets and NAMA (nationally appropriate mitigation action) 
crediting.  
Raising the ambition level 
It has become increasingly clear that raising the ambition level within the 
UNFCCC framework beyond the pledges in Copenhagen is extremely 
difficult. Therefore, there are attempts at doing so ‘outside’ or ‘around’ the 
UNFCCC. Several examples can be mentioned. 
Aviation and maritime 
Following the lack of progress in international fora such as the UN, or 
within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) on 
international aviation, the EU decided that at the start of 2012 emissions 
from all domestic and international flights arriving at or departing from an 
EU airport would be covered by the EU Emissions Trading System. The EU 
decided that the aviation sector would have to surrender allowances, which 
they receive for free or would be required to purchase. 
The EU’s right to cover international flights was contested by many 
other countries, either by political pressure or legal complaints. The most 
vocal opposition came from China and the US. As a result, in November 
2012 the EU suspended the inclusion of international aviation following the 
ICAO Council meeting of 9 November, in which, according the EU, 
significant progress was made towards the goal of global regulation of 
aviation emissions.  
In parallel, a similar approach is being pursued for maritime. The EU 
has confirmed its commitment to include these emissions in the existing EU 
reduction commitment should the UNFCCC processes fail to tackle them 
and has announced a proposal in this case. After the experience with 
aviation, however, it is more likely now that a solution is sought through 
the International Maritime Organisation.  
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Carbon border measures  
Conceptually speaking, the inclusion of aviation in the ETS is comparable 
to a ‘carbon border tax’ to pursue a global ‘level’ pricing of carbon, i.e. to 
include importers in the ETS or to impose an import tax on the content (i.e. 
including the embedded carbon) of CO2 of all goods imported into the EU 
from countries that do not have their own cap-and-trade system or 
equivalent pricing measures. If levied by major economies, such as the US 
and the EU, this would most likely create a global ‘shadow’ carbon price 
even in the rest of the world. This would at least partially, through trade 
flows, establish carbon transfer pricing even in those parts of the world 
where governments have so far refrained from imposing domestic 
measures of any magnitude.44 Nevertheless, carbon border measures would 
have potential implications for world trade, international relations in 
general and climate negotiations, as witnessed in the controversy on 
including international aviation in the ETS.  
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition  
While within the UNFCCC policy discussions on emission reductions 
concentrate on long-lived greenhouse gases, and in particular on CO2, the 
role of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) in reducing global warming 
levels and impacts in the shorter term has received less attention. Recent 
studies by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2011 and 
UNEP & WMO, 2011) estimate that a portfolio of low-cost abatement 
measures of black carbon, tropospheric ozone and methane can reduce 
temperature increases by 0.4–0.5C between 2010 and 2050. While the 
abatement of SLCPs can in no circumstances replace CO2 measures, 
addressing them in parallel has considerable benefits in the near term. 
Launched in February 2012, the UNEP-based Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition (CCAC)45 was created to develop a number of initiatives 
addressing i) black carbon emissions from heavy-duty diesel vehicles and 
                                                     
44 In other words, it creates a mechanism that enforces the pass-through of carbon 
costs across the globe, therefore making domestic consumers pay the full cost of 
carbon. In principle, solutions to such issues as WTO compatibility, estimating the 
embedded carbon or equity concerns can be found, e.g. Gros & Egenhofer (2012). 
45 The state members are Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US and the European Commission. Other members 
include international organisations and NGOS. 
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engines, ii) black carbon and other pollutants from brick production, iii) 
SLCPs from municipal solid waste, iv) HFC alternative technology and 
standards, v) methane and black carbon emissions from oil and natural gas 
production, and other measures.  
Green growth  
More recently also within the EU, the concept of ‘green growth’ has gained 
popularity. This is partly owing to the failures of international climate 
negotiations, and partly to the economic stagnation following the 2008 
financial crisis. The notion of green growth increasingly seems to suggest a 
way out of both the ‘economic’ and ‘climate’ crises. The shift to a low-
carbon economy would unleash a wave of investment, innovation and 
more jobs. Developed countries would re-establish economic 
competitiveness partly due to high-tech green technologies, while 
developing countries and emerging economies would move on to more 
sustainable paths of economic development (Zysman and Huberty, 2012).  
Reducing emissions from deforestation  
Reducing emissions from deforestation or forest degradation (REDD-plus) 
as part of the international negotiations is a controversial issue. Within the 
EU, there is a consensus on the importance of attributing a value to 
environmental services, such as those avoiding deforestation. The 
importance of avoided deforestation was discussed in detail during the 
review of the ETS and is recognised in Article 10(3) of the ETS Directive.  
To date, the sovereign participation of EU member states in the 
international REDD-plus market generally appears to be the most likely 
avenue for the EU and its member states. This approach is also seen as 
preferable to linking to the ETS and international carbon markets. Full 
linking to international carbon markets would first require more clarity in 
the design of REDD-plus markets, notably addressing questions of 
permanence, monitoring, reporting and verification and more generally 
compliance, as well as a solution to the tricky question of how to absorb the 
expected volumes of credits (e.g. O’Sullivan et al., 2010).  
To date, the link to the EU ETS is the auctioning of EUAs, which will 
supply EU governments with funds for sovereign participation. Yet, 
current and expected EUA price levels are insufficient for EU financing 
commitments.  
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Technology 
While there may be different views on whether the stabilisation of GHG 
emissions in line with the UNFCCC’s objectives can be achieved with 
technically proven technology, the need to bring carbon-efficient 
technologies to the market at scale more quickly is uncontroversial. Also 
undisputed is the need to develop, demonstrate and deploy as yet 
unproven technologies, in order to reach climate change targets beyond 
2050. This is evidenced by the EU’s SET-Plan, which has put a special 
emphasis on a long-term agenda of energy research, demonstration and 
innovation for Europe in order to make low-carbon technologies affordable 
and competitive and thereby enable market uptake to meet the EU 2020 
targets, as well as to realise its 2050 vision of a low-carbon economy. 
The IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 2012, however, finds that 
progress in almost all technologies (i.e. nuclear, clean coal, CCS in power, 
CCS in industry, buildings and biofuels in industry) is not where it needs 
to be to meet global ambitions for GHG emission reductions. The notable 
exceptions are renewables and to a degree industry, vehicle fleet economy 
and electrical vehicles, where there is progress but additional effort would 
be required to meet targets.  
Areas for cooperation  
Both the failure of the Copenhagen climate change negotiations and the 
economic crisis caught the EU off guard. Since the demise of the Kyoto-
style top-down world of legally binding emission ‘targets’ for developed 
countries and ‘actions’ for developing countries, and the subsequent 
substitution by a bottom-up approach based on voluntary pledges (with or 
without review), the EU has struggled to find a new climate change 
consensus. Although support for climate change policy is still very high 
among politicians and citizens alike, discussions on the distribution of costs 
and benefits among sectors, regions and member states have become more 
acrimonious.  
The EU has also realised that ‘leadership’ requires followers. In 
Copenhagen, there was little if any interest in the EU’s offer to increase its 
ambition level to 30% GHG emission reductions in 2020 compared with 
1990. The EU’s negotiation partners were rather preoccupied with 
replacing the top-down architecture of the Kyoto Protocol with a bottom-
up model of voluntary pledges. 
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While there might be a comprehensive and legally binding, global 
climate change agreement that the EU had so hoped for, it will significantly 
fall short of the EU’s declared ambitions. Hence, the matter of a level 
playing field for EU industry, especially in times of economic crisis and 
uncertainty, will become more important and may hold back a new EU 
consensus. 
The best way to address this from the EU perspective is through the 
(gradual) establishment of a global carbon market. In addition to being able 
to address competitiveness in both the short and long term, a global carbon 
market would go a long way towards setting up a framework for global 
climate change policy as well as offering the possibility to address climate 
finance. This could also give a boost to low-carbon technology deployment 
and possibly to technology development.  
While all this does not offer any hope of keeping the global average 
increase in mean temperature to below 4°C or 3°C at best, the EU along 
with other countries is trying to increase the level of ambition, mainly by 
working outside but not against the UN framework. Aviation, shipping 
and short-lived climate pollutants are examples in this regard. Other 
potential areas might be REDD-plus or certain ‘green growth’ themes, 
including finance.  
This opens the door to a different approach. Owing to positive 
domestic changes in Brazilian climate policy, as well as Brazil’s willingness 
to collaborate, the EU may seize the opportunity to counterbalance the 
present lack of influence originating from its own domestic climate policy 
by engaging in effective bilateral assistance to Brazil. In doing so, the EU 
may also be able to engage further with other BRIC countries, by 
demonstrating the benefits of collaboration. The EU could regain some 
influence and bring some additional momentum to its industrial policy in 
the area of low carbon technologies. 
There is actually strong interest in technology cooperation on the part 
of Brazil. First, this would point to joint research cooperation with the EU 
and its member states, and capacity building would be a key building block 
in this respect (e.g. transferring managerial and organisational capabilities). 
Fields for ‘technology transfer’ that regularly appear on the list of areas for 
cooperation (such as CCS, smart grids, solar and wind energy, and energy 
efficiency), on the other hand, will require further work to identify the 
public policy issues. Technology transfer typically is integral to trade and 
notably investment, where industry deploys and therefore transfers 
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technologies. Public policy issues outside R&D cooperation remain limited 
in scope.  
Possible initial actions might be for the EU to offer better market 
access to bio-ethanol or reduce trade barriers for second-generation 
ethanol. Still, it must be said that the high number of cars with diesel 
engines in the EU somewhat reduces the market potential for bio-ethanol. 
Of course, a move to increase its domestic ambition level from a 
situation in which it is very close to having achieved its unilateral targets of 
-20% because of the economic crisis and other events unrelated to climate 
change policy would support the EU’s position towards its partners. How 
this will play out is impossible to say at this stage. 
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Table A1. National overall targets for the share of energy from renewable sources 
in gross final consumption of energy in 2020 and member state GHG 
emission limits in non-ETS sectors for the period 2013–20 (%)  
Member state Share of energy 
from renewable 
sources in gross 
final consumption 
of energy, 2005 
Target for share of 
energy from 
renewable sources 
in gross final 
consumption of 
energy, 2020 
Member state GHG 
emission limits in 
2020 compared with 
2005, GHG 
emission levels 
(from sources not 
covered by the ETS) 
Austria 23.3 34 -16 
Belgium 2.2 13 -15 
Bulgaria 9.4 16 20 
Czech Republic 6.1 13 9 
Cyprus 2.9 13 -5 
Denmark 17 30 -20 
Estonia 18.0 25 11 
Finland 28.5 38 -16 
France 10.3 23 -14 
Germany 5.8 18 -14 
Greece 6.9 18 -4 
Hungary 4.3 13 10 
Ireland 3.1 16 -20 
Italy 5.2 17 -13 
Latvia 32.6 40 17 
Lithuania 15.0 23 15 
Luxembourg 0.9 11 -20 
Malta 0 10 5 
The Netherlands 2.4 14 -16 
Poland 7.2 15 14 
Portugal 20.5 31 1 
Romania 17.8 24 19 
Slovak Republic 6.7 14 13 
Slovenia 16.0 25 4 
Spain 8.7 20 -10 
Sweden 39.8 49 -17 
UK 1.3 15 -16 
Source: European Commission website. 
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Abstract 
This chapter analyses the current picture and prospects for EU–Brazil 
relations in the political and security arenas. As actors experiencing 
relevant changes, albeit in different directions in their respective 
international status quo, the EU and Brazil have found some common 
ground for convergence at the macro level on some structural issues, such 
as the normative framework of a changing global order, the striving for a 
multipolar world and the relevance and desirability of multilateralism. At 
the same time, it is argued that they differ significantly as to the strategies 
pursued in the attainment of those shared interests, resulting in competing, 
or eventually divergent, policy preferences when addressing specific issues 
and developments at the international level, limiting the prospects for a 
deep mutual commitment and engagement in political and security 
dynamics at the global level.  
Brazil, the EU and the changing global order  
The EU and Brazil are key international players whose respective 
international status quo has been changing in the course of past decades, 
though in opposite directions. Europe – and Western Europe in particular – 
was for some centuries a core region and a leading actor in world politics, 
but since the rise of the US as a global hegemon, it has been continually 
challenged by economic, geostrategic and demographic developments, 
particularly after the cold war. The advent of the EU raised expectations 
regarding Europe’s reassertion as a forefront global actor. With the end of 
the cold war, however, the US emerged as the sole and undisputed 
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superpower and the only country able to project its interests and its power 
globally. At the same time, the major axis of the global economy shifted 
from the northern Atlantic to the Pacific with the rise of the Japanese and 
Southeast Asian economies in the late 1980s, followed by China and India 
in the last two decades. Finally, new emergent powers and economies have 
also been trying to find their place up on the international stage. 
Even so, the EU still occupies a very prominent position in global 
politics and in the world economy: it is the most important and closest ally 
of the US, a very influential actor in major multilateral institutions, and it 
accounts for 20% of global GDP and 37% of the world’s total exports.46 Yet 
its relative power and international influence have been largely perceived 
as stagnant or even declining amid the rise of new political and economic 
actors. These political and economic shifts encompass a process of power 
redistribution in which, according to Zaborowski (2006), the EU is 
becoming “a smaller part of a larger world”. What matters for the sake of 
the present analysis in this regard is that the EU’s changing international 
role and relative position bring about an impending need for it to face the 
simultaneous challenge of reasserting its own profile – currently in highly 
adverse circumstances – while reassessing the scope and the reach of its 
relations with the US and with other major, emerging global actors, Brazil 
among them. 
Brazil, on the other hand, has experienced a process of international 
emergence that was especially noticeable in the past decade and 
underscored in its successful initiatives in i) addressing domestic 
challenges in social and economic development, ii) projecting its influence 
in its neighbourhood and iii) fostering some changes in major mechanisms 
of global governance. Unlike the EU, Brazil’s share of world GDP is very 
small and its total exports comprise only 1.1% of world exports, but it has 
become the seventh largest world economy and a privileged destination for 
flows of foreign direct investment. It holds the largest and most diversified 
industrial base in Latin America and one of the world’s greatest 
endowments of biodiversity, natural and energy resources. In addition, it 
has played an increasingly active role in helping to shape the multilateral 
debate and decisions on important global issues.  
                                                     
46 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, IMF, 
Washington, D.C., October 2012; see also World Trade Organization (WTO), 
“Trade growth to slow in 2012 after strong deceleration in 2011”, Press/658, WTO, 
Geneva, 12 April 2012.  
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Both actors, therefore, and from different perspectives and 
trajectories, have faced the common challenge of (re)framing their 
international strategies in the midst of new realities while dealing with the 
political demands and opportunity costs that their changing relative 
positions in the international system imply. This lays the ground for 
political convergence on some structural issues, such as the normative 
framework of a changing global order, the desired pattern of power 
distribution, the relevance of multilateralism, the reform of leading 
international institutions of global governance and the priority issues on 
the global agenda.  
At the same time, they have differed significantly in their responses 
to immediate international developments and in how to advance in the 
short to mid-term in the attainment of shared interests and goals. These 
differences, it is argued here, reflect structural and immediate 
conditionalities that their different international trajectory imposes upon 
each of them, resulting in competing, or ultimately divergent, preferences 
when addressing specific policy issues and developments at the 
international level.  
Brazil approaches the contemporary global order from a pragmatic 
and realist-based view that emphasises its asymmetric character, its 
inherently unstable nature and the uncertainties associated with a growing 
number of sources of insecurity. The latter range from power 
concentration, a revival of geopolitical and strategic competition over 
territories and natural resources to the global diffusion of transnational 
organised crime and the challenges to energy, food, the environment, 
health and cyber security. Such a perspective leads Brazil’s foreign and 
security policies to embrace a reformist bias concerning its own relative 
position in the international order and the major mechanisms of political, 
economic and security governance at the global level. It expresses a clear 
preference for multipolarity as a desired power structure and for 
multilateralism as its corollary, a preference that is underscored in four 
basic assumptions:  
i) multipolarity and multilateralism best express the complex and 
diffuse pattern of power realities across various issue areas in a 
highly interdependent world;  
ii) they provide a more favourable context to negotiate and 
accommodate tensions derived from power disputes, differing and 
often competing perspectives, and policy responses to the major 
global challenges in the political, economic and strategic realms;  
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iii) they are more likely and suited to promoting and preserving stability 
at the global and regional levels; and  
iv) they provide a more favourable political context for countries willing 
to enhance their own international profile.  
It is from this essentially normative background that Brazil’s 
approaches to the changing global order and to its own international 
participation and aspirations as a rising global actor must be assessed.  
Threat perceptions and broad security posture in an uncertain 
context 
Brazilian views on international security acknowledge the unstable 
character of the post-cold war order and the diversified and complex array 
of potential threats, from those associated with international organised 
crime, terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction to ethnic and 
religious conflicts, climate change, global pandemics and cyber crime, 
among others. It is clear that Brazilian security concerns are quite 
encompassing and convergent on threat perceptions in the EU and the US, 
even though Brazil differs from both as to the assessment of the priority to 
be assigned to specific issues. As to defence, Brazil’s primary concerns are 
concentrated on more conventional issues of territoriality (continental and 
maritime) and the protection of resources. Even though it has no enemies 
and is not confronted by formal claims by its neighbours or any third 
country over its territory, it identifies in the international context an 
increasing potential for conflicts over territory and resources.47 While it also 
acknowledges that a generalised conflict among states is not expected in 
the near future, Brazil’s defence policy states that the dispute over maritime 
spaces, aerospace dominance and scarce sources of water, food and energy 
might lead to interference in domestic affairs, to disputes and eventually 
conflicts in areas not subject to the sovereign rule of any state.48 It also 
expresses a concern about borders as objects of international disputes, as 
the last continental spaces available are being occupied.49 The emphasis on 
these aspects displays a relevant difference in relation to the approaches of 
the US and the EU, whose chief concerns regarding food and energy 
security in particular are related to the proper and safe provision of and 
                                                     
47 Ministry of Defense, National Defense Policy, Section 3.1, 2012. 
48 Idem. 
49 Idem (www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/pnd.pdf). 
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access to (re)sources they must necessarily seek abroad. Being a major food 
exporter and holding vast reserves of energy sources (gas and oil in 
particular), fresh water and biodiversity, Brazil is sensitive to possible 
disputes over these resources, even if its own assets are not immediately at 
stake. This helps explain the orientation of its strategic defence policy to 
prepare Brazilian armed forces to be able to successfully dissuade and 
ultimately react by coercive means to any eventual attempt perpetrated by 
a foreign actor with the aim at acquiring or controlling any part of Brazilian 
territory, its resources or its population. Therefore, Brazilian armed forces 
are not structured or positioned according to any specific enemy; on the 
contrary, they are expected to be able to be present, in due time and with 
sufficient power resources, in any part of its territory to dissuade and to 
respond to any sort of aggression to its integrity.  
The primary concern with its territory and the protection of resources 
is a core element in understanding Brazilian sensitivity and its cautious 
approach to another key contemporary and contentious security issue: 
international intervention. Throughout the post-cold war period, Brazil’s 
foreign policy and defence establishments have been coming up against the 
need to reconcile their traditional nationalist and sovereign-biased 
approaches to international affairs and to development, on the one hand, 
with the impending need to address global issues from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, on the other. For quite a long time, the Brazilian military, 
especially those from the Army, have been voicing their worries about the 
prospect of international intervention in the Amazon – dismissed as unreal 
by many segments of Brazilian society and others abroad. Meanwhile, 
Brazilian diplomacy has faced the task of aligning Brazil with the evolving 
multilateral debate on human security, the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
and humanitarian intervention. Brazil ultimately endorsed the principle of 
R2P based on the clearly stated objectives of protecting populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. But it 
continued to voice its preference for preventive measures and mediation as 
well as its concerns about insufficient awareness and assessment within the 
United Nations and the international community of the dangers associated 
with the use of force during and after military interventions. The 
underlying element of such a position is the fear that R2P might be 
instrumental in legitimising military interventions carried out for the 
pursuit of vested political, economic or strategic interests other than those 
strictly related to humanitarian concerns. President Dilma Rousseff, in her 
speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 2011, 
addressed these concerns and launched the concept of “Responsibility 
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while Protecting”, which would be further developed in a concept paper 
that Brazil asked the UN Secretary-General to circulate among member 
states with the aim of fostering a wide debate on the implementation of 
international interventions under the aegis of the UN. Basically, this new 
conceptual framework intends to prevent missions mandated by the 
Security Council to protect civilians from causing more harm than the harm 
they are supposed to prevent. It also intends to lay the grounds for a 
responsible and accountable resort to military force under the aegis of R2P 
based on some fundamental principles and procedures, like the 
prominence of preventive policies over military action, the exhaustion of all 
peaceful means available to protect civilians under the threat of violence, 
the judicious, proportionate and limited use of force in strict accordance 
with the mandates granted by the Security Council and enhanced 
procedures to monitor and assess the interpretation and the 
implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions.50  
The Brazilian proposal was articulated in consultation with the other 
BRICS51 and was, to a large extent, a response to the implementation by 
NATO of UNSC Resolution 1973 of March 2011 authorising the use of force 
in Libya. There were different reactions to the proposal by the members of 
the UN and within the Security Council in particular. Among those who 
share apprehensions about the fragilities of the Security Council in 
overseeing military operations mandated under the aegis of R2P, the 
proposal was a welcome and opportune development; some European and 
US officials, on the other hand, took a more cautious position, as they 
regarded it as an attempt to impose constraints on the Security Council in 
the use of military force.52 These alternative assessments somewhat 
illustrate the different approaches of Brazil and EU members in the Security 
Council regarding humanitarian intervention and the roles of the Security 
Council. Brazil, along with the other BRICS, has emphasised the need to 
strengthen preventive diplomacy and the Security Council itself as a crisis 
management mechanism by subjecting the implementation of resolutions 
authorising the use of force to stronger and more effective controls – a 
                                                     
50 Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, “Responsibility to Protect”, Statement at the United 
Nations, 21 February 2012. 
51 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
52 Richard Gowan, The Security Council Credibility Problem, Perspective/FES New 
York, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New York, NY, December 2011, p. 5. 
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proposition that provokes resistance by Western powers, including many 
EU members, as mentioned above.  
Nevertheless, the EU’s rejection of the use of force in handling the 
crisis in Syria in the aftermath of the operation in Libya has allowed 
convergence with Brazil in that regard. But differences re-emerged when 
the EU, along with the US, decided to resort to economic sanctions to force 
the Syrian government to start conversations with the opposition to find 
the terms for a political transition without rejecting an eventual resort to 
force. Brazil and its IBSA53 partners, in turn, have favoured mediation and 
not sanctions as a primary step and seem unwilling to support the use of 
force. As important as these differences might be, the EU and Brazil are 
poised, at least circumstantially, to exploit their still narrow path of 
convergence on humanitarian intervention, and the debate on 
“Responsibility while Protecting” provides a starting point. 
Still, it is important to highlight that such a possibility might be 
severely constrained, from a Brazilian perspective, by the outcome of the 
ongoing debate among European countries on NATO’s overstretch. Even 
though Brazil and the EU share basic premises and the diagnosis as to the 
uncertainty and instability of the global order and the importance of 
multipolarity and multilateralism in addressing them, NATO’s actions on 
behalf of the Security Council beyond the borders of its member countries 
does hold great potential to trigger political divergences with Brazil and its 
BRICS partners. The Treaty of Lisbon reaffirms the central relevance of 
NATO for transatlantic relations and for Europe’s security and the need to 
reform it, but the fate of the alliance is still an open question, which is 
subject to the assessment of critical threats in the long term, its functionality 
in addressing them, and ultimately, the prospects for US–Russia relations 
in particular. The influence of emerging powers in this regard is very 
limited. Yet, as they are likely to become increasingly important partners of 
the EU in countering impending transnational threats, there will be a 
possibility of the EU considering some restraints on an interventionist 
NATO for the sake of forging a broader and more favourable political 
context for security cooperation, for reform of the global security 
framework and for greater global stability.54 Moreover, there are issues on 
                                                     
53 IBSA refers to India, Brazil and South Africa. 
54 Klaus Neumann, “Security Perspectives for Europe”, in “VII Conference of Forte 
Copacabana, A European–South American Dialogue”, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 
Rio de Janeiro, 2011, p. 17. 
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which the relative political weight of the emerging powers is not to be 
neglected: the reform of global governance mechanisms, the changing 
circumstances of the US as a global hegemon, the rise of China and other 
issues of mutual concern, such as the environment, energy, health, food 
and cyber security. It is of utmost relevance that the EU finds the political 
grounds to work together with the emerging powers, and with Brazil in 
particular, on these issues if an effective, multilateral global order is to be 
envisaged. In this sense, a crucial question is the extent to which both the 
EU and Brazil are really willing to make mutual concessions with respect to 
highly valued but not necessarily shared political perspectives on global 
politics and security for the sake of fostering a truly multipolar but 
concerted world order. 
The approach to mini-lateral settings (G-20, IBSA and BRICS) and 
global governance 
As seen in the previous sections, the perception of ongoing changes as to 
international power distribution and the pursuit of a more pragmatic and 
universalistic approach to its partnerships has led Brazil to distance itself 
from the formal, traditional approach to foreign policy anchored on the 
northern Atlantic axis (US and Western Europe) and to diversify its 
political and economic ties to other countries and regions. Thus, South 
America and Africa, along with China, India and Russia to a lesser extent, 
have become the key targets for political dialogue, trade partnerships and 
the promotion of South–South cooperation.  
Aside from growing bilateral relations with those countries and 
regions, Brazil has actively promoted and resorted to mini-lateral coalitions 
as a core dimension of its international strategy. Historically, Brazilian 
interest in international coalitions had been directly linked to the 
importance assigned to the strengthening of multilateral institutions as a 
means to reduce power asymmetries and to channel the demands and 
concerns of the developing world in both political and economic instances, 
such as the G-77 in the UN General Assembly, or even the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.  
At present, however, a whole new generation of international 
coalitions – the WTO G-20, the BRICS and IBSA – has gradually emerged, 
introducing new important referents in the multilateral debate on 
governance issues as well as the international strategies of individual 
countries in both the developed and the developing world. As novel 
elements in the context of contemporary world politics, they have served as 
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privileged frameworks for articulating the interests of a small, but 
heterogeneous group of rising powers and are themselves expressions of a 
rapidly changing world order.  
IBSA, BRICS and the G-20 have also become important fora through 
which to advance Brazilian interests at the global level and have helped 
enhance its profile as a global actor in unprecedented ways, as they have 
allowed Brazil to foster initiatives in such issue areas as multilateral trade 
negotiations, incremental South–South relations, development assistance, 
global economic governance and the reform of international regimes and 
political institutions.55 Moreover, as controversial and sensitive as it might 
be, they have provided Brazil more room for manoeuvre at the global level 
independently of its neighbours without necessarily hampering its own 
regional interests and initiatives. Finally, they have proved to be useful for 
Brazil to voice its interests and concerns in improving its own international 
standing, along with the other emerging powers, and in fostering 
multipolarity. 
It is therefore important to highlight how these international 
coalitions also respond to various issues and possibilities connected with 
Brazil’s international interests. The WTO G-20 has been important for 
effectively bringing the development agenda to the core of multilateral 
trade negotiations. It has also been successful in shifting the balance of 
power in trade negotiations on a very sensitive issue, but its importance 
has quickly waned, like the Doha round itself.  
IBSA, in turn, has become a forum for focusing on South–South 
political dialogue regarding global issues, namely the reform of the UN, the 
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and development assistance, 
along with security, fighting poverty and social policies among others. 
Largely perceived with some degree of scepticism as to its long-term 
viability, IBSA has managed not only to subsist but also to exploit niches of 
opportunities to consolidate itself as a channel for South–South 
cooperation. Despite its diffuse agenda and the lack of effective content in 
many of the areas it has embraced, IBSA has proved to be an initiative that 
can provide political leverage at relatively low cost at the multilateral level 
(including in the Security Council, as seen in the previous section). Its 
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relevance and effectiveness cannot be assessed in relation to either the 
existence of a formal trilateral agenda that grants it a programmatic sense 
or through the ability of the three countries in pursuing and carrying out 
common strategies in response to the most pending issues of the global 
agenda. Rather, the relevance of IBSA and its international credibility 
derives from the ability of the three countries to capitalise on opportunities 
for working together (including piecemeal ones) and translate these into 
outcomes. In this regard, one cannot easily escape the idea that IBSA – and 
the BRICS– is still valued differently to a great extent by each of its three 
members. Yet notably, India, Brazil and South Africa seem willing to 
sustain IBSA, even after South Africa joined the BRICS. IBSA shall remain a 
useful initiative for Brazil’s quest for a more assertive international profile 
and enhanced standing on the global stage. It is functional for Brazil in 
conveying a sense of compromise with the ideals, concerns and objectives 
of the so-called ‘Global South’ in the realm of international cooperation, 
and IBSA represents an alternative path, especially when working together 
or converging with China and Russia within the BRICS is not feasible.  
The BRICS, in turn, has emerged for Brazil as a forum from which it 
might eventually accede to the status of a recognised international actor in 
the framework of a select grouping that might respond to global 
governance challenges in various issue areas, from the Security Council to 
the G-20. While IBSA and the WTO G-20 touch upon issues related to 
economic development and South–South cooperation, the BRICS offers the 
possibility of bringing the country closer to hard-core issues of 
international politics either multilaterally, where it may find its proper 
context, or eventually through other mechanisms and more flexible 
arrangements.  
This possibility is not automatic, however, as it depends to a great 
extent on the willingness of China, Russia and India to work together on 
such issues as international security, climate change and international 
finance, among others. Still, despite the scepticism of many politicians and 
experts as to the ability of the BRICS to do so, it has made advances in some 
important realms. It acted decisively in favour of the consolidation of the 
G-20 as the main forum for the political debate on economic and financial 
issues, thus replacing the G-8 and its expanded version (G-13), and in 
restructuring the decision-making criteria of the International Monetary 
Fund. It supported Brazil in framing its concept of “Responsibility while 
Protecting” and its partners worked together in the Security Council during 
the Libya crisis. More recently, it decided to move towards the creation of 
its own development bank. The BRICS is certainly, nowadays, much more 
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than an acronym or an incidental source of influence in some multilateral 
fora. It is gradually becoming an important referent in world politics. At 
this point, it is not yet clear that it will play a relevant role in negotiations 
on politically divisive issues like international security, reform of the UN 
Security Council and climate change, on which there are competing 
interests and discrepant positions among its members. Even so, the 
achievements in forging new structures for economic and financial global 
governance are of utmost importance for Brazil given their immediate 
political implications and the greater influence they allow Brazil to have in 
shaping international norms, institutions and decision-making.  
As to the G-20, as mentioned above, it has been the most influential 
initiative that Brazil has helped to forge and spur, as it has emerged as the 
single most relevant sign of change in the pattern of the highly 
concentrated decision-making power on economic issues that has prevailed 
since the Breton Woods institutions were set forth. So far, the G-20 is the 
only instance of governance that has succeeded in challenging the 
prominence of the G-8 and in asserting the greater political importance of 
emerging powers in the current landscape of the international political 
economy. As the epicentre of the ongoing economic crisis is now located in 
Europe, the G-20 has temporarily been pushed aside by the European 
institutions and governments in its management. Nevertheless, most of the 
issues that triggered the economic crisis in 2008 – exposing severe and 
concrete weaknesses and failures of economic governance mechanisms – 
have not been adequately addressed if judged from the necessity of forging 
new instruments and parameters to correct and prevent private economic 
institutions and governments from engaging in the behaviours and policies 
that jeopardise the world economy at large. Therefore, we should expect 
the G-20 to re-emerge as a major referent in the debate and promotion of 
global economic governance.  
The principal liability regarding the functionality of these groupings 
is that they all rely heavily on the incentives and the political willingness of 
individual countries to privilege them in their respective economic and 
foreign policy strategies. Even though the signs have been positive in this 
regard so far, it is important to bear in mind that neither IBSA nor the 
BRICS or the G-20 are bound for a natural process of consolidation. On the 
contrary, all of them are still subject to political setbacks whenever the 
incentives for one of its actors to play alone are stronger than the benefits 
and the costs of collective action. Apart from IBSA, where Brazil may be 
able to persuade its two other partners to keep investing political capital in 
its development and consolidation, the other groupings – the BRICS in 
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particular – are largely dependent on the uncertain and unpredictable 
political reasoning of individual actors that, like Brazil itself, are driven by 
a strong sense and value of independence in their international behaviour. 
If, on the one hand, coalitions like IBSA and the BRICS derive their political 
appeal from the individual attributes of their members and from the 
potential transformations they may induce in the international system by 
working together, on the other, they are highly vulnerable to the 
uncertainties about each country’s commitment to collective action when 
competing national interests or differently valued outcomes come to be at 
stake among them.  
So far, there seems to be no strong incentives for Brazil to deviate 
from its reliance on these groupings, limited though they are, as to date it 
has benefited from the possibilities they have brought about for it to 
manage different agendas in various settings, taking advantage of the 
flexibility they provide.  
Concluding remarks: Prospects and scope for cooperation with the 
EU 
In a context marked by the diversification of options for Brazil to enhance 
its international participation and by the quest for greater independence in 
the realm of its foreign and security policies, more immediate efforts 
intended to reverse perceptions of the declining importance of Europe as a 
political and economic partner for Brazil are crucial for the sake of defining 
the prospects of bilateral relationships in the mid-term. There are actual 
incentives for Brazil to take advantage of the difficulties that the US and EU 
face with regard to their relative international positions to favour its own 
political ambitions as a global actor. Although there is no unavoidable 
conflict between these ambitions and the deepening of its relations with the 
EU in particular, a decisive political investment in strengthening bilateral 
relations is still required. The framework of the bilateral partnership is a 
favourable one, even though it still lacks genuine impulse.56 If it fails to 
open the way for concrete advancements in the contending areas and issues 
at the multilateral level, namely in the UN and in other major institutions 
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such as the G-20 and the WTO, it will certainly be subject to progressive 
deterioration and loss of political appeal. In the near future, there might be 
more similarities and possibly more convergence of Brazil and Europe on 
global issues and governance mechanisms, but such convergence will not 
be a spontaneous outcome of shared interests and priorities. On the 
contrary, Brazilian concerns with the protection of territory and resources, 
the EU’s with the necessity of reassuring its relevance to the US, its reliance 
on NATO in countering its most immediate threats to its own security, as 
well as the reconciliation of the sustainability of food, energy and 
environmental security are all sources of discrepancies between the EU and 
Brazil. The willingness to advance the political dialogue on these issues is a 
determinant of the scope and fate of the bilateral partnership.  
Even so, opportunities in some issue areas can also be envisaged, as 
Brazil’s regional actions in the security realm raise prospects for 
cooperation with the EU, particularly in relation to countering the traffic of 
illegal drugs and the prevention of terrorism. The intensification of 
triangular cooperation in development assistance also emerges as a 
promising area for further progress as, due to the economic crisis, the major 
donor countries are trying to maximise the ever more limited resources 
they may continue to provide in development assistance.  
On the other hand, regional integration in the scope of UNASUR and 
Mercosur may provide limited opportunities for EU engagement with 
Brazil. The reasons for this are that Brazil’s commitment to regional 
integration mechanisms is constrained by sovereignty considerations, by 
the actual political and economic conditions in the neighbourhood and by 
the stronger presence of extra-regional players, namely China. Moreover, 
Brazil has decoupled its regional and global strategies, as pointed out in a 
previous section. Finally, the economic crisis and the uncertainties of 
European integration and Mercosur make the inter-regional strategy 
unattractive in more immediate terms.  
Therefore, given the limitations of inter-regionalism to provide a 
broader framework for bilateral relations, the prospects for forging an 
enduring and encompassing partnership will rely increasingly on the 
possibility of working together on the global agenda. In this regard, a more 
open and flexible perspective will be required from the EU to exploit 
opportunities for addressing the contending issues – particularly those 
referring to climate change, food, energy and environmental security – on 
which a Brazilian nationalist bias is expected to endure, though 
increasingly tempered by evolving cosmopolitan tendencies.  
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THE EU AND BRAZIL: PARTNERING IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD? 
GIOVANNI GREVI 
Abstract 
The international system is changing fast and both the European Union and 
Brazil will need to adapt. This paper argues that such a process of 
adjustment may bring the two closer together, even if their starting points 
differ considerably. Europe looks at the ongoing redistribution of power as 
a challenge, Brazil as an opportunity. Europe is coping with the detrimental 
impact of the economic crisis on its international profile; Brazil is enhancing 
its influence in its region and beyond. Their normative outlook is broadly 
compatible; their political priorities and behaviour in multilateral 
frameworks often differ, from trade to development and security issues. 
Despite the crisis, however, there are signals of renewed engagement by 
the EU on the international stage, with a focus on its troubled 
neighbourhood and partnerships with the US and large emerging actors 
such as Brazil. The latter is charting an original course in international 
affairs as a rising democratic power from the traditional South with no 
geopolitical opponents and a commitment to multilateralism. In testing the 
limits of its international influence, Brazil will need dependable partners 
and variable coalitions that go well beyond the BRICS format, which is not 
necessarily sustainable. This contribution suggests that the strategic 
partnership between the EU and Brazil may grow stronger, not only as a 
platform to deepen economic ties and sustain growth, but also as a tool to 
foster cooperation in political and security affairs including crisis 
management, preventive diplomacy and human rights.  
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is a global actor in the making, against the 
background of a changing world. There is a fragile but unprecedented 
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experiment of political integration taking place while tectonic shifts are 
shaking the foundations of the lab itself. The question for the future of 
Europe is whether or not internal developments and external trends are 
broadly compatible. Is the EU seeking to transcend the principle of 
sovereignty and balance of power realpolitik, while others gaining ground 
on the global stage are reinforcing these paradigms? Consonance between 
the normative heritage and the broad strategic posture of the European 
Union and the key features of the emerging international system would 
suggest scope for Europe to retain and even enhance its position in 
international affairs. Dissonance, with the current redistribution of power 
and competition of ideas draining the EU’s resources and credibility, 
would point to the marginalisation of Europe in a polycentric world. 
No doubt, the EU and its member states have watched uncomfortably 
as new or restored powers gain shares of the economic and political 
marketplace, while the neighbourhood of the Union has been growing ever 
more unstable. Europe has been perceived as lagging behind 
developments. Arguably, however, the EU may prove better placed than 
others to address the mutual vulnerabilities associated with deep 
interdependence and to submit recipes for the management of shared 
problems.  
Although mired in a serious legitimacy and governance crisis, topped 
up by recession in most member states, the travails of the Union may point 
to political innovation – not decline. If so, the strategic outlook and 
priorities of the EU and Brazil, stemming from disparate historical 
experiences and exposing significant differences today, may prove 
convergent down the line. Brazil – the ‘country of the future’ – has in many 
ways become a power of the present. Old Europe – allegedly the ‘power of 
the past’ – may yet again prove to be of some inspiration for the future, if it 
gets its house in order.  
Europe’s evolving strategic outlook 
Whether the EU can be defined as a normative power – one that acts based 
on values and according to values – is a matter for debate. For one, the EU 
is not the only international actor that sets values and principles at the core 
of its foreign policy narrative.57 For another, the foreign policy practice of 
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the EU or other players on the international stage does not entirely match 
this concept. Values matter in politics but they need to come to terms with 
the balance of other factors and interests. The need for such a balance 
intensifies as the international system grows more diverse and unstable, 
calling for pragmatic solutions to accommodate competing interests. 
That said, beyond philosophical debates, values and norms do play a 
more or less direct role in framing action, and very much did so when 
European integration started with the European Coal and Steel Community 
of 1952 and the European Economic Community of 1957. Europe was built 
and defined by opposition to its past, namely to authoritarianism and war. 
It was an ambitious functionalist project (cooperation in one field would 
lead to joint efforts in others) deeply rooted in shared values (democracy, 
human rights and peace), and implemented under the American security 
umbrella (NATO) during the cold war. The North Atlantic security 
community provided fertile ground for European integration to prosper, 
paving the way for irreversible peace among member states. At the same 
time, since its beginnings, European integration was not conceived as an 
end in itself. As Jean Monnet put it, the “Community itself is only a stage 
on the way to the organised world of tomorrow.”58 This vocation is deeply 
ingrained in the ethos of the EU. But EU foreign policy was slow to 
develop, and the ‘world of tomorrow’ is proving less organised than 
Monnet would have wished for. 
The striking feature of the environment surrounding the first decades 
of European integration, up to the end of the Cold War and beyond, was 
the marginal weight of the so-called developing world (all but the West 
and the Soviet bloc), whether from an economic, political or security angle. 
What was taken for granted over those decades was in fact an 
extraordinary phase of Western predominance, which endured in different 
shapes from the early 19th century to the early 21st century. It was in this 
landscape that, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Treaty of 
Maastricht of 1992 established the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU. Seen from this standpoint, the Balkan wars of the 1990s 
proved to be a very hard, and largely failed, test for the nascent CFSP. But 
the operations carried out by NATO in Bosnia in the mid-1990s and in 
Kosovo in 1999 fitted the unipolar moment when a confident West would 
dispatch humanitarian military interventions to protect civilians from 
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authoritarian and abusive governments. The principle of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ would be codified by 2001 and transposed into the UN World 
Summit Declaration of 2005.59 Over the same years, following the much 
contested US-led intervention in Iraq, the EU would adopt its first (and, so 
far, last) overall security strategy in 2003.60  
The European Security Strategy (ESS) started off by stating: “Europe 
has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free.” The document codified 
the identity of the EU as the champion of “an effective multilateral system”. 
Its threat assessment largely focused on asymmetric threats to an 
established order (such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and state failure). The strategy called for what could be defined 
nowadays as a ‘forward’ approach to crisis management with an emphasis 
on prevention and a focus on the deep causes of conflict. Around the 
Union, Europe’s transformative power would promote “a ring of well-
governed countries”. In short, the EES directed the Union to become more 
active, capable and coherent in addressing non-traditional threats and 
stressed the comprehensive and multilateral character of Europe’s 
international engagement. However, it featured no reference to the geo-
strategic shifts that would soon challenge the economic and normative 
foundations of the international system itself. Brazil was not mentioned in 
the 2003 document whereas China and India only appeared, as potential 
strategic partners, at the very end of the paper. 
In pursuing its soft power strategy, the EU sought to promote 
regional cooperation and integration in other parts of the world, for 
example establishing partnerships with the Mercosur and the African 
Union. In its own neighbourhood, alongside the completion of the 
enlargement of the Union to Central and Eastern Europe, the EU adopted 
the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003. The latter mirrored the 
legalistic and transformative logic underpinning the enlargement process. 
It sought to improve political and economic governance via aid conditional 
on reforms, but there was no agreement among member states to offer 
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commitment to the final goal of EU accession as the essential motivating 
factor for neighbouring countries.  
2003 also saw the first crisis management operations deployed under 
the then-called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now 
Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP), including the EU police 
mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and the small military operation Artemis in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. As many as 27 operations have been 
launched since in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia), most of them 
civilian and eight of them military.61 None of these operations, mainly 
tasked with post-conflict stabilisation, institution-building and training 
local forces or police, may have achieved strategic objectives on their own, 
but some of them have made a difference on the ground, from Kosovo to 
Chad, whether in laying the basis for stability or offering humanitarian 
protection. In a few years CSDP operations became an important 
dimension of EU engagement abroad but have not triggered a clear drive 
for EU member states to deepen defence cooperation within the EU.  
The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS, an otherwise 
rather uninspiring document, deserves a mention here as evidence of the 
(slowly) evolving strategic outlook of the Union, and of creeping questions 
about the stability of the post-cold war order.62 The notion of a ‘changing 
world’ is central to the very title of the report, which starts by 
acknowledging that globalisation has brought with it opportunities, but 
also made threats more complex and interconnected, while “accelerating 
power shifts and…exposing differences in values.” The threat assessment 
was complemented by a new focus on climate and energy security in a 
world of scarce resources, as well as on cyber security. The notion of 
“partnerships for effective multilateralism” was introduced, referring to 
cooperation with both multilateral organisations and other important 
powers, including chiefly the US but also Brazil, Canada, China, India, 
Japan, Russia and South Africa. 
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This report was published a few months after the start of the global 
financial crisis and four weeks after the first meeting of the G20 in 
Washington, in November 2008. Few anticipated then that the crisis would 
become a defining experience for the European Union, putting its political 
resilience and credibility under very severe stress. The banking crisis 
became a sovereign debt one, and evolved into a crisis of legitimacy when 
austerity proved the only answer to gaps in public finances and 
competitiveness. The economic downturn had three principal effects on EU 
foreign policy. For one, it diverted resources from external initiatives, 
whether in terms of aid packages or crisis management and defence, given 
deep cuts in public spending. For another, it drained focus from foreign 
and security policy at large, as EU member states turned inwards, 
quarrelling over the ways out of the crisis and preoccupied with 
deteriorating socio-economic indicators. Above all, however, the crisis has 
hit hard the very profile and credibility of the Union as a rule-based 
experiment of political integration and a supporter of effective 
multilateralism.63 
This was not the most fertile ground for the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. The Treaty called for more policy 
coherence at a time when the political cohesion of the Union was being 
questioned. It established a supposedly more powerful post of EU foreign 
policy chief at a time when foreign policy took a back seat in EU priorities. 
However, it restated and expanded the normative bedrock of Europe’s 
foreign policy and external action, stating that 
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world.” (Article 21, TEU). 
The common foreign and security policy of the EU was born in the 
reassuring post-cold war unipolar world, but was to grow up in the much 
tougher strategic environment of the early 21st century, marked by 
asymmetric threats, power shifts and economic turmoil. It was not 
supposed to be that way. The EU was not prepared to cope with successive 
crises and, like other major actors, has been struggling to adapt to a more 
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competitive, diverse and polycentric international context. That said, the 
track record of the Union and of its member states is not all bleak and 
important adjustments are in the making, which hint at new levels of 
engagement and new scope for cooperation with other major actors such as 
Brazil.  
Europe as a security provider 
Europeans feel at the same time safe and vulnerable. As in the case of 
Brazil, the territorial integrity of EU member states is not endangered and 
no major inter-state wars seem in sight, with the possible exception of 
hostilities involving Iran. Most Europeans do not feel to be the target of 
deliberate threats from third countries. The threat assessment fleshed out in 
the 2003 ESS, as complemented by the 2008 report, remains largely 
relevant. And yet, Europeans feel more vulnerable than ten years ago to the 
risks affecting an increasingly fragile globalisation, and to the perceived 
loss of influence in their vicinity. Infrastructure is exposed to disruptions, 
including in the virtual space, energy supplies to political tensions and 
security crises, commercial shipping to piracy and welfare to unchained 
market forces. From a security standpoint, this growing sense of 
vulnerability is linked to two concurrent geopolitical shifts. Both of them 
are challenging the EU, but also creating the opportunity for the Union to 
enhance its role of security provider.  
First, it is by now clear that the EU neighbourhood is no longer 
centred around the Union but has become a more fragmented or 
polycentric space.64 In the fluid context determined by the Arab 
revolutions, local actors enjoy and exploit greater scope for manoeuvre. 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken bold diplomatic initiatives and 
extended effective networks of influence in North Africa and the Middle 
East. Other major powers play a growing role in the neighbourhood of the 
Union. Russia is seeking to reassert its old sphere of influence in the East 
and China is extending its economic reach well into the Gulf and the 
Mediterranean. In short, while it retains considerable influence in its 
vicinity, the EU is no longer the magnet to which most of the region is 
inevitably attracted.  
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Second, the US is rebalancing its strategic posture with a focus on the 
Asia-Pacific region. The much discussed pivot to Asia does not necessarily 
amount to disengagement from Europe and in particular from the critical 
Middle East theatre.65 International security crises there would still see 
decisive American involvement and the US is keeping a close eye on 
sources of instability in the region, including via drones and Special Forces. 
But, alongside their stated disillusionment with the prospects of European 
‘demilitarisation’, the US will be less willing to invest political capital and 
resources to address the many simmering tensions in the region 
surrounding the EU. As the crises in Libya, Syria and most recently Mali 
demonstrate, Europeans will have to take more responsibility to support 
stability around the Union, including with military means as a last resort.  
Deepening interdependence requires the EU to enhance its 
engagement in various frameworks of international cooperation. As a 
relatively open power in economic terms and one relying on energy 
provisions and other natural resources from abroad, the EU is critically 
dependent on the resilience of globalisation. However, geopolitical trends 
seem to point to a more regional focus for the EU as a security provider. 
After almost three years without new deployments, the EU has launched 
four CSDP operations since 2012. These include EUCAP Nestor, tasked 
with regional maritime capacity-building in the countries of the Horn of 
Africa and West Indian Ocean; EUAVSEC South Sudan, a tiny mission 
charged with improving security at the Juba airport; EUCAP Sahel Niger, 
charged with building the capacity of local security forces to fight terrorism 
and organised crime; and EUTM Mali, a 500-strong training mission 
directed to enhance the operational capacity of the Malian army. Notably, 
all of these missions are taking place in the extended southern 
neighbourhood of the Union.  
This is also the region where the Union is seeking to upgrade the 
implementation of the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ envisaged by 
the Treaty of Lisbon (and countless internal documents and debates) to 
prevent and manage crises. The EU has adopted a ‘Strategic Framework for 
the Horn of Africa’ and a ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the 
Sahel’, both in 2011. Given the shortage of money, there is a risk that the EU 
will start ‘throwing strategies at problems’ as opposed to developing clear 
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shared priorities and pursuing them by anticipating events and not 
reacting to them. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the 
Union as a security provider is not standing still and is beginning to build 
on its considerable experience, for example by supporting effective 
mediation between Sudan and South Sudan and helping regional 
organisations such as the African Union in dealing with the ongoing 
conflict in Somalia.66 
There is a question as to whether EU member states see the Union as 
the principal vector of their cooperation in security and defence matters or 
as one platform among others. The EU hardly featured on the radar screen 
during military operations in Libya in 2011 and its role was marginal to the 
recent French intervention in Mali. The EU still lacks permanent 
operational headquarters and is unlikely to acquire them soon, given the 
opposition of the UK but also other countries. The strategic culture of most 
EU member states is not an ‘expeditionary’ one and, when sizeable 
multinational military operations are to be deployed, NATO seems to most 
Europeans the safest option. For the foreseeable future, the role of the 
Union as a security provider is best seen as complementary, modular and 
preventive. This entails both limitations and opportunities, not least for 
cooperation with important partners such as Brazil.  
First, the EU cannot handle complex crisis situations on its own. But it 
can bring much added value in conjunction with others. All military 
operations under the CSDP have been launched within the frame of a UN 
resolution and the EU has acquired much experience in cooperating with 
the UN and regional organisations on the ground, as well as with NATO. 
The record is surely mixed, but it does point to the shape of future 
interventions, where national initiatives, coalitions of the willing and 
multilateral efforts will likely overlap. 
Second, there are many ways through which the EU can support 
peace and stability, regardless of whether that includes boots on the 
ground or not. Humanitarian support to refugees and displaced people is a 
case in point at the peak of a crisis, often alongside concrete engagement in 
crisis diplomacy, followed by engagement in capacity and institution-
building in fragile or failed states, including via civilian CSDP missions. 
The EU has financed the setting up of a crisis or situation room at the 
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headquarters of the Arab League, and is planning to do the same with the 
African Union.67 Some of these measures fit with the broadly preventive 
approach of the EU as a security provider, aimed to create the conditions 
for lasting stability. Failures are much more visible than incremental 
progress on this score but it is equally the case that, from the Sahel to 
Palestine via Somalia, peace would stand little chance without the 
sustained involvement of the EU and of its member states via development 
assistance, security sector reform and support for democracy, human rights 
and good governance at large. Demand for these deliverables will arguably 
grow with a view to sustain peace and security in fragile regions. 
Reading change: Where you sit is where you stand 
When assessing the evolution of the international system, where you sit is 
where you stand. The difference in the relative positions of the EU and 
Brazil explains their distinct readings of the emerging order, or disorder. 
The redistribution of power and the accompanying geopolitical tensions, as 
well as growing instability in the EU’s neighbourhood, challenge the 
normative outlook and strategic approach of the EU. A great deal of the 
EU’s international role and identity is predicated on replacing the rule of 
power with the power of rules in global affairs.  
As such, the Union has been branded as a post-modern actor bent on 
overcoming geopolitics and the balance of power through diplomacy, 
engagement and multilateral regimes, progressively eroding the hard shell 
of national sovereignty.68 With this branding, however, came also a 
warning. Europeans may well be past the modern Westphalian system in 
their mutual relations, but the surrounding world remained populated by 
proud, modern sovereign powers, keen on maximising their relative gains 
through hard and soft means. And vast areas of instability resemble the 
pre-modern world of weak states and widespread human insecurity. 
This diagnosis may be too clear-cut to describe the more complex 
dynamics at play within different regions and countries, and within Europe 
itself. While the EU has been preaching a largely post-modern, normative 
agenda, the practice of the Europeans has been much more uneven, 
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including double-standards in dealings with authoritarian regimes. By and 
large, however, the consolidation of the multilateral system was central to 
the grand strategy of the EU.69 It was taken in Europe as corresponding to 
the expansion of the so-called liberal order to other international 
stakeholders, alongside the spread of globalisation. China’s entry into the 
WTO in 2001 seemed to match this vision, as did further trade 
liberalisation, envisaged under the Doha round. These developments were 
regarded as fitting both Europe’s values and its tangible interests. 
Against this background, the combined effect of power shifts, the 
financial crisis and revolutions in the Arab world requires a redrawing of 
the mental maps of the European foreign policy establishment. As in all 
cases of rapid transitions and multiple shocks, it takes time and is not a 
painless exercise, all the more so for a collective international actor like the 
EU. European analysts and practitioners have mostly registered the 
progressive shaping of a multipolar world. From a European standpoint, 
this is first and foremost a statement of fact, due to the sheer redistribution 
of power assets, and not a normative consideration. In political terms, 
multipolarity is regarded with unease both because it affects Europe’s 
influence and interests (growing geo-economic and geo-political 
competition) and because a multipolar system is generally considered an 
unstable one, prone to destabilisation.  
The European discourse takes the redistribution of power as one 
important dimension of ongoing change, but qualifies it in two important 
ways. First, power is not just shifting among states but also growing more 
diffuse to a variety of non-state actors and networks. From this standpoint, 
reality might have skipped multipolarity. In other words, actual power 
trends point to a polycentric and pluralistic international system and not 
one where a few countries run the show.70 Second, while power is shifting, 
interdependence is deepening and so do the challenges associated with an 
open but fragile international system. In an inter-polar world, the power of 
major actors rests not just on relative gains but on the coordination and 
cooperation required to preserve stability, enable growth, fight illicit traffic 
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and avoid the worst effects of climate change.71 In a context of mutual 
dependence, a zero-sum world is no destiny, but the possible consequence 
of wrong choices. One may say that the organising principle of the EU’s 
external action is coming to prevent the slide towards a hostile zero-sum 
world by default, out of a vacuum of leadership and responsibility.  
Multipolarity looks different in Brasilia. However, the ultimate 
concerns of the EU may not prove so remote from those of a rising power 
with a similar value system, aiming to entrench growth and stability in the 
long run. Boosted by high growth rates and active diplomacy, Brazil 
pursues an autonomous strategy of power projection beyond its region by 
leveraging engagement in a variety of formats. From a Brazilian 
standpoint, the progressive shaping of a multipolar world carries positive 
normative connotations, by opposition to traditional American and 
European hegemony. A multipolar world would be a more fair and 
democratic place, with major emerging countries and the developing world 
at large playing a much bigger role in setting the terms of interdependence. 
Echoes of the traditional claims of the so-called global South versus the rich 
and selfish North co-exist (and sometimes jar) in the Brazilian discourse 
with the pragmatic pursuit of national interest on the global stage. 
Likewise, Brazil’s robust commitment to multilateralism is both 
principled and instrumental (which, to a different degree, is the case for all 
international actors). Suspicious of (Western) interference in domestic 
affairs, Brazil is a vocal although not unqualified supporter of the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference and of the central role of the 
United Nations (UN), notably in legitimising the use of force. As such, 
Brazil can be considered as both a conservative and a revisionist power. It 
is reluctant to support innovations in global governance that might result 
in the delimitation of national autonomy, from more intrusive verifications 
under the climate or non-proliferation regimes to punitive measure or the 
responsibility to protect, not least out of concern for their possibly abusive 
or one-sided implementation. However, Brazil vocally calls for the reform 
of major multilateral structures to carve out more votes, seats and power 
for large emerging countries. Together with Germany, India and Japan, 
Brazil has pushed hard for the enlargement of the UN Security Council to 
these four additional permanent members, so far to no avail. On the other 
                                                     
71 G. Grevi, The Interpolar World: A New Scenario, Occasional Paper No. 79, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009.  
210 | GIOVANNI GREVI 
hand, Brazil’s voting shares at the IMF substantially grew from 1.3 (before 
the 2008 reform) to 1.7 (today) to 2.2 (based on the 2010 reform, not yet in 
force). At purchasing power parity, Brazil’s economy accounts for about 
2.8% of the world GDP. 
In other words, when it comes to global governance, the EU seeks to 
create new regimes while preserving, or adjusting in a cautious and 
incremental way, the rules and composition of traditional multilateral 
frameworks. Brazil is less interested in new governance enterprises, from 
climate change to multilateral trade deals, but aims to transform the 
balance of power and some of the normative parameters underpinning 
existing institutions. 
Aside from formal institutional frameworks, Brazil has been 
investing a lot in cooperation with other emerging powers, notably through 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), IBSA (India, 
Brazil and South Africa) and BASIC (BRICS less Russia) formats. This 
strategy of ‘parallel minilateralism’ is overtly directed to boost the 
influence of Brazil on the international stage. As such, it has been effective 
to influence the global debate on issues ranging from the reform of 
multilateral financial institutions, the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions and the development agenda. BRICS countries have been 
holding annual summits since 2009 and regularly meet at ministerial or 
senior official level, including on the side of international fora such as the 
G20. 
However, minilateral groupings of emerging countries are unlikely to 
prove viable building blocs of a new order.72 The priorities, geostrategic 
positions and value systems of the BRICS point in different directions over 
the medium term, once the process of political emancipation from the 
allegedly ‘hegemonic’ international order is accomplished and the 
responsibilities that global engagement entails are acknowledged. There is 
no unified bloc of rising powers shaping up to confront the traditional 
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West, including the EU.73 The five BRICS stand out as having in common as 
much as what divides them.  
Brazil and South Africa are democracies pursuing the 
‘democratisation’ of international relations with a bigger voice for the 
South; Russia is a traditional if declining great power keen on dealing with 
other major players on a peer-to-peer basis. Brazil complains about 
‘currency wars’ and the under-appreciation of the Renmimbi (as well as of 
the US dollar), which affects the competitiveness of Brazilian industry at a 
time when China is extracting from Brazil little more than natural 
resources. Russia and China, jealous of their prerogatives, are reluctant to 
grant permanent membership on the UN Security Council to fellow BRICS 
countries. The geostrategic concerns of Brazil in the South Atlantic are 
remote from the threat perceptions of China, India and Russia. In political 
terms, for all of the BRICS, the defining relationship remains that with the 
US, although other partnerships are gaining strength. In economic terms, 
the EU may have lost market shares, notably in India and Latin America, 
but it remains a vital trade and notably investment partner for all the 
BRICS. Spain and Belgium alone have a larger investment stock in Brazil 
than the US. In 2010, China was ranked 16th in the list of the top 20 
investors in Brazil by stock.74  
The way ahead: Uncovering common ground 
Closer engagement between the EU and Brazil would offer the opportunity 
to challenge binary narratives on the fledgling international order (old vs. 
new powers; North vs. South) and to make a difference together. Gaining a 
better perspective sometimes requires taking a step back. The last few years 
have been hard on Europe and rewarding for Brazil. But whether recent 
experience shows divergent paths ahead is a different question. Drawing 
linear projections of irreversible decline for Europe and unstoppable rise 
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for Brazil may be misleading since Europe has more assets than often 
acknowledged and Brazil faces considerable challenges to sustain its 
remarkable performance. In both cases, addressing domestic dysfunctions 
is a requirement for influence abroad. If they were to succeed, both actors 
could be regarded as emerging ones on the international stage. And they 
would share much more than what divides them. 
The EU and Brazil share common values but have so far 
implemented different power strategies – the former anchored to the so-
called ‘Western camp’, the latter bent on challenging it through soft 
balancing.75 However, both are well placed to overcome the sterile and 
outdated distinction between North and South. The contention here is that, 
over time, what may come to define global actors will be less their growth 
rates than their political and normative outlooks, at home and abroad. This 
is not to argue that new divides will or should be drawn on normative 
grounds, for example between democracies and undemocratic regimes. On 
the contrary, it is to stress the important bridging role that the EU and 
Brazil could play to expand the common ground between different 
perceptions and agendas. The future will not be shaped by established or 
rising powers but will likely have to be co-shaped. Those with the will and 
ability to connect across traditional cleavages will stand to gain the most 
influence. 
The strategic partnership that the EU and Brazil established in 2007 
has underperformed in many ways. But poor implementation so far should 
not detract from the aim to leverage bilateral engagement to improve 
cooperation in broader formats. So-called ‘strategic partnerships’ can be 
regarded as fulfilling three important roles.76 First, they position the two 
parties on the map as pivotal mutual interlocutors. This is important 
political currency for both the EU, whose international actorness is often 
questioned, and for Brazil, which has long pursued its ‘insertion’ in the big 
league. Second, structured bilateral relations provide the level playing field 
for trade-offs to maximise respective interests, notably in the economic 
sphere. The partnership as such has not matched expectations on this 
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account, with the trade deal held hostage to inter-regional politics and 
protectionism on the rise. That said, a traditionally asymmetric economic 
relationship has evolved into a more balanced one with sustained two-way 
investment flows and Brazil becoming the fifth-largest investor in the EU. 
The last bilateral summit in January 2013 suggests that recession in Europe 
and the economic slowdown in Brazil might have focused the minds of 
both parties on the opportunities that closer engagement might bring for 
growth.77  
The third and key function of the strategic partnership is to help 
address together big issues on the international agenda through regular 
consultations, including in international fora. As noted above, progress has 
been slight but some areas for renewed engagement can be detected. 
Climate change is one, as discussed in other working papers prepared for 
this project.78 The EU has been leading from the front to reduce carbon 
emissions and Brazil has passed national legislation including binding 
reduction targets, while discretely mediating between advanced and 
emerging or developing countries in the run-up to the Durban summit in 
December 2011.79 Their efforts will simply be vain if they fail to bring more 
parties on board to commit to meaningful and somehow verifiable targets. 
Political and security affairs offer much opportunity for the EU and 
Brazil to join forces, if pragmatic cooperation progressively diminishes 
normative dissonance and assuages long-held suspicions of Western 
imperialism in Brazil. The latter has been making a growing contribution to 
UN peacekeeping operations. In early 2013, Brazil is the 11th largest 
provider of troops to peacekeeping operations, with a total of about 2,200 
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officers. While Brazilian forces serve in operations in Africa (for example in 
Liberia, South Sudan and Ivory Coast) and the Middle East (Lebanon), 99% 
of Brazilian troops are concentrated in the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti, 
which Brazil also leads.80 This is a significant effort but also one that could 
pave the way for more relevant engagements beyond Latin America, 
notably in the African continent where the vast majority of peacekeepers 
are deployed. Peacekeeping is an area of clear potential synergy between 
the EU, its member states and Brazil, notably when it comes to sharing 
lessons, devising comprehensive approaches to humanitarian emergencies 
and joint deployment. Bilateral negotiations are ongoing on a framework 
agreement for Brazilian personnel to take part in CSDP operations, 
following similar deals with eight other partners, including Canada, 
Turkey and the US. 
Of course, broader normative and geopolitical considerations 
surround issues of peace and security. At the core of the international 
security conundrum lies the tension between the principles of sovereignty 
and non-interference on the one side, and those of human rights and their 
protection on the other. Both have deep roots in international law (as well 
as in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Constitution of Brazil) and, as any other 
legal norms, their practice and interpretation are subject to evolution. Work 
on the concept of human security and the progressive codification of the 
doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) challenge both the unconditional 
support of the principle of sovereignty and the unbound pursuit of the 
‘humanitarian’ agenda by military means.  
Brazil has tried to build on the framework of R2P with the notion of 
the so-called ‘responsibility while protecting’. According to this approach, 
the three pillars of R2P (the responsibility of individual states to protect 
their population, the responsibility of the international community to help 
them do so and, if that fails, its responsibility to take action) should be seen 
as strictly sequential in both chronological and political terms, with military 
action regarded as the very last resort and subject to the careful assessment 
of its consequences.81 Besides, ‘responsibility while protecting’ entails that 
military action should not only be authorised by the UN Security Council 
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but should also be more closely monitored in its implementation. 
Intervention should be carried out within the limits and to fulfil the ends 
indicated in UN resolutions. While the politics of intervention are not an 
exact science and flexibility has to be built into action, the Brazilian 
contribution can be seen as a step towards bridging agendas and 
perceptions. It is telling that the cold reception by the US and EU members 
states, in the aftermath of the air campaign in Libya, has been paralleled by 
prudent silence on the part of other BRICS countries, except the 
endorsement of South Africa.  
This initiative fits a broader, if very cautious, development of Brazil’s 
diplomatic posture, alongside the shift from the Lula to the Rousseff 
administration. Since 2011, Brazilian diplomacy has taken more distance 
from authoritarian or illiberal regimes in Latin America and beyond, 
including for example Iran. While not supporting further sanctions on Iran 
and initially hesitating to condemn the Assad regime in Syria, Brazil is 
increasingly uncomfortable with the dangers and consequences of 
diplomatic stalemate on both accounts. In the course of 2012, Brazil, 
supported two UN General Assembly resolutions condemning human 
rights abuses and calling for political transition in Syria.82 The EU and 
Brazil should deepen their direct exchanges on major security crises, as 
both of them will be called upon to exercise greater responsibilities in this 
domain. At their last summit in January 2013, they agreed to formally 
establish a high-level dialogue on matters of peace and security, including 
peacekeeping and peace-building.  
Crisis diplomacy and crisis management pose inevitable political 
obstacles but a wider preventive agenda offers much scope for more 
structured cooperation, at the nexus between democracy and development. 
As in other policy areas, diverse historical experiences and attitudes to 
development cooperation and institutional capacity-building can provide 
inputs to define more effective approaches and concrete, joint or mutually 
reinforcing, initiatives. State fragility and bad governance, whether in Latin 
America or in Africa, are a common concern of Brazil and the EU, not least 
because they provide fertile ground for the proliferation of illicit trafficking 
across the South Atlantic and over to Europe.  
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Brazil has been reluctant to be seen as associated or working with the 
EU – a traditional donor from the North – for example in Africa. But there 
is growing recognition that the two parties can at least experiment with 
selective cooperation on specific issues via triangulation with third 
countries. Following the so far limited experience of triangular cooperation 
to promote bio-fuels in Africa, the European Commission signed the 
Charter of Brasilia in January 2013. The latter envisages joint initiatives 
with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa on issues of citizenship and 
electoral democracy. If implemented, these and other small bottom-up 
projects may play an important role to incrementally build confidence 
among the EU and Brazil, as important shapers of the future development 
agenda.83  
Conclusion 
The EU and Brazil share more than what divides them, but their current 
outlook on the emerging multipolar system differs. Launched in the 
reassuring post-cold war strategic environment, the EU common foreign 
and security policy has had to cope with a turbulent regional and global 
context in the last decade. The financial crisis has been a game-changer, 
accelerating the redistribution of power away from Europe and creating 
more political space for rising powers on the international stage, including 
through recently-established formats such as the BRICS. Revolutions in the 
Arab world and the shift in the geostrategic priorities of the US require the 
EU to become more pragmatic and nimble as both a security provider and a 
normative entrepreneur. In both respects, Brazil can become a truly 
strategic partner of the Union as its responsibilities are set to grow in 
parallel with its global outreach and interests. Political and security affairs, 
amongst other issues, offer considerable room for deepening cooperation, 
from crisis management to preventive diplomacy and the normative debate 
on responsibility to protect. Joint initiatives in third countries, addressing 
the nexus between development and democracy, could become another 
terrain for mutual engagement. This would also help overcome 
questionable divides between old and new powers, or between the global 
North and South, and shape new shared agendas. 
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PROMINENT ROLE IN THE AMERICAS 
SUSANNE GRATIUS AND MIRIAM GOMES SARAIVA 
Abstract 
Brazil has a dual identity as a Latin American country and BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa). The regional and the global 
dimensions of Brasilia’s foreign policy have been closely intertwined. 
Inspired by the idea of development and autonomy, in the last ten years 
Brazil has assumed a stronger regional leadership. The result has been the 
emergence of a South American space, with Mercosur and Unasur as the 
main integration schemes. For Brazil, regionalism is not only a goal in itself 
but also an instrument for exerting global influence and for ‘soft-balancing’ 
the United States. Washington’s lower profile in the region has facilitated 
Brazil’s rise as a regional and even continental player, with a strong 
influence on the Latin American puzzle composed of different pieces or 
concentric circles.  
Introduction 
The new millennium is somewhat different. The global scenario is more 
fragmented, marked by a trend towards multi-polarisation, and the global 
economy has been hit first by the financial crisis that struck the US in 2008, 
and now with even more serious impacts from the euro crisis. The 
problems inside the European Union have cast into doubt both the 
economic strategy adopted thus far and the very future of integration in the 
continent and beyond.  
This new reality has paved the way for the rise of new players and 
contrasting world views from the liberalism that prevailed in the 1990s: 
different conceptions and priorities towards certain deep-rooted principles 
in the West, such as the responsibility to protect, democracy and human 
rights. In South America, the emergence, since the early 2000s, of new left-
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wing governments keen to bring about political reform, reducing these 
countries’ alignment with the United States, and the powerful crisis in 
Argentina, weakening its influence in the region, have given Brazil more 
scope for autonomy in the region.  
Related to Brazilian continental policy towards regionalism, we can 
identify five dimensions of Brazilian expansion of its weight in the region 
that, in an ideal type, we would call concentric circles, following the EU 
integration model: the bilateral neighbourhood policy towards Argentina; 
Mercosur (Common Market of the South); the South American dimension 
and Unasur (Union of South American Nations); the Latin American 
dimension and the Celac (Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States); and the whole hemisphere and the OAS (Organisation of American 
States). 
What does this Brazilian move towards regionalism mean and how 
does it relate to its global projection? Which are the constraints of Brazil’s 
leadership role in Latin America and the Americas? Can Brazil’s view on 
regionalism be compared to the EU’s policy? What kind of commonalities 
and differences between Brazil and the EU in this issue can be found?  
Brazil’s foreign policy between global and regional projection  
In these times of change in the shaping of a new world order, Brazil has 
begun to stand out for its assertive participation in international politics, 
where it has favoured anti-hegemonic, multi-polar positions and its 
increasingly strong leadership in its own region. During the Lula 
administration from 2003 to 2010, Brazil gradually started step by step to 
shoulder the costs inherent in cooperation, governance and integration in 
the region. At that time, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) – with a 
total budget that exceeds that of the Inter-American Development Bank – 
began to finance infrastructure projects in South America.  
The election of Lula da Silva at the end of 2002 and ensuing rise of an 
autonomy-oriented group in Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs cast the 
country’s foreign policy in a new light. Diplomatic support for existing 
international regimes in the 1990s gave way to a proactive push towards 
modifying these regimes in favour of southern countries or Brazil’s 
particular interests, which was defined by Lima as soft revisionism. As a 
result, Brazil promoted the trilateral dialogue forum IBSA (India, Brazil, 
South Africa) and became an active member of the influential BRICS group 
of countries and its annual summits. 
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The idea of bringing other emerging or poorer Southern countries on 
board to counterbalance the might of traditional Western powers served as 
the basis for the country’s international actions. While coalitions with 
emerging partners helped boost Brazil’s global pretensions, its diplomatic 
efforts were geared towards bolstering its international standing 
independently of any other nation, with its role as a global player being 
firmly grounded in the ideas of autonomy and universalism that were the 
predominant diplomatic thinking at the time. 
• Alongside Brazil’s international rise, its leadership in South America 
also started to be seen as a priority, but more than a goal in its own 
right, the regional was seen as part of the broader framework of 
south-south cooperation. Indeed, the moves to boost its global and 
regional projection came simultaneously and were seen by Brazil as 
mutually beneficial. The cooperation with its regional neighbours 
was perceived by policy-makers as the best way for Brazil to realise 
its potential, support economic development and form a bloc with 
stronger international influence. The creation of the South American 
Defence Council and the Brazilian command of the UN peacekeeping 
force in Haiti, whose troops are drawn from different countries in the 
region, were seen as helping Brazil towards a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. According to Flemes, in its upward progress in 
a new more multipolar world order, Brazil would need regional clout 
in global negotiations, but would not be tied down to any form of 
institutionalisation that might restrict its autonomy.  
• When it comes to its regional neighbours, however, Brazil’s global 
projection has been observed with some unease. It has not been 
regarded as beneficial for the region, but simply as a means for Brazil 
to pursue its own individual goals. This has raised the cost of its 
regional leadership, which has come under fire repeatedly by 
neighbouring countries in global dimensions.  
• This articulation between global projection and increasingly 
consolidated regional leadership was also an expression of the 
political will of President Lula and a pro-integration epistemic 
community that included left-wing political players close to the 
Workers’ Party and scholars who supported regional integration. 
Members of this latter group were in favour of consolidating 
integration in political and social terms, holding that there were real 
mutual benefits to be gleaned. Since the beginning of her 
government, President Dilma Rousseff has maintained her 
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predecessor’s foreign policy strategies: a revisionist stance towards 
international institutions, representation of southern countries and 
regional leadership. The autonomy-oriented group has continued to 
hold sway in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and there have been 
stronger signs of developmentalism.  
Meanwhile, when it comes to the main priorities of foreign policy and 
the coexistence of global and regional projection, there have been a few 
changes: South America has given way to a broader ambition to build 
political leadership amongst southern nations, including countries from 
Africa. To this end, pushed by Brazil, regular summits between the South 
American Community of Nations (Unasur) and North and Sub-Saharan 
African countries are held.  
And in the balance between global and regional projection, the 
former has taken precedence over the latter. In economic terms, the region 
is one amongst other pillars. Brazil’s external trade is nearly equally 
balanced between the EU, Asia/China, the United States and Latin 
America. Compared to its neighbour Argentina, which increased trade 
relations with Latin America, Brazil’s trade relations with Latin America 
are at a constant 20% level (4% of the GDP). Nonetheless, an estimated 80% 
of Brazil’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated in South America 
and the region is the main market for Brazilian manufactured exports. 
Neighbourhood Policy and Strategic Partnerships:  
Argentina, Mercosur and Unasur 
In the Americas, Brazil pursued an incremental strategy of expanding its 
weight, creating different circles step by step. The first dimension of Brazil’s 
regional policy was the integration process with Argentina. From the 
beginning, Brazil’s integration strategy has been closely linked to 
democracy. According to the Constitution of 1988, promoting the 
economic, political, social and cultural integration of Latin America is an 
important strategic objective of Brazil. The alliance with Argentina was 
created in the mid-1980s when the two countries’ democratic regimes were 
reestablished. If rivalry was the dominant pattern in relations between 
Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, this began to change in the 
mid-1980s, when both countries returned to democracy and signed several 
bilateral agreements.  
In 1991 Mercosur was created, joining Uruguay and Paraguay, but as 
far as Brazil’s partners in the region are concerned, Argentina has held top 
spot. The bilateral dialogue at the political level between the two countries 
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has been maintained and has worked as the Mercosur’s political axis. After 
the Argentine crisis of 2001, Brazil has been all in favour of maintaining its 
cooperation agreements and bilateral relations with its southern neighbour, 
although its weight in regional dynamics has dwindled and relations between 
the two countries have not always been smooth. Argentina’s 
reindustrialisation policy has clashed directly with the expansion plans of 
Brazilian businesses and the influx of Brazilian manufactured goods. The 
construction of autonomous Brazilian leadership in the region and the 
growing asymmetry between the two countries both economically and in 
terms of their regional influence has frustrated any expectations Argentina 
may have had of sharing leadership. Brazil’s increasing international presence 
has yielded new opportunities for its diplomats to operate in different 
multilateral forums without the presence of Argentina, and has not brought 
any benefits for Mercosur. Nevertheless, cooperation between different 
corresponding ministries from the two countries, such as education, energy 
and labour, has grown. The development of regional infrastructure has 
enabled both countries to work together on common projects.84  
During the Dilma Rousseff administration, a rising tide of trade-related 
problems has hampered the partnership. Yet when the political crisis erupted 
in Paraguay, the Brazilian government was quick to align itself politically 
with Buenos Aires. And, more importantly, efforts have been made to 
maintain close cooperation to prevent the resurgence of any kind of cross-
border rivalry.85 Argentina is still considered the main Brazilian strategic 
partner. 
Mercosur represents the second step of Brazil’s political designs for the 
region, although it has followed an asymmetrical integration process. Created 
in 1991 with an aim of becoming a common market, it was consolidated as an 
incomplete custom union and, since 2000, has played second fiddle in 
                                                     
84 Antonio Carlos Lessa, “Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula 
era (2003-2010)”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Ano 53 Special edition. 
Brasilia, 2010, pp. 115-131, defines strategic partnerships as commercial exchange 
and investments; the density of political dialogue; channels for dialogue; 
convergence of agendas in multilateral forums; and involvement in common 
development projects. Arguably, the only one of these items that is not pursued in 
the case of Argentina is the fourth one. 
85 For more on this topic, see Miraim G. Saraiva Encontros e desencontros. O lugar da 
Argentina na política externa brasileira, Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço, 2012. 
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Brazilian behaviour towards South America, having been identified more as 
the vector for the consolidation of Brazilian power in the region.86 
Mercosur proved that Brazil’s foreign policy in the early years of 
democratic governments clearly focused on its neighbours and particularly 
on Argentina. From the 1990s until the financial collapse in Argentina in 
2001, Brazilian regional policy was concentrated on Mercosur, including 
the two smaller countries Paraguay and Uruguay. The crisis in Argentina 
and the rise of Brazil began to change Brasilia’s neighbourhood policy. 
Under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) and 
particularly during the first term of the Lula Presidency, Mercosur was 
increasingly seen as a platform for a broader integration process in South 
America.  
In spite of Brazil’s support for Argentina in 2001, since then the bloc has 
faced trade-related difficulties and has ceased to exert any significant 
influence on Brazil’s global strategy. Meanwhile, its objectives have been 
redefined: on the initiative of Argentina, political and social dimensions have 
made core issues for the bloc. In other words, a dimension that was not part 
of the Treaty of Asunción has taken shape instead of the traditional model 
of economic integration. The Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund 
(Focem)87 was created in December 2004, confirming Brazil’s willingness to 
invest in the other countries in the bloc. Coordinated responses to 
transnational threats have also been organised.88 This new model is 
basically built on articulation between the autonomy-oriented diplomats 
and the politicians from the Workers’ Party with a profile that is something 
like post-liberal regionalism.89  
                                                     
86 Granja, Lorena, in a doctoral thesis project -“Bilateralización, contexto asimétrico 
y condicionantes políticos: el caso del Mercosur”. IESP/UERJ. August /2012- 
characterises the process of asymmetric integration by the existence of strong 
asymmetries, the fact that one of the members is potentially a regional leader, and 
the fact that many intra-bloc relations are bilateral. 
87 The Focem was created with an initial fund of US$100 million a year, with Brazil 
contributing 70% of its monies to invest in infrastructure projects inside the bloc 
(80% addressed to Paraguay and Uruguay). The funds have been progressively 
increased. See http://www.mercosur.int/focem/ 
88 For more on this topic, see Flemes, op.cit. pp. 404-436. 
89 For more on this topic see Miriam G. Saraiva “Brazilian Foreign Policy: Causal 
Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice”, in Gian Luca Gardini and Peter 
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Mercosur has also grown: agreements have been signed with Peru, 
Ecuador and Colombia, making them associate members of the bloc, and 
Venezuela applied for full membership in 2006. Bolivia might follow soon. 
At the beginning of the Rousseff government, the bloc was shaken by the 
political crisis in Paraguay in June 2012, identifying the crisis with a threat 
of the democratic regime and electing to suspend the country’s 
membership temporarily. But, surprisingly, the other members of the bloc 
also decided to accept Venezuela definitively as a full member. This 
expansionary move has brought trade-related problems relating to the 
customs union (Venezuela is not altogether in favour of adapting its 
foreign trade to this model) and negotiations for trade agreements with 
countries outside the region. While it has brought a more balanced 
membership to the bloc, the range of political positions that must now be 
catered for is far broader and the risk of political instability has increased 
since the death of President Hugo Chávez.  
A wider Mercosur including Bolivia and Venezuela, both reluctant to 
sign free trade agreements, poses an additional obstacle to the successful 
conclusion of an association agreement with the EU, in negotiation since 
2000. Given the traditional obstacles of an EU-Mercosur agreement 
(disputes and a lack of coherence within Mercosur, high tariffs for 
industrial products, and the protectionist Common Agriculture Policy of 
the EU), some representatives of the Brazilian private sector speculated that 
a possible negotiation between the EU and Brazil could lead to a trade 
bilateral association agreement. However, in the short term, this kind of 
agreement is not considered desirable for the government of Dilma 
Rousseff. It would not be consistent with the Common External Tariff, and 
Brazilian diplomacy shows preferences to maintain the custom union, 
despite all the exceptions, as an instrument to preserve the cohesion of the 
bloc and the partnership with Argentina. Moreover, the EU continues to 
deny Brazil’s primary demand – opening its agricultural market – and the 
financial crisis assailing the European makes a radical reform of the 
Common Agriculture Policy even more unlikely. Moreover, the planned 
negotiation of a Transatlantic free trade agreement between the EU and the 
United States will concentrate Brussel’s trade policy for the next two years, 
undermining its political will to re-engage with Mercosur. For those 
                                                                                                                                       
Lambert (eds), Latin America Foreign Policies: between ideology and pragmatism. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 53-66. 
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reasons, the prospects for an early conclusion of an FTA look less bright 
than ever.  
Meanwhile, Brazil has increased its role in South America, the third 
concentric circle of its neighbourhood policy. In 2000, Brazil launched the 
South American Summits that paved the way for Unasur, under a clear 
leadership of Brazil and (at that moment) a prominent role of Venezuela. It 
was a first step to integrate both Mercosur and the Andean Community, 
under a single umbrella.90 Since 2008, when the 12 countries signed the 
constitutive treaty, Unasur has been institutionalised and counts on a 
permanent Secretariat in Quito (Ecuador) and a parliament based in 
Cochabamba (Bolivia). While the Andean Community declined, due to 
Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur and a lack of leadership within the bloc, 
Mercosur and Unasur became major platforms for Brazil’s regional strategy 
which, at that time, was a synonym for its neighbourhood policy. At the 
same time, asymmetries between Brazil and its South American partners 
increased.  
The Lula administration started out in January 2003 with a period of 
stability and economic growth, which augmented the asymmetries between 
Brazil and its regional neighbours. In a bid to respond to the new regional 
balance of political and economic power, the government’s foreign policy 
prioritised the construction of a structured South American framework 
under Brazilian leadership, with Brazil taking decisive responsibility for 
the integration and regionalisation process.91 With this aim in mind, its 
diplomatic corps put renewed effort into building the country’s leadership 
in the region using the techniques of soft power and reinforcing 
multilateral initiatives. 
During the Lula years, a complex structure of cooperation was 
established with the region’s countries, giving priority to technical and 
financial cooperation and bilateralism. Investments in the region and 
infrastructure projects funded by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
grew between 2003 to 2010, bolstered by the Initiative for the Integration of 
                                                     
90 The proposal, launched by Brazil in the 1990s, to create a free trade area between 
the Andean Community and Mercosur did not succeed.  
91 Here, leadership is understood as a country’s capacity to influence the region’s 
political and economic trajectory with mechanisms of soft power. On the other 
hand, regional power combines the capacity to set the course of integration and 
regional cooperation. 
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Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). These projects helped 
improve articulation with neighbouring countries in non-trade-related 
areas and reinforced regionalisation in the continent. On the other hand, 
the infrastructure initiative IIRSA has been a mechanism for the Brazilian 
government to protect its investments in the region. 
To implement its project, the strategy to consolidate the South 
American Community of Nations – which went on to become Unasur – has 
been important for Brazilian diplomacy. Once Lula was elected, efforts 
were made to institutionalise it, adding new projects to its remit, such as 
political dialogue, energy integration, and South American financial 
mechanisms or the South American Defence Council. This was one 
expression of Brazil’s increasing technical and financial cooperation with its 
South American neighbours. For the Brazilian government, the 
organisation has become the main entity for multilateral action through 
which its diplomatic efforts are channelled, where common positions can 
be agreed upon with other countries from the region, assuring regional 
stability and, with limited results, also common responses to some 
international political issues.92 In this process, however, Unasur remains 
strictly intergovernmental in nature, which has assured Brazil a degree of 
autonomy towards its partners in the organisation and in its global 
aspirations.  
Nonetheless, Brazil’s actions in South America are not without their 
tensions. New developmentalist economic strategies and protectionist 
measures adopted by left-wing governments, and social demands arising 
from changes in the political regimes in neighbouring countries, have 
challenged Brazil’s position, forcing it to grant economic concessions by 
shouldering the financial burden of regional paymaster. It was only 
towards the end of President Lula’s first term in 2006, when Brazil reacted 
to the nationalisation of Petrobras’s gas reserves by the Bolivian 
government accepting the Bolivian initiative, that the Brazilian government 
began to show any real willingness to cover some of the costs of South 
American integration, beginning to shed what Burges called its “highly 
cost-averse leadership style”.93 
                                                     
92 The aim of taking joint action outside the region has not taken shape. The Unasur 
countries do not agree on how they will vote in multilateral forums. 
93 Burges, Sean, “Bounded by the Reality of Trade: Practical Limits to a South 
American Region”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3, October 
2005, pp. 437-454. 
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Meanwhile, the Brazilian government has made important moves in 
the domestic arena with a view to garnering political support for its 
regional leadership ambitions, as reflected in the formation of a coalition 
that supports having the country cover some of the costs of South 
American integration. Thinkers from the Workers’ Party have had some 
influence on this behaviour, seeing cooperation as a plus, encouraging the 
formation of a South American identity, and working more closely with 
countries whose governments are identified as left-wing.  
Dilma Rousseff’s election at the end of 2010 has resulted in a waning 
in the political dimension of Brazil’s approach to the region. With the 
declining influence over Brazilian foreign policy of some political leaders 
with links to neighbouring governments, especially in Venezuela, Bolivia 
and Ecuador, the country’s actions have taken a pragmatic turn and a 
lower political profile. For instance, its action within the South American 
Defence Council, created on the initiative of the Lula government to align 
defence policies in the region’s other countries with Brazil’s, is on hold. But, 
on the other hand, the case of Paraguayan President Lugo’s ousting in June 
2012 was taken by Brazilian diplomats to Unasur, thereby identifying it as 
the leading political body in the region. 
The aim of bolstering its leadership in the region has gradually given 
way in Brazil to the idea of establishing more widespread leadership, 
taking in some countries from Africa.94 Brazil’s actions are more 
development-oriented, prioritising bilateral ties with its neighbours 
through technical and financial cooperation, even if the achievements in the 
field of regional cooperation have been consolidated. 
In the South American dimension, and taking into account that 
Argentina is a strategic partner of Brazil, Mercosur and Unasur are the 
concrete outcomes of Brazil’s efforts to create, for economic, diplomatic and 
security reasons, a South American Community of Nations. While 
Mercosur, besides the relation with Argentina, is the economic platform 
and nucleus for economic integration, Unasur is a forum for political 
consultation and inter-state cooperation on infrastructure (foremost 
                                                     
94 Special attention has been paid to Portuguese-speaking countries. Beside this, 
Brazil has signed Technical Cooperation Agreement with eight African countries 
and has signed adjustment in existing agreement with other six countries. During 
the period, Brazil opened/re-opened embassies in 17 African countries. In 2006, 
following the proposal by the Brazilian government, the Forum South America-
Africa was created.  
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Brazilian investment), defence and other topics on the neighbourhood 
agenda. It is, to a large extent, to the credit of the Brazilian government that 
for the first time ever, South America has become a geopolitical space with 
some influence on the regional and global stage. Nonetheless, Brazil’s 
leadership role in South America has been challenged recently by the 
Pacific Alliance launched in 2012 between Mexico and three South 
American countries: Chile, Colombia and Peru. This new initiative is based 
on common economic interests (free trade area, a common stock market) 
and close trade relations to Asia. It is not yet clear if Unasur and the Pacific 
Alliance are complementary or competing initiatives.  
Leadership in Latin America and the Americas? 
A fourth step in Brazil’s strategy was to expand the country’s interests to 
the rest of Latin America. Once its prominent role in South America and on 
the global stage had been consolidated, Brazil’s political elites began to 
draw more attention to Central America and the Caribbean, which had 
been traditionally under the influence of the United States. An important 
strategic movement (and alternative to US sanctions policy) was the 
renewal of relations with Cuba. Historical political affinities between the 
Workers’ Party and Castroism motivated closer bilateral relations and 
economic cooperation.95  
In 2004, Brazil assumed the military command of the UN mission in 
Haiti. Although its engagement in Haiti had more to do with its aspiration 
to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it helped to 
foster Brazil’s relations with the Caribbean. In 2009, rather by accident (the 
former president Manuel Zelaya chose the Brazilian Embassy in which to 
escape from his adversaries), the former Lula government got involved in 
the political crisis in Honduras after the military coup against the elected 
President Zelaya. This pro-active policy of the Brazilian government 
illustrates a political will to think about neighbourhood policy beyond 
South America. Latin America is the fourth (and less relevant) cycle of 
Brazil’s regional policy. The prominence of the autonomy-oriented group 
or ‘developmentalist faction’ in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the post-Washington consensus in the region (meaning a major role of 
the state as a social and economic agent) paved the way for new regional 
                                                     
95 Among other projects, the Cuban Port Mariel will be reformed with the help of 
Brazilian investment.  
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priorities. Not economic integration but political consultation and 
diplomacy are today’s cornerstones of Latin American integration. 
Under the Lula Presidency, closer relations with Cuba, Brazil’s 
military command of the UN stabilisation mission in Haiti and its 
diplomatic influence in the political crisis in Honduras contributed to give 
the country a higher regional profile and status. It was also Brazil, together 
with Venezuela that pushed for the transformation of the dialogue forum 
Rio Group into the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(Celac), which held its first meeting in Brazil and was officially created in 
2011 in Caracas. It could be a regional initiative identified with the 
historical Latin America, which may, in turn, counter-weight the declining 
Inter-American system. However, the creation of the Celac, that still lacks 
an organisational structure or treaty, has not received the same attention as 
Unasur in Brazilian diplomatic circles. Nonetheless, today, Brasilia’s 
regional policy is no longer limited to its own sphere of influence but 
increasingly includes Central America and the Caribbean, the traditional 
backyard of the United States.  
 The last circle refers to the hemispheric dimension. During the 1990s, 
when the OAS reframed its role in the region, focusing on democracy and 
human rights issues, the divergences and a low political profile between 
Brazil and the US became evident. While Brazil defended a non-
interventionist position, the US proposed support for democratic rules. The 
negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was the 
last American attempt to design a hemispheric project. 
However, there was no agreement between Brazil and the United 
States over how regional issues should be handled, although the absence of 
a US policy for the region has prevented any stand-offs between the two 
countries. The Brazilian government has operated autonomously whenever 
issues relating to the continent have arisen. Washington’s low-profile in 
Latin America and the concentration of a few countries of strategic interest 
(Colombia, Central America and Mexico) facilitated Brazil’s proactive Latin 
American policy. The failure of the FTAA negotiations at the Summit in 
Mar del Plata in 2005 proved the limits of Washington’s traditional 
hegemony in the Americas and contributed to a stronger regional profile of 
its rival in the south. Without a hemispheric project, the OAS “lacks a 
guiding vision”96 and has lost appeal in Latin America. Although the OAS 
                                                     
96 Peter Hakim, “The OAS in Trouble Again”, Latin Pulse, 30 November 2012. 
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is still the most consolidated collective institution in the Americas, it lacks 
both leadership and followers. Moreover, a serious financial crisis is further 
weakening the traditional Organization. Brazil is promoting regional 
concertation outside the traditional framework instead of increasing its 
weight in the Inter-American environment, which reflects a US hegemony.  
Against that background, Brazil perceives its regional policy not only 
as a goal in itself but also as an instrument for autonomy and “soft-
balancing” the United States.97 Thus, its attitude towards integration is not 
interest-free. Apart from common regional goals, the country also seeks to 
implement a neighbourhood policy that serves Brazil’s power aspirations98 
in South America, Latin America and the Americas.  
Brazil’s concentric circles 
Conscious or not, Brazil’s regional policy followed a structure of concentric 
circles: Argentina, Mercosur, Unasur and Celac. In its first period, it was 
clearly focused on repairing relations with its historical rival Argentina. 
The successful creation of Mercosur produced a new quality of close 
bilateral relations that transformed, over time, into an asymmetric alliance 
between Argentina and Brazil with negative effects on the evolution of 
Mercosur. Nevertheless, Mercosur remains the nucleus of Brazil’s 
integration project and is the most institutionalised of the circles. 
Compared to the declining Andean Community, Mercosur still represents a 
magnet for other countries: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru are 
associated members and Venezuela has now become a full member. 
Table 8. Brazil’s concentric circles 
Circles/ 
goals 
Countries  Objectives Brazil’s interests 
1: Bilateral 
neighbour
hood 
policy 
(1985) 
Argentina Cooperation, dialogue and 
economic integration, 
confidence-building  
Economic interests, 
political stabilization 
and peace, create a 
bilateral alliance 
                                                     
97 Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism, and global order: what space for 
would-be great powers?”, International Affairs 82, 1, 2006, pp. 1-19.  
98 See Anna Ayuso “EU-Brasil: nueva estratgia para um cambio de tiempo”, Política 
Exterior 149, September/October 2012, pp. 58-68.  
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2: 
Mercosur 
(1991) 
Argentina, 
Brazil, 
Paraguay, 
Uruguay. 
(Venezuela 
joined the bloc 
in 2012) 
Economic and institutional 
platform, free trade area and 
(incomplete) customs union 
with coordination in many 
other areas*, institutional 
structure including a Court 
of Appeal, Secretariat, 
Parliament, Permanent 
Commission 
Economic interests, 
market in the South, 
bloc-building, 
initially a platform 
for global insertion 
3: Unasur 
(2004) 
12 South 
American 
countries 
Infrastructure projects, 
political dialogue and 
concertation (summits), bloc-
building and autonomy, 
Treaty signed in 2008, 
permanent secretariat, South 
American Defense Council 
Create a geopolitical 
space in South 
America, economic 
interests 
(infrastructure 
projects, BNDES), 
political stabilisation 
and bloc-building, 
(export of military 
technology), 
regional power 
4: Celac 
(2011) 
33 Latin 
American and 
Caribbean 
countries 
Political cooperation and 
dialogue (summits), 
cooperation and 
coordination, confidence-
building, not 
institutionalised (no 
permanent Secretariat) 
Bloc-building and 
“soft balancing” the 
US, autonomy, 
regional power 
aspiration 
5: OAS 
(1948) 
34 Latin 
American and 
Caribbean 
States, Canada, 
the United 
States 
Highly institutionalised 
inter-American system under 
the US hegemony (now 
weaker), democracy 
promotion and human rights, 
cooperation and coordination 
in many issues, irregular 
summits, FTAA (1994- 2005) 
Dilution of US 
hegemony, more 
South American 
(Brazilian) influence, 
limited Brazilian 
interests  
* Environment, social policies, education, culture, local administration and cities, border 
management and migration, etc.  
Source: The authors. 
Unasur is the major platform for the country’s power ambitions and 
has been the third step in Brazil’s incremental regional policy. To create a 
geopolitical South American space was, again, a Brazilian effort to stabilise 
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its Andean neighbourhood, to protect its investments in the region and to 
create a bloc of countries balancing US interests and a power position in the 
region. Despite converging interests and sporadic conflicts, Brazil 
successfully pushed towards new items on Unasur’s agenda (among 
others, defence and security) and its institutionalisation by a treaty that was 
approved in 2008. Unasur is not Chávez’ but Lula’s ‘child’. South America 
as a common geopolitical space has been create by Brazil99 to stabilise its 
neighbours and to amplify its continental and global power.  
It is probably too early to predict that the Celac, launched in 2011, 
will become the fourth (and in any case less relevant) circle in Brazil’s 
regional policy. The future of Celac largely depends on the relationship 
between the two regional players, Brazil and Mexico. The rivalry between 
the countries and their diverging strategies of global assertion (Mexico by 
North-South and Brazil by South-South cooperation) still represent a major 
obstacle to regional cooperation and a result-oriented political dialogue. 
Nonetheless, the election of Enrique Peña Nieto as President of Mexico, 
who assumed the presidency in December 2012, could represent a shift in 
Mexico’s US-oriented foreign policy towards a more prominent role of 
Latin America and closer relations with Brazil.100 The latter would be an 
important step to consolidate Celac beyond Brazil and Venezuela’s power 
ambitions and ‘soft balancing’ strategies. 
The three platforms – Mercosur, Unasur and Celac – are part of a 
complex regional and continental puzzle heavily influenced by Brazil. 
While Mercosur serves to consolidate the alliance with Argentina and 
(more recently) Venezuela, South America is a label for political 
stabilisation and cohesion and Celac is designed as a forum (or future 
organisation) for regional influence and autonomy from the United States 
and, in political terms, a declining inter-American system based on the 
OAS. In this sense, and although it is not and will probably never become a 
Latin American OAS, the Celac is seen as a counter-weight to a declining 
inter-American system and a less hegemonic United States. Given its own 
power aspirations, Brazil’s interests in the inter-American system led by the 
OAS and dominated by the US are rather limited. But even so, up to now 
                                                     
99 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched the South American Summits in 
2000 in Brasilia.  
100 Susanne Gratius, “El nuevo sexenio en México y su relación (poco) estratégica 
con la UE”, FRIDE Policy Brief No. 84, FRIDE, September 2012. 
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Brasilia has not been able to create a regional organisation that could, even 
in the long run, replace the OAS’ sophisticated institutional structure, 
including its human rights system.101 Brazil’s regionalism is clearly limited 
to Latin America.  
There are still many open questions regarding Brazil’s leadership 
role. Although the country is a regional power by size and resources, it 
does not behave as a regional hegemon but often as a reluctant and 
sometimes even doubtful leader. Although it is the sixth-largest economy 
in the world, it does not assume the full costs of its prominent role in both 
regional economic integration and regional governance. Although BNDES 
has more resources to South American countries than the World Bank, it is 
nearly focused on domestic goals, and Brazil’s contribution to Mercosur´s 
Focem is rather limited and does not represent a substantial contribution to 
its neighbour’s development.  
Finally, Lula’s enthusiasm and proactive engagement for regional 
cooperation in a context of a booming economy and ideological affinities 
with the Latin American left has been replaced, under Dilma Rousseff, by a 
calculated mixed strategy of preserving self-interests and assuming a 
cautious leadership role in a less favourable economic environment. The 
latter means that it might be more difficult to justify the costs of a Brazilian 
leadership in Latin America to the domestic clientele. Closely related to 
that question, Brazil’s own economic performance (and particularly the 
costs of de-industrialisation and raw material exports) will also determine 
its role in the region. 
Can Brazil’s vision on regionalism converge with that of the EU?  
There is no easy answer to that question. Although both are strongly 
committed to regionalism, it is difficult to detect commonalities if we focus 
on the EU’s integration model and the scenario Brazil is building in South 
America with its neighbourhood policy.  
To begin with, both, Brazil and the EU share a regionalism of 
concentric circles, differentiating between various levels of cooperation. 
Nonetheless, in the case of the EU, there is a clear nucleus or hard-core of 
deeper integration represented by the Euro-Group. In the Americas, there 
is no clearly identifiable nucleus of more advanced regionalism but several 
                                                     
101 Including the General Assembly, the General Secretariat, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Juridical Committee. 
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overlapping or competing groups. While Brazil is the anchor of Mercosur 
and Unasur, its leadership role in Latin America and the Americas is much 
less defined, challenged by its neighbours (an example is the Pacific 
Alliance) and limited by the power position of the United States.  
With regards to the understanding of integration, unlike the EU, 
Brazil is less interested in the traditional model of economic integration 
with its neighbours than in creating a bloc of political influence in the South 
and, later, in Latin America. Moreover, integration in a European sense of 
pooling sovereignty has no future in a region where national sovereignty 
(given the long history of US interventions) still has a major appeal and 
institutions are less consolidated. Even worse, the asymmetries among the 
region’s countries are a strong obstacle for this kind of initiative. Thus, 
integration in South America has a different meaning than in the EU: it is 
strictly based on inter-governmental structure.  
The second distinction is Brazil’s strong universal vocation. While the 
EU concentrates on its neighbourhood policy and much less on the 
international stage, Brasilia seeks first of all a global role, and its regional 
policy is subordinated to this major goal. Today, not Mercosur but the 
BRICS group seems to be the main platform for Brazilian international 
actions.  
Beyond these general divergences, both, Brazil and the EU are strong 
advocates of regionalism, but do not share the same idea on what it means. 
Compared to the value-oriented construction of regionalism designed by 
the EU, Brazil’s neighbourhood policy is much more pragmatic and 
interest-driven. Given Brazil’s limited capacity to shoulder the costs of 
asymmetric integration, solidarity might be important but it does not seem 
to be a main characteristic of Brasilia’s vision of regionalism. Moreover, 
Brasilia advocates a regionalism as a strategy for its own economic and 
global performance and as an instrument for autonomy and ‘soft-
balancing’ towards the United States.  
Unlike the EU, Brazil does not propose a unique and highly 
sophisticated ‘model of integration’ but seeks to create different platforms 
for political dialogue and cooperation. The highly asymmetric character of 
relations between Brazil and its neighbours and the maintenance of 
national sovereignty explain why neither Brasilia nor other South 
American states propose to create supranational institutions, which have 
never been on the agenda. It is, therefore, useless to compare Mercosur 
CONTINENTAL REGIONALISM: BRAZIL’S PROMINENT ROLE IN THE AMERICAS | 235 
with the EU or to insist on concessions for (non-existing) supranational 
institutions by Brazil, as some academics do.102  
At best, Mercosur is an incomplete customs union, while Unasur 
represents a regional governance initiative in a geopolitical space and not 
an economic integration process. As a result, intra-bloc trade flows are less 
than 20% compared to more than half in the case of the EU. Although 
Mercosur’s structural fund Focem demonstrates that the EU and Brazil 
share the idea of compensating for imbalances, for domestic, institutional 
and other reasons, Brazil’s role as a regional paymaster is much more 
limited. It is important to stress that Brazil is only one nation state with 
high inequalities in its income distribution while the EU is, at least, an 
entity of states. Moreover, Brazil is not the economic anchor in South 
America, but, like other countries in the region, it depends heavily on 
external partners, mainly China, the United States and the EU. For these 
reasons, the level of regionalisation in South America is still low, compared 
to a higher profile of regionalism found in the EU, with increasing levels of 
political and cultural cohesion.  
Beyond these differences, similar to the Franco-German connection 
that is now dominated by Berlin, the tandem Argentina-Brazil has declined; 
the asymmetries between both countries are stronger and Brazil has a dual 
identity as a South American and BRICS country. On the other hand, the 
partnership between Brazil and Argentina has a specificity that bring it 
closer to the first circle of the EU’s regionalism: the relationship between 
both countries is no longer based on interactions between the foreign affairs 
ministries, but on direct relations between corresponding ministries of 
different areas. 
In spite of all differences, if we move to the EU and Brazil’s 
regionalism outside their borders it is possible to identify some 
commonalities. Firstly, both could collaborate to stabilise politically the 
regions around themselves and consolidate democratic regimes. The EU 
projects its own democratic political model externally while Brazil defends 
the consolidation of democratically elected governments in the region. Both 
Mercosur and Unasur have democratic clauses and during the 2000s, the 
non-intervention principle was replaced by the non-indifference precept 
                                                     
102 For a recent example, see Jean Daudelin “Brasil y la “desintegración” de 
América Latina”, Política Exterior 149, September/October 2012, pp. 50-57. 
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towards the neighbouring countries.103 Brazil acted together with Argentina 
to suspend Paraguay as well as identified its political crisis as a threat to 
the democratic regime. 
Secondly, Brazil and the EU act to protect their own investments in 
neighbouring countries and to consolidate an economic link between these 
countries and its economy – in the European case focusing on its economic 
model and, in the Brazilian, oriented to the country’s development. 
Both are living very different moments of history, however. The 
Brazilian rise and the relative decline of the EU may in some sense balance 
relations between the two partners, but this will not necessarily translate 
into a major convergence between them in terms of an integration model. 
As with many issues on the agenda, diverging perceptions on regionalism, 
but some similarities towards the countries outside their borders, reveal 
that Brazil and the EU share the values but not the goals and instruments. 
Brazil is a nation state trying to build something whereas the EU is a 
strange animal in between an international organisation and a 
supranational body. There is, therefore, a thin ground for cooperation that 
needs mutual comprehension, major internal adjustments and 
compromises by both sides but which can favour the creation of regional 
initiatives with different profiles.  
  
                                                     
103 In the words of Lula’s Minister Celso Amorim –“A política externa do governo 
Lula: os dois primeiros anos”, Análise de conjuntura OPSA No. 4, 
http://obsevatorio.iuperj.br/analises.php- “Brazil has always taken the stance of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States [...]. But non-intervention 
cannot mean a lack of interest. In other words, the precept of non-intervention 
should be seen in the light of another precept, based on solidarity: that of non-
indifference.” 
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EUROPE’S CONTINENTAL REGIONALISM 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews the multiple forms of European continental 
regionalism, which takes the overall shape of a complex set of concentric 
circles, with a substructure of a core group within the EU based on the euro 
and Schengen areas, and several rings of neighbours outside, including the 
European Economic Area, the regions of the EU’s neighbourhood policy 
and finally some pan-European organisations. While all world regions have 
their own unique features, the European case offers some important lessons 
that should be of interest to other world regions. The first is what appears 
to be a relatively robust model for single market integration. The second 
consists of the lessons currently being learned on the hazards of monetary 
integration without adequate fiscal and political integration. The third 
lesson is another warning, over the difficulties of anticipating the political 
dynamics of integration processes once set in motion, often described in 
Europe as a ‘journey to an unknown destination’. The fourth consists of the 
EU’s current efforts to develop a comprehensive neighbourhood policy, 
which is encountering difficult issues of matching ambitious objectives 
with incentives of adequate weight. Nevertheless, the policy sees a 
landscape of positive and constructive relations between the EU and its 
neighbours, in marked contrast to some ugly conflictual or coercive 
features seen in the cases of other continental hegemons – the three BRIC 
states of China, India and Russia, but not the fourth one, Brazil.  
Continental regionalism remains an inescapable feature of 
contemporary international relations. Factors of geography combined with 
elements of common history and culture make it so. It may be questioned 
whether the topic now slips into the background given the advance of 
globalisation, with new communication technologies favouring inter-
continental economic integration by cutting the costs of distance 
dramatically. However, the performance of global governance remains 
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unimpressive, and to take just one crucial example, that of trade, regional 
initiatives are clearly advancing more than global ones. In addition, the rise 
of multipolarity puts the spotlight on how the leading poles will behave in 
their regional neighbourhoods. The champions of multipolarity may have 
the capacity to act as regional hegemons, but this does not yet inform us 
how these actual or potential hegemons will deploy their power; soft, hard, 
medium or possibly not at all. 
This chapter reviews Europe’s ongoing experience with its 
continental regionalism, with a view to unveiling points of comparison 
with the Americas, and the role of Brazil as the leading regional power in 
South America, and one of the leaders in Latin America and the Americas 
as a whole. Brazilians and Europeans may reflect together on how to join in 
a global conversation on this topic with the world’s other continental 
regions, notably Africa and the several Asias, the South, South-East and 
East, each of which have populations comparable to or greater than Europe 
or the Americas. 
Once upon a time, several decades ago, the European-Latin American 
version of this topic had a rather simple format. The then European 
Community (EC) had launched a clear and comprehensive institutional 
structure for its own integration. This EC was developing its relations with 
Latin America, and in particular was keen to encourage Mercosur to 
develop as a regional integration organisation. Experts in European affairs 
frequented the capitals of Mercosur to explain how the EC worked.  
The story at the European end, however, has now also become a good 
deal more complicated and uncertain as regards its future. 
The paradigm of concentric circles – Part I (internal) 
The term concentric circles is currently being used in both Europe and 
Latin America. Europe’s concentric circles are numerous. 
While it is conventional to regard the EU as the centre that has 
arranged its neighbours in a set of concentric circles, the story has become 
more complicated within the EU itself. At the level of informal political 
discourse, there is talk of hard core and two-tier Europe, while at the 
formal level, the Schengen area and eurozone have permitted opt-outs for 
some old eurosceptic member states (the UK), or made inclusion for new 
member states dependent on conditions to be met after accession. The 
method of ‘enhanced cooperation’ has been written into the treaties, 
allowing for new initiatives to be taken by a substantial number of states, 
although this has been little used.  
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The hard core proposition has been aired for many years as a vague 
idea by those wishing the EU to advance to a fuller federal structure, with 
the presumption that the core group would be based on the original six 
member states, to be later joined by other member states to re-establish the 
unity of the EU in due course. However, this idea has stumbled with the 
division of inclinations between the open federalists (Germany, Belgium 
and Italy), versus France, which keeps a distance from the federal idea, 
while the Netherlands has been turning increasingly eurosceptic. France 
and the Netherlands notably tarnished their hard core reputations with 
negative referendum results over the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, but 
later acquiesced in the repackaging of most of its content in the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which was then again put into doubt by Ireland, which had to vote 
three times before ratifying successfully. 
All of the foregoing was part of the political landscape before the 
current eurozone crisis, but now the issues of who should be the centre or 
hard core, and with what political and institutional content, have been 
dramatically intensified. The brutal logic of financial markets has made 
Germany the undisputed hard core of the eurozone, and exposed further 
fault lines between eurozone states. The role of the Franco-German pair as 
joint hard core, as in the days when their leaders acted as if twins on the 
European stage has faded: Adenauer-De Gaulle, Schmidt-Giscard d’Estaing 
and Kohl-Mitterrand, followed less convincingly of late by Schroeder-
Chirac and Merkel-Sarkozy, and now with more explicit differences 
between Merkel and Hollande. But the new divisions have two cross-
cutting aspects, financial and political. Financially Germany is joined by the 
Netherlands, Finland and Austria as hard-line paymasters of the eurozone, 
whereas almost all of the ‘Club Med’ have become bail-out recipients 
(Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, together with Ireland) or likely recipients (Spain 
and Italy). This has led to an ominous rift in the psychological-sociological 
stereotypes depicted in the popular media between that of the north 
characterised as morally superior, thrifty and hard-working versus the 
lazy, corrupt, siesta-loving, early retirement-loving and deficit-loving 
south. These stereotypes are further mirrored in the southern media by 
images of diktat from Berlin, with the burning of German flags in the 
streets of Athens. These populist images are only half-truths if not outright 
lies, with the Irish and Spanish financial crises having been caused by 
mismanagement by the banks, including those of the north and their 
supervisors of the finances of the real estate sector. But they still have 
become important psycho-political realities, as warned by Mario Monti, 
who, when becoming Italian prime minister in 2011, define himself as a 
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‘very German’ economist. These popular stereotypes are reinforced by the 
long-standing fault lines in economic policy thinking between ‘monetarists’ 
and ‘economists’, or currently between ‘austerity’ versus ‘growth’, or since 
everyone favours growth and stability together, on how growth is to be 
boosted.  
At the political level, the debate rages on how the manifest systemic 
defects of the eurozone are to be mended. At the level of short hand, the 
argument now is that a sustainable economic and monetary union needs 
not only what the EU already has, namely a single market and common 
currency with a central bank, but also a banking union, a fiscal union and a 
political union. In essence the banking union would see a centralised bank 
regulatory and deposit insurance system, the fiscal union would involve 
some combination of central powers over budgets, mutualisation of public 
debts and a larger common budget, while political union would see some 
further steps towards federalisation. If these steps are taken, the 
fundamental structure of the EU will be reshaped, not excluding the 
possibility of secession by the UK, which might then join one of the external 
circles, although the present government’s preference is to negotiate the 
repatriation of various EU competences (i.e. more opt-outs) while 
remaining ‘in’ rather than ‘out’. 
The paradigm of concentric circles – Part II (external) 
Given the huge amount of political energies currently being consumed by 
these internal dramas, it might be supposed that little is left over for the 
complex set of external concentric circles seen in the EU’s external and 
neighbourhood policies. While the internal will surely affect the external in 
due course, for the time being foreign ministers continue to go about their 
business with their concentric circles as if as usual. 
First come the almost-member states, namely the three external 
members of the European Economic Area (EEA) – Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein – and as a special case Switzerland, which is almost an EEA 
member. These are states that have accepted the application of huge 
amounts of EU market law in exchange for their businesses and peoples 
being treated as if full members for the four freedoms of movement (goods, 
services, capital, people). These are states that wanted complete economic 
integration but could not accept the apparent loss of political sovereignty 
by acceding to the EU (although Iceland has now changed its mind, seeking 
full accession). So elaborate parallel structures have been created to manage 
the EEA, including a special court of justice to rule on disputes. All these 
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states have now also joined the Schengen area, which makes them in this 
respect more integrated than some EU member states. 
Second come the micro-states of the neighbourhood (Andorra, 
Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican), which are not big enough to warrant 
either EU or EEA membership, but are even more dependent on the EU 
economically, and are all part of the eurozone and Schengen areas as well 
as largely part of the single market. Most of these micro-states, together 
with the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, have developed important 
offshore financial markets, traditionally as tax havens, but are now 
increasingly constrained to accept the reach of EU financial and fiscal rules. 
There are points of comparison with the micro-states of the Caribbean here. 
Third come the accession candidates. This is where the EU’s 
regionalism is unique by comparison with the other continental regions, in 
having an explicit integration process for the accession of some of its 
neighbours, in principle any that are democratic, but realities are more 
discriminating (a point to which we return). The accession process amounts 
to the most extensive and intrusive exercise in political conditionality 
anywhere in the world. The candidate state has to submit to negotiations 
over 35 so-called ‘chapters’ that cover every sector of EU law, policies, and 
political norms, with the need not only to legislate conformity with the 
legendary 30,000 pages of EU law, but also to demonstrate their capacity to 
implement it.104 This method was worked out to manage the accession of 
the Central and East European states, with conditionality designed to 
ensure that the post-communist regimes were truly transformed in line 
with Western democratic standards. Some recently acceding member 
states, namely Bulgaria and Romania, were considered borderline cases, 
and so remained subject to special monitoring arrangements after 
accession.  
The ongoing accession process seems not (yet?) to be affected by the 
eurozone crisis. In the major case of Turkey, the accession negotiations 
were already at an impasse, while Iceland has recently and rapidly 
advanced as accession candidate.  
The full inclusion of the whole of the Balkans remains the political 
dogma. Croatia acceded in July 2013. The other Balkan states are at various 
                                                     
104 For a more detailed account, see M. Emerson, “Just Good Friends? The 
European Union’s Multiple Neighbourhood Policies”, The International Spectator, 
Vol. 46, No. 4, December 2011. 
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stages of the pre-accession process, and may be viewed as the fourth circle - 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, and with Kosovo 
bringing up the tail given its still unresolved status. However, in all these 
cases, the same 35-chapter structure of the accession negotiation process is 
followed in drawing up Stabilisation and Association Agreements. These 
are accompanied by the same regular reports by the Commission grading 
degrees of progress in accordance with EU law and standards, but with 
longer time horizons anticipated for full compliance. Financial assistance to 
the pre-accession Balkan states is substantial, somewhere between the 
member states and the official ‘neighbourhood’ states, to which we now 
turn. 
The fifth circle is that of the officially named European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is divided between the east and the 
south. To the east, six European former Soviet states, excluding Russia, are 
also grouped under the Eastern Partnership regional programme (from 
west to east: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan). To the south are the ten Mediterranean states, which share 
with the EU the Barcelona Process and Union for the Mediterranean (from 
west to east: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria).  
The historical narrative leading to today’s ENP tells us much about 
how the EU develops its policies. The accession of Spain and Portugal of 
1986 was the first trigger, the new member states wanting to develop 
relations with their southern Mediterranean neighbours. This led in 1995 to 
the Barcelona Process, which became a comprehensive regional-
multilateral framework for political and economic relations with the ten 
southern Mediterranean states, leading also to a set of Association 
Agreements and Free Trade Agreements with most of them. Meanwhile, in 
1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the negotiation of a Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia, which established a 
template used for further PCAs with all other former Soviet states, 
including those in Central Asia. Next, when the EU was on the verge of 
completing the accession of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 2000s, 
the concern became to avoid neglecting the ‘new neighbours’, leading to 
proposals for a ‘neighbourhood policy’ initially to target Belarus, Ukraine 
and Moldova. This led to a chain reaction, first with the addition of the 
three southern Caucasus states, and then also to the southern 
Mediterranean neighbours via the argument from the southern EU member 
states that any new advantage offered to the eastern neighbours should be 
extended also to the south. This led to a confusing overlay of the ENP on 
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top of the Barcelona Process, which only Brussels cognoscenti really 
understand. 
The working method of the ENP launched in 2005 for both east and 
south was based on a set of bilateral Action Plans, designed by the 
European Commission and bearing a strong resemblance to most of the 35 
chapters of the accession process, even though membership prospects were 
excluded – hence the unofficial ‘enlargement-light’ expression. When the 
Commission had to make up its mind what to do, it extrapolated its own 
internal working method and toolkit of norms, laws and instruments, 
without clearly marking out how far this EU acquis should be diluted or 
selectively applied to the neighbours. On the contrary, the doctrine was 
that the most advanced neighbours should be invited to adopt the 
maximum amount of the acquis: “everything but the institutions” was an 
expression used by Romano Prodi when he was President of the 
Commission. The ENP launch also coincided in its timing, and was 
encouraged by the outbreak of, the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe; 
Rose in Georgia and Orange in Ukraine. 
The next round in the EU’s north-south dialectics began when 
Nicholas Sarkozy became President of France in 2007, immediately 
announcing his intention to overtake the politically disappointing 
Barcelona Process and ENP with a new Union of the Mediterranean (UfM) 
that would bring together only the Mediterranean states of the EU and the 
south. This wild initiative, obviously not well thought through, hit a brick 
wall in Berlin, which was not ready to relinquish the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy to the southern member states. The proposal was quickly 
repackaged to become a further layer to the EU’s Mediterranean policy, 
leaving many observers rather mystified as to how it related to the 
Barcelona Process and the ENP. Technically its specificity is to promote 
major regional projects, with the aid of a secretariat in Barcelona, and a 
summit process initially jointly presided over by north and south in the 
persons of the then President Sarkozy and the then President Mubarak. 
Sarkozy’s political idea here was that this would be welcomed as a new 
equality in the relationship, notwithstanding Mubarak’s repressively 
undemocratic regime (we come to the end of Mubarak and the Arab 
uprising in a moment).  
However, the next move was when the north returned in 2009 to the 
battle to keep the north-south balance unimpaired, with Poland and 
Sweden launching the Eastern Partnership as a fresh overlay on top of the 
eastern branch of the ENP. The substance behind this was not very 
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apparent beyond a wish to do ‘more’, and so the Commission was 
instructed to find some ideas to put behind this. Poland and Sweden would 
like Ukraine to be offered a membership perspective, but this is a non-
starter for some other member states. The rationale found by the 
Commission was to complement the bilateralism of the ENP Action Plans 
with a regional-multilateral dimension, which was duly called the Eastern 
Partnership. This fitted into a rather tortured logic with what had already 
emerged for the Mediterranean, since the Barcelona Process, re-baptised 
‘Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean’, is essentially regional-
multilateral, whereas the ENP is essentially bilateral. 
The latest round in neighbourhood dynamics is the Arab uprising 
starting in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011. At the time of writing it is 
unclear where this indisputable turning point in Arab history is leading, 
with a wide array of conceivable regime scenarios – real democracy, 
modest democratic evolution, revolutionary chaos, failed state, military 
regime, renewed authoritarianism, Islamic state, etc. What is clear is that it 
has shaken up thinking in the EU about its neighbourhood policy. The 
former complicity of the EU, and especially Mediterranean member states 
such as France, Italy and Spain, with the former authoritarian regimes of 
North Africa in the supposed interests of security and stability has been 
completely discredited along with the EU’s disregard in practice for the 
democratic values supposed to be underlying the ENP. The Commission 
and High Representative hurried into completing a review of the ENP, 
giving renewed emphasis to what they now call ‘deep democracy’.  
The core economic objective of the ENP is to negotiate ‘deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements’ (DCFTAs), for which negotiations 
have been concluded with Ukraine, but signature has been delayed because 
of the EU’s discontent with the politics of President Yanukovic, and in 
particular the imprisonment of his political rival, Yulia Timoshenko. 
DCFTA negotiations have also advanced with Moldova, Armenia and 
Georgia, but only after these countries had satisfied a heavy set of pre-
conditions from the Commission’s trade policy department. These pre-
conditions have been criticised for demanding too onerous a degree of 
compliance with EU internal market regulations for these neighbouring 
states that are not granted membership perspectives.105  
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In response to the Arab uprising, there is a new stress on democracy, 
conditionality and increased financial assistance from the EU, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The open question is whether this can have real 
impact on the tumultuous political dynamics of these states. On its own, 
the EU has incentives of limited magnitude to offer alongside the enormity 
of the political struggles going on in the Arab states. It is not alone, 
however, and there is the obvious case for coherent and mutually 
reinforcing actions by the EU, US, World Bank and IMF together. The EU 
regards the Obama administration as a congenial partner at the level of 
doctrine, and the EU is working closely with the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) in any case in its neighbourhood.  
The competing hegemons 
The EU invited Russia to join in the ENP, but it refused to be grouped with 
the EU’s other ‘neighbours’ among the former Soviet states, which are the 
target of its own continental regionalism. Russia as a global power with G8 
and BRIC membership, has been willing to have a Strategic Partnership ‘of 
equals’ with the EU. There is no hegemon-periphery relationship at the 
geo-political level here. On the contrary, this becomes a tale of two 
competing hegemons in the same continent, diluted however with an 
overlay of pan-European organisations.  
The EU-Russia relationship has been struggling for 20 years to find a 
comfortable equilibrium point, without really succeeding, but without 
disastrous conflict either. The two parties are totally different animals geo-
politically: the EU is a complex, horizontal, normative civilian power 
structure devoid of military strength, while Russia under Putin has seen the 
restoration of a ‘verticality of power’ with its huge territorial Eurasian 
space, UN Security Council status, nuclear hardware and energy resources 
and its claim to great power status. The EU tries to draw Russia into its 
usual packages of norms and standards, ranging from the political to the 
technical. One Russia political discourse, especially Putin’s, is that it does 
not need to import anybody else’s norms, since Russia as a great power has 
its own. Yet the realities are more complex, with the manifest pressures 
within Russia for more democracy and a better rule of law. Medvedev, 
when President, pushed a ‘modernisation’ agenda both domestically and 
for relations with the EU, following Russia’s long history of aspirations 
towards its European identity. There is a glaring contradiction in 
contemporary Russian politics between the ruling elite’s hunger for 
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restored geo-political power and the increasing demands of society for a 
‘normal European life’ and their disinterest in geo-politics.  
Putin, however, now re-elected President, has announced priority for 
building up his pet project of a Eurasian Union, which does not yet exist, 
but for which a start has been made with a customs union into which 
Russia has so far drawn only Belarus and Kazakhstan, with ambitions for 
deepening with a single market and widening with further members. The 
project mimics various features of the EU, creating a ‘Commission’ with 
‘Commissioners’, who are tasked with developing the enterprise. The 
unanswered question is whether this project can progress where the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. The major target is to 
draw Ukraine into the customs union and thence into the Eurasian Union, 
which Ukraine has so far rejected, since it would mean scrapping the 
DCFTA agreement with the EU and its broader European aspirations, and 
implies outright strategic competition over the same overlapping 
neighbourhood. Russia is willing to put serious money into the project, 
having already bailed out Belarus and made some significant loans to 
Ukraine. It woos Moldova, trying to factor into the process its hold over 
Transnistria, although Moldova currently prioritises its EU relationship, 
and of the three South Caucasus countries it succeeded in September 2013 
to persuade Armenia to join the customs union. Otherwise its enlargement 
prospects focus on Kyrgizstan and Tajikistan, the two smallest and weakest 
states of Central Asia. Russia hardly advances any normative basis for its 
neighbourhood policy beyond lip service to political non-interference, 
while in practice engaging intermittently in, or threatening coercive acts 
towards its neighbours, the most extreme example having been the war 
with Georgia in 2008. In August 2012 there emerged quite precise 
information on how the 2008 invasion of Georgia had been planned in 
advance, and how Putin’s ‘decisiveness’ had been blocked for a few days 
by Medvedev’s ‘indecisiveness’.  
Central Asia sees another theatre of overlapping neighbourhood 
policies, with Russia having made a concordat with China over their joint 
leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is a 
loose framework legitimising China’s hugely expansive economic role in 
Central Asia, with major transport and other infrastructure developments 
supported from the Asian Development Bank. China clearly won the 
competition with Russia over the development of Turkmenistan’s gas 
exports, constructing an overland pipeline crossing other Central Asian 
states. On the other hand, the consensus between China and Russia on the 
normative doctrine of political non-interference flies very well with Central 
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Asia’s autocracies, in clear contradiction with the EU’s Central Asian 
‘strategy’ that gives prominence to human rights. 
Pan-European multilateralism 
There are three significant institutions reflecting the long-standing and 
persistent case for an all-inclusive ‘one Europe’, which of course is the 
antithesis to the competing neighbourhood policies of the EU and Russia. 
The oldest is the Council of Europe, founded in 1948, whose core functions 
are the codification and protection of human rights enforced by the 
European Court of Human Rights, and broader and looser democracy 
promotion activity. Upon the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-91, all of 
the European states of the former Soviet bloc acceded. The second is the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose core 
function has been the codification of security norms in the basic principles 
of the Helsinki Founding Act of 1975, which from the beginning included 
all of Europe and the United States, and with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was expanded to include all the newly independent states, including 
the five Central Asians. The third is the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), founded in 1994 in order to help establish sound 
private-sector governance in the former communist states of the Soviet 
bloc.  
The key point about all three is that they define and embody the 
norms of modern Europe – respectively in the political, security and 
economic domains. From the EU’s standpoint, they are unambiguously 
reinforcing its objectives for the wider European space. From Russia’s 
standpoint they are all about the tensions and ambiguities in its present 
political and economic condition, fitting well with the views of Russia’s 
modernisers, but running into conflict with conservative and authoritarian 
forces. In these circumstances the three organisations could hardly become 
very powerful, yet their degree of effectiveness differs. The OSCE has been 
sidelined by Russia, and is reduced to token activity, or frustrated attempts 
at conflict resolution. The EBRD has found a respected niche role in all 
post-communist states in helping insert sound corporate governance into 
the projects it funds. At the European Court of Human Rights more cases 
are brought against Russia than any other member state, yet Russia has 
respected its rulings and not walked out, and the role of the Court is 
important for Russian human rights activists. 
The human rights field makes for an interesting comparison between 
Europe and the Americas – i.e. between the European Convention for 
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Human Rights and its Court under the aegis of the Council of Europe on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the Inter-American Convention for Human 
Rights and its Court under the aegis of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS). While the two Conventions and Courts have much in common, the 
major difference is that the United States as regional hegemon has 
undermined the Inter-American Convention and Court by refusing to ratify 
the Convention and accept the jurisdiction of the Court for its own affairs. 
The EU member states, for their part, are fully bound by the European 
Convention and Court. Now, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU itself, as 
regional hegemon, has acceded to the Convention for its own policies and 
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court. As a result it is not so surprising that 
the Inter-American Convention and Court are subject to serious attempts 
by left-leaning Latin American states led by Venezuela (the ‘Alba’ 
countries) to undermine their functions, and Brazil has contested a Court 
ruling to the point of withdrawing in 2011 and not replacing its 
ambassador to the OAS.  
To complete this already complex landscape we should not forget 
NATO as the main pillar of the trans-Atlantic alliance, also located in 
Brussels, and whose European membership has enlarged alongside that of 
the EU. And there is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), born out of the post-war Marshall Plan, originally as 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), but which 
has gradually metamorphosed from an essentially European project into a 
global club of the world’s advanced economies.  
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Conclusions: The relevance of European experiences and lessons 
learned 
Prompted by the euro crisis, the declining weight of the EU in the world 
economy and rising euroscepticism, one frequently hears comments these 
days about the demise of the European model or its irrelevance for other 
continents. Taking a different view, one can identify several features of the 
European experience (rather than any single model) of recent decades that 
amount to a pertinent set of lessons that other world regions may usefully 
take note of.  
The first experience has been that of market integration for the four 
freedoms – goods, services, labour and capital, completed under the single 
market programme that advanced decisively in 1992, and now still 
advances an increasingly wide and complex process of regulatory 
integration. The lesson that the EU learned several decades ago is that deep 
market integration requires a strong institutional and legal structure – 
legislature, executive and court of justice. Overall, the EU’s experience here 
is looking like a quite robust model. It is particularly beneficial for 
economies that develop deep intra-industry trade and investment 
integration. It is therefore quite plausible that the ASEAN countries are 
now replicating much of this model in their 2015 ASEAN Economic 
Community project. By contrast, South America has divided between the 
Mercosur and more Pacific-oriented Andean states.  
The second experience of the EU has been that of adding the 
monetary union to the single market. The economic logic of this sequencing 
is also robust. As market integration deepens the costs of exchange rate 
uncertainty and instability increase. But the creators of the euro took the 
big risk of doing this with just an excellent, independent, ‘federal’ central 
bank. The monetary supervisory regime and above all the public finance 
system were left in a largely pre-federal state, relying on the member states 
to respect common budget rules while retaining their essential sovereignty 
over the budgetary instruments. The current euro crisis has shown that to 
have taken this politically attractive risk was a big mistake. The eurozone is 
now trying to build up adequate features of a banking union, fiscal union 
and political union. The lesson painfully learned, and now kindly offered 
to other continents, is not to make easy commitments to monetary union 
unless the parties truly accept the huge political implications, which 
obviously no other world continent is currently ready for. (Simple 
monetary union between an undisputed hegemon and small peripheral 
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units is a well-tested formula, but not a model for less asymmetric 
groupings of states).  
The third experience is indeed that of political integration. 
Contemporary Europe is quite post-modern in the sense that the 
Westphalian state model is now greatly diluted by both sub-state 
regionalism and supranationalism, translating into complex three-level 
power structures (regional, national, European), matched by an increasing 
degree of three-level identities perceived by citizens. These features of 
contemporary Europe appear to be both deeply rooted, yet also still of 
uncertain stability. The euro crisis pushes functionally for more euro-
federalism, which Germany, Italy, Belgium and some others support. But 
this encounters a divide not only with the eurosceptic British, but also 
political resistance among some of the committed Europeans, notably 
France. This is the current illustration of the old saying that “Europe is a 
journey to an unknown destination”. It is also a cautionary tale for other 
continents espousing ‘integration’. What does one mean by this? How far 
can one anticipate its dynamics? These are terribly difficult questions, even 
for a Europe of unquestionable commitment to common democratic values; 
how much more so for other continents with greater political heterogeneity. 
The fourth experience is about the EU’s projection of its norms and 
standards into its wider neighbourhood in Eastern Europe and the 
southern Mediterranean. Europe today may be both post-modern and post-
colonial, but it is not entirely unfounded for critics to say that it is also 
softly neo-colonial in its promotion of democracy and free trade based on 
its market regulations. The EU’s enthusiasm for spreading this gospel bears 
some comparison with Europe’s self-appointed ‘civilising mission’ in the 
19th and earlier centuries, for which a British governor of Hong Kong once 
famously said that Christianity and free trade were two sides of the same 
coin (now just substitute democracy for Christianity). In developing the 
current outreach of its norms and standards into its neighbourhood, the EU 
has been profoundly influenced by the historic transformation, both 
political and economic, of the formerly communist states of Central Europe 
as they acceded to the EU. This transformative experience encouraged the 
EU to try for the same results through what has been unofficially called an 
‘enlargement-lite’ neighbourhood policy, i.e. using the same norms and 
political conditionalities, but without the incentive of accession to 
membership. The disproportion between objectives and incentives is 
dramatically illustrated in the revolutionary turmoil of the Arab spring, 
inducing the EU now into advocating ‘deep democracy’ in the region, 
whereas the post-revolutionary outcomes there offer the widest of 
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conceivable scenarios, including the failed state, the radical Islamist state, 
renewed authoritarianism as well as democratic progress.  
In promoting all-European democracy, the EU has placed itself in 
outright political competition with Russia, which promotes a more clearly 
neo-imperial and somewhat coercive club of non-democracies called the 
Eurasian Union, while still bizarrely mimicking the EU’s institutional 
structure to support its new customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Europe has also some relatively weak or narrowly specialised pan-
European norm-setting organisations (Council of Europe, OSCE, EBRD), 
which nonetheless have value in bringing together otherwise 
heterogeneous neighbours, facilitating a long and slow process of 
normative convergence, and at least softening the conflict of values 
between the EU and Russia. The role of these organisations may in some 
cases be compared with analogous organisations in the Americas, notably 
in the human rights field, where formal structures are rather similar, but 
the effectiveness of the inter-American system seems to be relatively weak 
and contested. Like Europe, the Americas also have the complications of 
two leading powers, Brazil and the US with overlapping neighbourhood 
policies, with some geopolitical tensions between the two but perhaps with 
lesser degrees of political divergence compared to the case of the EU and 
Russia.  
Despite its complexities, limitations and internal crises, the EU has 
fashioned relatively positive relationships with its neighbours, compared to 
some other continental regions. The EU’s relations with virtually all of its 
neighbours are constructive and substantial, and devoid of ugly coercive 
aspects or hard security threats, which may be true of Brazil also, but not of 
China, India or Russia.  
Of course there are unique features to the European experience. The 
huge political investment in supranational institutions and law was only 
possible as a result of the trauma of two world wars, the extraordinary 
post-war reconciliation of historical enemies and the consensus in favour of 
democracy following the disasters of fascism. While these conditions are 
not replicated elsewhere, Japan, China and Korea still now have reason to 
reflect together on the way in which Germany succeeded in its 
reconciliation with France and the rest of Europe. On the other hand, for 
South or Latin America the preconditions for integration would seem in 
principle to be relatively favourable, given their geographical unity and 
common history, culture and sense of identity. These advantages are just 
waiting to be exploited.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACAA Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of 
Industrial Products 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations 
ASEAN+3 ASEAN region, plus Japan, South Korea and China 
ASEM Asia Europe Meeting 
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BRICS less Russia) 
BAU Business as Usual 
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
BRL Brazilian real 
CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
CCAP Center for Clean Air Policy 
CCNF Climate Change National Fund 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CELAC Community of Latin America and Caribbean States 
CEPI Confederation of European Paper Industries 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CGER Consultative Group on Exchange Rates 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
DCFTAs deep and comprehensive free trade agreements 
EBA External Balance Assessment 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEA European Environment Agency 
EIB European Investment Bank 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
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ESM European Stability Mechanism 
ESS European Security Strategy 
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme 
EUAs EU allowances 
EUMS EU member states  
FA Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 
FDI foreign direct investment 
FGV Getulio Vargas Foundation 
Focem Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
IBSA India, Brazil and South Africa 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IFIs international financial institutions 
IIP international investment position 
IIRSA Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America 
IMFC International Monetary and Financial Committee 
INPE Institute of Space Research 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
JI Joint Implementation 
LAC Latin America 
MDIC Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio 
Exterior 
Mercosur Common Market of the South (Spanish) 
Mercosul Common Market of the South (Portuguese) 
MEU Mercosur-EU 
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
NAMA nationally appropriate mitigation action 
OAS Organisation of American States 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
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OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PTA preferential trade agreement 
QE quantitative easing 
QELRO Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objective 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemical Substances 
REDD+ Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation  
RwP Responsibility while Protecting  
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SDR Special Drawing Rights 
SET-Plan Strategic Energy Technology Plan 
SLCPs short-lived climate pollutants 
SNEIC Second National Emissions Inventory Communication 
SPS Sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
TIVA trade in value-added 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UfM Union of the Mediterranean 
UNASUL Union of South American Nations 
Unasur Union of South American Nations 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USTR United States Trade Representative 
WGTDF Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance 
WMO World Meteorological Organization 
